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9Executing Practices 
Helen Pritchard, Eric Snodgrass, Magdalena Tyz˙lik-Carver
Towards the end of a keynote address on “Theory and Practice” 
presented in 1989 at the 11th  World Computer Congress, the well-
known computer scientist and mathematician Donald Knuth suggests  
a challenge to his audience. 
Make a thorough analysis of everything your computer does 
during one second of computation. The computer will execute 
several hundred thousand instructions during that second;  
I’d like you to study them all. (Knuth [1989] 1991, 12 –13) 
There is an expectation that comes from a technical understanding  
of execution that it is a straightforward running of a task. For instance, 
in computing, execution is often associated specifically with the 
fetch–decode–execute instruction cycle, during which a computer’s 
central processing unit (CPU) retrieves instructions from its memory, 
determines what actions the instructions dictate and proceeds to 
carry out those actions. But of course the instruction cycle does not 
encompass execution’s impact and embeddedness in the world, and 
it is this that contributors to this book elaborate and expand upon 
critically. As Knuth notes, “[e]ven when the machine’s instructions  
are known, there will be problems” (13). 
 Contained in every “blip” of execution is a range of technical  
and cultural issues to be addressed, with one operational experience 
of executing practices opening onto another (Fuller 2003).1 Executing 
Practices brings attention to what Isabelle Stengers (2005) describes 
as the particular demands of practices that propel execution. Practices 
are parsed as processes by which execution stabilises and takes hold 
in the world (Stengers, in Gabrys 2016, 9). Rather than considering 
the stability of execution as the norm, which we might approach with 
dystopic or paranoid dread, the authors in the book engage with and 
make interventions on the problems of execution. 
 Executing Practices alerts us that access to instructions that drive 
execution is only one account, and even then, our understanding of 
execution might always remain partial and speculative. If we approach 
Knuth’s challenge through an engagement with practices, it becomes 
apparent that processes of computation have particular obligations 
that infringe upon those who practise or are affected by it. Through 
geographic, temporal and material specificity the chapters attend  
both to the practices of execution and their differing research 
practices. The focus is on complexities inherent to different forms of 
execution, while also recognising an understanding of execution as 
a performance of step-by-step instructions. The outcome of this is a 
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collection of research practices that intervene in executing processes 
at differing points and locations to engage with the most important 
aspect of Knuth’s challenge—the problems of execution. 
“Uwaga … Start!!”:  Experiences of Execution 
The practices of the women who devised and implemented the pro-
gramming for ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer) 
in the 1940s might offer a useful orientation when addressing Knuth’s 
challenge. If we consider one second of computing in this example it 
becomes clear that it is not just algorithmic calculations that have to be 
attended to but also women setting values, connecting switches and 
wiring cables and plugs between different parts of the machine (what 
is now referred to as “direct programming”). At a time when there was 
no computer language and no operating system as such, “the women 
had to figure out what a computer was, how to interface with it, and 
then break down a complicated mathematical problem into very small 
steps that the ENIAC could then perform” (Kathy Kleinman, in Shep-
pard 2013; see also Chun 2004, Hayles 2005, Balsamo 1996). The work-
ing system which supported their invention of coding, with its various 
hierarchies and divisions of labour, was described by Jean Jennings, 
one of the ENIAC operators, in the following way: 
Betty and I were the workhorses, finishers, tying up all the  
loose ends. Kay was often more creative, suggesting clever ways 
to reduce total size of the program. Marlyn and Ruth agreed 
to generate a test trajectory, calculating it exactly the way 
the ENIAC was to do it so we could check the detailed steps 
once it was on the ENIAC. We spent a lot of time working on 
programming notation so we could keep track of the  
timing of program pulses and digital operations. The ENIAC  
was a parallel machine, so the programmer had to keep track  
of everything, whether interdependent or independent. 
(Jennings, in Fritz 1996, 20) 
Computing here, as well as being a physical execution of calculations 
that require wiring by hand, is also a task of military labour which is 
divided according to skills that demand an intimate understanding 
of the machine and processes required to run it. Situating ENIAC’s 
practices is also important. ENIAC was initially sponsored by the US 
military as a general-purpose electronic computer for calculating 
artillery-firing tables (the settings used for different weapons under 
varied conditions for target accuracy), and later for other tasks such 
as numerical weather prediction and the working out of implosion 
problems relating to the ongoing development of the hydrogen 
bomb. In this account of computational practices, the problems of 
execution are historically situated and entangled with the contingent 
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forces of machines, bodies, institutions, military labour practices and 
geopolitics, rather than simply a set of instructions that are outside  
of life. 
 Another example that highlights differing experiences of 
execution is the idiosyncratic coding practice of Radiokomputer that 
developed in Poland in the late 1980s. Radiokomputer illustrates the 
distributed relations to be taken into account when thinking about 
execution and how execution might be experienced. Radiokomputer 2 
was a radio programme broadcast on Polish National Radio between 
1986 and the early 1990s, transmitting via shortwave frequencies 
computer programs and games for early home computers such as 
Atari, ZX-Spectrum and Commodore 64. A similar distribution of music 
via radio was commonly practiced for most of the 1980s, when radio 
presenters would broadcast boths sides of vinyl LPs delivered or 
smuggled to Poland from West Europe. Political restrictions on culture 
and commerce at the time influenced and generated particular ways of 
sharing foreign pop culture. It is not surprising that this model was also 
used for distributing computer programs, which were radiocast for the 
listeners to record onto a cassette tape. At 4pm on Fridays after a brief 
introduction, the radio presenter would announce the transmission 
with a warning to listeners: “Uwaga … Start!!” which would mark a 
moment to press the record button on a tape recorder, after which a 
nationwide broadcast of noise would follow. As one of the programme 
listeners recalls, Spectrum sounds would differ from Atari, and 
Commodore would also sound recognisably different.3 Unfortunately, 
this cacophony of sounds would not always deliver, as any interference 
in radio waves could corrupt the program. According to computer 
users at the time, there was an estimated 70% success rate for this 
form of program recording, with Atari being the most amenable to this 
method and Spectrum being least open to it. To aid the process, the 
radio presenter wrote an article advising the best recording practice, 
which was then published in Bajtek, a monthly journal dedicated to 
computers and related technologies (for more details, see Jordan 
1986). The articles included step-by-step instructions, with information 
about what hardware to use (Polish cassettes produced by Stilon were 
not recommended because of the low level of iron necessary for better 
quality of recording) and how to set up for best results (including  
the advice to turn off all unnecessary electrical devices in the house, 
such as washing machines, hoovers, etc.). 
 Practices such as these highlight what are perhaps less familiar 
experiences of computing. In Radiokomputer, the socio-political 
situation and lack of copyright laws regarding software in Poland at 
the time generated a practice of national broadcast radio for free 
transmission of code. On Friday afternoons, as long as the radio was 
EXECUTING PRACTICES
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tuned to the right station, it was possible to listen to code and hear 
its crackling noises while attempting to record it so that it could 
be executed again as a game. This example is another instance of 
an executing practice which, together with the example of ENIAC, 
points to localised and physical experiences of code. A multiplicity 
of relations are highlighted in such executions, which, as well as 
including hardware and software, are also dependent on laws, cables, 
the electromagnetic spectrum, minerals, histories, gender relations, 
economies and so on. Issues of maintenance and instantaneous 
debugging are at the very centre of this form of code writing, 
inscribing computational ecologies as unexpected systems that are 
as temporary as they are concrete in the moment of their execution. 
And so investigations of execution pay attention to which stories of 
execution we choose to tell and which are forgotten in the history  
of software. 
 Where should we conclude this readily sprawling task of 
practicing and working through execution as inquiry? This is a key 
question, and as contributions to this volume suggest, whilst accounts 
might reveal the terminal character of computation, there is no end 
to such investigations. For instance, Knuth’s challenge could be 
considered to be a practical study in which one remains within the 
physical confines of the machine itself: a world of circuitry-registers, 
operational codes, scan codes, glyph selections, screen renderings, 
non-keyboard inputs and the like. In addition, this “your computer” 
is itself connected to the distributed services of the Internet, subject 
to and executing within “local” and “global” experiences of packet 
switching, resolutions of internet protocols, scripts, multiple caches 
and loads, and so on. And what then of the busy electrons and swerving 
atoms charging the “bare metal” and flowing onwards within greater 
infrastructures of electricity, optical fibre, manufacturing and so on? 
And what of the different collective entities and bodies that necessarily 
act as transducers for such energies? Knuth’s problem opens further 
still and in come the uninvited guests of perspectivalism, political 
economy and the general meshed nature of the world. In the meantime, 
the complexity and amount of actions performed by a typical computer 
have increased exponentially. As one commenter on a Hacker News 
thread replied to the question of what happens when you type  
Google.com into your browser and press enter? “Somebody also needs 
to talk about what’s happening in the CPUs, with 3 billion or so instruc-
tions per CPU core every second, all devoted to looking up a cat  
video for you. When you play a cat video, more computation occurs 
than was done in the history of the world prior to 1940” (Animats 2015). 
 Beyond standard attempts aimed at unpacking discrete instances 
of execution — typically carried out with the intention of optimising  
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the executing processes involved — the notion of tracking execution 
and its many shifting parts over a particular instance of time has 
produced a variety of responses on the part of practitioners and artists. 
In Diff in June (2013), artist Martin Howse uses a small bit of custom 
script to track whenever a bit of data is changed between one day 
and the next within the file system of an IBM x60 machine. Running 
the script results in a 1,673 page transcript that creates a narrative of 
“a day in the life of a personal computer written by itself in its own 
language, as a sort of private log or intimate diary focused on every 
single change to the data on its hard disk” (Howse 2013). In this book, 
David Gauthier’s contribution Loading … 800% Slower enacts a method 
of détournement that willfully slows down the bitrate of an internet 
connection, making audible the many “timely designed assaults” of 
the invisible scripts involved in composing a particular web page. 
Magdalena Tyz˙lik-Carver and Andrew Prior assemble code, interface, 
texts and sound in a Ghost Factory experiment that makes recursivity 
available to participating bodies, whether human or not. Elsewhere, 
the excessive character of execution as a form of eroticism is hacked 
by Marcelle, a pair of white cotton briefs equipped with vibrators 
that respond to surrounding WiFi networks. An intervention by Marie 
Louise Søndergaard which, as further discussed in her joint article 
with Kasper Hedegård Schiølin, functions as a conceptual tool that 
posits eroticism as “an inherent aspect of computational culture and 
history”. Meanwhile, Olle Essvik investigates execution as a practice of 
bookbinding that incorporates book-end papers bought at an auction 
in Sweden. In the process he explores random noise generation and 
“chance executions” by referencing situated material histories whose 
traces are found on the purchased papers and then performed in the 
making of the book. Such methods and their often performative modes 
of “parasitic rendering” (Gauthier) bring to the fore inflecting and 
productive relations of even the most minor executing procedures. 
 The contributors to this collection account for both the practical 
specificities of computing and a range of matters both very close to 
and also, seemingly, very far from the machine itself. In particular, 
the book presents why, and in which ways thinking through a notion 
of execution can be useful. Each piece in the book provides its own 
response. Some work towards defining a particular mode or process 
of execution, and others use execution as a concept through which to 
study a variety of issues and their relations to one another. As writers 
such as Karen Barad (2007) make clear, the path towards answering 
a question such as Knuth’s will say much about the ontologies, 
epistemologies and various ensembles of objects and entities brought 
together in answering it. It is because of this complex character of 
computation that questions such as Knuth’s are commonly brought 
EXECUTING PRACTICES
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up during job interviews in computing and related fields. Ask a Java 
programmer what they understand execution to mean and you will 
likely get a rather different answer to that of someone involved with 
physical computing or a researcher working within the fields of 
queer theory or software studies. Such accounts of execution point 
to complex relations that are highlighted in practices, opening up an 
understanding of execution to its different experiences. 
 While each contribution in the book covers differing experiences 
of execution, we will highlight a few tentative themes shared by many 
of the chapters. The intention is not to categorise the contributions or 
map out a definitive set of themes, but rather to give a sense of some of 
the directions which working through a notion of execution takes us. 
Executing Temporalities 
Today it is no longer a couple of hundred thousand instructions 
executing per second (as Knuth suggests in 1989), but rather an accel-
erating number of potential instructions at any one time. One practical 
way in which to deal with Knuth’s suggestion on the typically much 
faster machines of the present would be to cut a single second into a 
more manageable unit of time: perhaps a nanosecond (one billionth 
of one second), the time it typically takes to execute one machine 
cycle on a 1 GHz microprocessor. If we take computational time to be 
linear — in the way that Knuth’s challenge might suggest — the focus 
is on that moment in read-write culture where the computer program 
“does what it says”. Execution is often considered as a culminating 
step in writing a program, yet at the same time it is but a split moment 
in computer time: a second that is instantaneous with another second, 
and another and so on. 
 As Winnie Soon’s and Brian House’s essays in this book both  
argue, computation depends upon increasingly brief and strictly 
maintained micro-temporalities, in which the maintaining of a 
consistency in signal processing is essential for the establishing of 
clock cycles, both in local and more global instances of computation. 
Thus, as House’s essay explains, Google Spanner’s “TrueTime” 
Application Programming Interface (API) is a practical method for 
synchronising the executing uncertainties of individual computer 
time in relation to the various needs of Google’s globally networked 
systems. Nevertheless, like the many timekeeping strategies  
before it, in the process of doing so, Google Spanner inevitably has  
a direct role in establishing various forms of “micro-experiences” 
for the many users that come within its sweep (House). Soon traces 
this micro-temporality of computers and the network back from the 
planetary scale to the rather more mundane instance of a “throbber”, 
those pulsating images of spinning wheels that for Internet users 
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signify a time of waiting for a stream of information to resolve itself. 
As Soon explains: “a throbber icon acts as an interface between 
computational processes and visual communication”, thus echoing 
Wendy Chun’s well-known statement that software creates an invisible 
system of visibility by obfuscating certain structures while revealing 
others (2004, 27). In this sense, the throbber can be understood as 
an obfuscation of the necessarily discontinuous executing processes 
of discrete computing, replacing the asynchronous and uncertain 
clockworks of these tasks with an intentionally smoothed-out visual 
presentation of the network. Thus a throbber, like Google Spanner’s 
TrueTime, is itself yet another cultural and computational practice that 
plays a role in “constantly rendering the pervasive and networked 
conditions of the now” (Soon). 
 In his preface to this book, Yuk Hui notes that “[e]xecution is 
always teleological because to execute means to carry out something 
which is already anticipated before the action”. Any particular telos 
can be reached according to different methods, each with their own 
temporalities and often isometric worldviews. Hui traces the way 
in which a largely linear temporality with predefined sequential 
procedures and relative logical certainty—such as one finds in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century forms of mechanisation—represents 
both an intuitive and simple method of application in executing 
procedures. At the same time, such perspectives can be seen to readily 
coevolve with the material and economic conditions of the time in 
question. The eventual arrival of general-purpose electronic computing 
machines in the twentieth century sees an explosion of linearity into 
non-linear recursive cycles of execution. In the process, this introduces 
different potential rhythms of mechanisation and related paradigms  
for understanding the world; with the implications of automation 
and the steady rise of platform capitalism posing particularly urgent 
questions for enquiry. 
 In his separate article contribution, Gauthier interrogates 
misplaced notions of executions as apodictic commands to be followed. 
In opposition to this sense of command as control, he highlights prac-
tices of debugging as illustrative of the continual and unpredictable 
itineration of signs and signals working themselves through the archi-
tectures of any given machine at a given time. The term execution and 
the way in which it emphasises a sense of a decisive moment can risk 
a similar emphasis on foreclosure. In contrast, the equally common 
terminology of running a program has the effect of shifting the focus 
to a sense of the durational aspects of live execution (runtime) and the 
ongoing, necessary processes of maintenance involved in executing 
systems—a topic which Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter’s article explores. 
Her ethnographic investigation in Chennai, South India into the Y2K 
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problem at the turn of the millennium gives a poignant example that 
links maintenance to a number of problems, including those of compu-
tation and its economic conditioning as well as particular colonial and 
other historical trajectories. 
Executing Ecologies 
As contributions to this book show, execution is not simply a clean 
delivery of a task. Command and control is never absolute. This is not 
to say that a program does not do what it says. Rather, the authors focus 
on what execution is, how it operates and what might be obscured in 
the process. The history of computing is one in which computation, in 
its actual execution and spreading into domains of all kinds, inevitably 
grows wild. As media theorist Friedrich Kittler aptly states, 
David Hilbert’s dreamlike program to clear out the opacity 
of everyday language once and for all through formalization 
is undone not only at the clear, axiomatic level of Gödel or 
Turing, but already by the empiricism of engineers. Codes with 
compatibility problems begin to grow wild and to adopt the 
same opacity of everyday languages that have made people 
their subjects for thousands of years. (Kittler 1997, 167) 
Knuth himself, in an aside during the same keynote, hints at this unruly 
expansiveness of computing in the world. He refers to a recent exper-
iment carried out by researchers looking to identify and count each 
tree in a tropical forest. By Knuth’s reckoning, the process of counting 
250,000 trees in the arboreal survey was roughly equivalent to the 
number of instructions in a second of computing at the time (Knuth 
1991, 13). What, one may ask, is the point of this seemingly off-handed 
comparison, in which Knuth sees fit to even include detailed photo-
copied samples from the article on the tree survey in his slides for 
the keynote presentation? A response suggested by this book would 
be that enumeration, as a theory and practice lying at the core of 
computing, puts into motion further modes of counting and calculative 
execution. Francisco Gallardo and Audrey Samson give the example  
of Charles Darwin’s work on evolutionary deviation from the norm, 
highlighting how, with the gradual maturation of statistics, theory 
becomes fully provable as a “thing that holds” (Alain Desrosière, cited 
in Gallardo and Samson); in other words, as a theory that becomes a 
fully executable practice. To parcel out the mathematical or the tech-
nical from the many other relations that Gallardo and Samson point to, 
is to miss one of the key qualities and emphases of execution as the 
direct experimentation with various materially directed affordances 
and relationalities. This becomes that, and along the way, becomes 
something entirely else, with each execution posing further correla-
tions, problems and interpretations to be addressed (Snodgrass). 
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 As Jennifer Gabrys notes in the collection’s afterword, execution 
“is a process and condition that might unfurl through code, but also 
overspills the edges of code”. Such intensifications of computation into 
the lived, everyday experience and its situated applications introduce 
ecologies that bring other figures of execution that operate outside of a 
relatively stabilised domain of computation. Contributions in this book 
include sound, image, user practices, popular culture and shrimping 
alongside computation. In these instances, execution is often treated as 
a bio-geo-political process that engages complex terrains. The skins of 
mammals become sites for pincer-like executions by tick or computer 
(Snodgrass). Transgenic fish and microbes become organisms where 
execution is increasingly instantiated (in both a metaphysical and 
computational sense) by the extension of computation into biotic 
subjects (Pritchard). Brown shrimp (Crangon crangon), fishing trawlers  
and mechanised modes of automation exist within critical territories 
of extinction (Gallardo and Samson). In other articulations of 
natureculture, content curating functions through practices of linking, 
liking, reposting, RSS feeds or even contouring, while making users’ 
bodies operational for the purposes of big data (Tyz˙lik-Carver). Hard-
coded forms of self-representations such as one finds in the example 
of emoji character sets are governed by Unicode protocols and the 
dominant corporate interests of the present (Pierrot, Roscam Abbing 
and Snelting). Bodies of many kinds become malleable materials 
that introduce both flexibility, resistance and often unruly factors of 
contingency into execution. 
Executing Politics 
Computing, as an endeavour which emerges out of concerted efforts 
at command and control, has demonstrated a propensity for furthering 
the range of executable tasks towards which it can be applied. We 
find ourselves in an era of an Internet of Things in which computation 
insinuates itself into objects such as fridges (Gabrys), deadly execu-
tions by remotely controlled and autonomous drones (Schuppli) and 
executions that take place in toxic and polluted landscapes (Pritchard). 
This increasingly wide range of executing things and practices has 
the effect of entering into and rerouting a wide range of endeavours. 
If Marx’s dictum that “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal 
lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist” (Marx,  
cited by Hui), what is it that a distributed army of Internet-connected 
web cameras rerouted to carry out a denial of service (DDoS) attack 
against websites and web hosts (Gabrys) can be said to represent?  
As Gabrys’s afterword on these new methods of making things oper-
ational puts it: “Within the Internet of Things, what programs are to be 
run? Who decides which programs are to be prioritised? And how are 
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the conditions of the executable shifting to give rise to new problems 
of execution?” At a time when the iconic spectacle of execution by  
guillotine has been replaced with that of execution by an opaque and 
rapid agglomeration of black-boxed algorithms fed into remote  
drone operations, the task becomes that of developing “a politics 
appropriate to these radical modes of calculation” (Schuppli). 
 The term execution is often associated with death and the taking of 
life. Its histories include l’exécuteur du testament, from twelfth-century 
France, designating the executor of the will.4 In such a manifestation,  
a specific practice of execution is already embedded in regulatory 
forms of bureaucracy. As Susan Schuppli highlights in her contribution 
on “Deadly Algorithms”, the etymological and genealogical roots of 
the term can take on further meanings in the contemporary context  
of drone warfare, in which “it is only by executive decision that the  
US President can execute the kill order, which in turn executes a 
coding script that operates the remote-controlled drone, that is itself 
engaged in acts of summary execution”. Similarly, Geoff Cox, explains 
how, as with the act of entering into language, there is a similar, 
perhaps even more overt and inherent violence to the imposition of 
entering into an interaction with software, particularly for the way in 
which “[w]ith program code, it not only symbolises but enacts violence 
on the thing during runtime: it quite literally executes it” (Cox). This 
kind of “softwar” (Angela Mitropoulos, cited in Cox) of aggression is 
exerted not only in overt practices of violence but also in everyday 
interactions with software. 
 It is not only that contemporary modes of execution can be seen 
to enact particularly strong impositions within the domains in which 
they operate, but also that, in many cases, these impositions come with 
their own forms of exception. Is it unreasonable to take an algorithm 
to court? What is the responsibility of an individual (human or 
nonhuman) in a complex computational configuration? Accountability, 
whether individual or collective, is buried in a mesh of technical, 
legal and administrative complexity. Peggy Pierrot, Roel Roscam 
Abbing and Femke Snelting give an example of such complexities in 
their chapter on the Unicode Consortium’s implementation of a skin 
tone modifier mechanism for emoji. Their chapter highlights how the 
various technology corporations involved in the Unicode Consortium 
(such as Apple, Google and Microsoft) claim reputational victories 
for themselves in relation to a particular implementation, while never 
considering the colonial assumptions inherent within systems of 
encoding. As the authors highlight, in such a strategy of exception and 
deferral,5 “the companies hide behind the limitations of the standard 
if necessary, and break out of its confines when desirable” (Pierrot, 
Roscam Abbing, Snelting). And if drone strikes during Obama’s 
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presidency are one instance of executing practices, Donald Trump’s 
election in late 2016 signals emerging ways in which politics is 
executed on a global scale. As (at the time of writing) Trump is ushered 
into office on a cresting wave of Twitter updates, election hacking 
controversies, algorithmically supported fake news items (so-called 
post-truth politics), the mainstreaming of a slew of long brewing 
far-right movements is taking hold in violent ways. This situation asks 
one to, once again, “radically rethink what it means to say ‘everyone’”, 
particularly when the de facto standpoint of the majority of the 
dominant corporations involved in providing the infrastructures and 
platforms of online expression is one of employing an “a-politicised 
and egalitarian discourse of diversity” (Pierrot, Roscam Abbing  
and Snelting). 
 In response to practices where various states of exception are 
executed, one oppositional strategy can be to uncover and create 
various forms of oversight and forms of accountability. Tyz˙lik-Carver’s 
chapter highlights the continuous editing by many users of the 
Wikipedia entry on “curator”, from its first registered entry at 23:19  
on 6 December 2003, delivered by the IP address 131.211.225.204,  
to an entry in Summer 2016 that includes a fork in the main definition 
and describes “technology curators” as those “able to disentangle 
the science and logic of a particular technology and apply it to real 
world situations and society, whether for social change or commercial 
advantage”. In these works we see what Tyz˙lik-Carver describes as 
the way in which executing practices of different kinds are “distributed 
across and performed by agents of different orders”. Samson’s 
additional contribution to the book highlights several different forms 
of “erasures” and the ways in which they can be seen to “execute 
knowledge production”. Samson gives a range of examples, such 
as the case of University of California Davis’s hiring of reputation 
management firms to delete an incriminating photo of a pepper spray 
incident on their campus, so as to avoid negative coverage of the  
event. Meanwhile, Hilfling Ritasdatter’s essay gives a report of acts of 
black-boxing that sometimes unwittingly become apparent in moments 
of actual or potential breakdown. The anxieties and worries concerning 
a breakdown of global systems, caused by the Y2K bug, opens up a 
moment in which the many complex internal technical, economic and  
geopolitical relations come into focus. Hilfing Ritasdatter shows how 
these relations uphold the networked global economy and point 
towards “the neo-colonial divides” that are maintained and supported 
by such “anxious” executing flows. 
 These processes work their way across the spectrum of the polit-
ical and beyond. We live and die with/in their executions. As Schuppli 
points out, their significance is manifest and everywhere to be seen 
EXECUTING PRACTICES
20
EXECUTING PRACTICES
and experienced: 
Algorithms have long-adjudicated over vital processes that  
help to ensure our wellbeing and survival, from pacemakers 
that maintain the natural rhythms of the heart, genetic 
algorithms that optimise emergency response times by cross-
referencing ambulance locations with demographic data,  
to early warning systems that track approaching storms, detect 
seismic activity, and even prevent genocide by monitoring 
ethnic conflict with orbiting satellites. (Schuppli) 
Such executing devices are charged by existing modes of politics, 
just as they might enable or be reoriented to execute other potential 
politics. Together with them, various forms of life might be inscribed, 
curated, supported, destroyed or left to wither away. In Helen 
Pritchard’s chapter on “Critter Chips”, we see how organisms are held 
in semi-living yet enduring states by computational practices, and 
in Gallardo and Samson’s contribution we see this in their example 
of how populations of brown shrimp are manipulated in ways that 
mutate the notion of extinction itself, highlighting neoliberalism’s 
dependably thorough ability to financialise all aspects of life and 
death. Specifically, their example of shrimping involves the bringing 
together of the fields of computation, statistics, economics and boat 
design to generate a category of “commercial extinction”. This is a 
slowly fluctuating mode of deadening as a possible mode of life — what 
Gallardo and Samson describe as “a comfortable form of catastrophe”. 
This almost undead, inexhaustible drive of executable code in its ideal 
form is readily put into practice by neoliberal, neo-colonial and/or 
necropolitical (Mbembe 2003) forces in modes of operation that often 
veer towards exhaustion. As further evidenced in the examples of 
the forkbomb (Cox) and the example of the Mirai botnet DDoS attack 
(Gabrys), one can in these instances witness the full undead force and 
“ability of processes of execution to destroy the very infrastructure of 
the executable” (Gabrys). 
 In the face of any such apparent “destiny of execution” (Hilfling 
Ritasdatter), the direction of many of the contributions here is to 
suggest a politics of critique as invention, reverse engineering, 
intervention, repair, resistance and configuration. As the wide variety 
of topics and examples covered in this book acknowledge, there  
is an inherent excess and immanence to execution. Automation 
continually opens onto contingencies, breakdowns and unexpected 
new terrains of the executable. Similarly, execution has the quality  
of being both a thought experiment at the same time that it is a  
matter of practising this experiment in the world. The apt inscription 
and salute of executability —“Hello, world!”— captures this sense  
of both a putting into practice of a particular instantiation amongst 
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many others as well as a following of its encounters and iterations 
in the world. In this mesh of executing practices, the potential for 
configuration continues to make itself available, whether at the level  
of mass intervention or in the tweaking of a single line or second  
of code. 
Notes 
1. See also Fuller’s brief discussion 
of Knuth’s challenge in this same book 
(Fuller 2003, 17). 
2. For more details, see http://atariki.
krap.pl/index.php/Radiokomputer  
(in Polish). 
3. See http://suchar.net/forum/
viewtopic.php?t=15335&sid=0f308438 
cf03ed15f3eb13d8b6d073b7 (in Polish). 
4. For a further exposition on 
execution, see the entry on “Execution”, 
jointly written by several contributors 
to this collection, in Braidotti and 
Hlavajova’s forthcoming Posthuman 
Glossary collection). 
5. At the first Execution symposium 
(2015) held in Aarhus, Denmark, it 
was pointed out that such protological 
commands and manoeuvres on the part 
of contemporary modes of power can  
be seen to be summed up in the exultant 
refrain of a song from a comic opera of 
Gilbert & Sullivan’s: “Defer, Defer, to the 
Lord High Executioner!” ([1885] 1992). 
For documentation and coverage from 
each of the two Execution events, see the 
following links: http://softwarestudies.
projects.cavi.au.dk/index.php/*.
exe_(ver0.1) & http://softwarestudies.
projects.cavi.au.dk/index.php/*.
exe_(ver0.2).
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Preface:  The Time of Execution
Yuk Hui
Since the late twentieth century, one can clearly observe how the 
word “execution” has expanded its meaning from its main use in 
administrative, bureaucratic and juridical milieu since the fourteenth 
century into the operations of machines and weapons. What exactly  
the watershed moment was remains a historical question to be 
debated. However, its signification today has become an urgent 
social and political question. It marks a paradigm shift from human 
management to machine management of almost everything: drone 
killings, DDoS attacks, deep packet inspection, etc. We may want to 
ask: what does this change of semantics mean? And how is one to 
understand “execution” in the age of machine automation?
 Paradoxically, words such as “machine” and “automation” have 
become more and more abstract, while both hardware and software 
have become increasingly concrete. The process of concretisation 
(Simondon 2012, 21–26)1 is reflected in the constant amelioration of 
different layers (e.g. from the microphysical layer to that of the high 
level application layer) and the transductive operations between 
and beyond them. It is necessary to investigate the concretisation 
of technical and digital objects in order to understand such a shift. 
At the same time, it is important to avoid romanticising a human 
machine complex as “machine assemblages”. I see this volume and 
the invaluable effort of the authors to be motivated by an urgency to 
seriously inquire into practices and their relation to the question 
of execution.
*  *  *
Execution is always teleological because to execute means to carry  
out something which is already anticipated before the action: execution 
of laws, execution of a plan, execution of a criminal. The telos can be 
reached in variable paths with different temporalities. The intuitive and 
simplest form of execution is linear, driven by pre-defined procedures. 
For example, we can see this in recipes: the subject follows step by 
step instructions until the goal is reached. In the relation between one 
step and the next step, there is a normalised necessity that assures the 
orientation.
 This linearity is present in the mechanisation of the world that  
we still read today in the work of René Descartes amongst others, char-
acterised by the geometrical clarity and logical certainty exhibited in 
the axiomatic. We may want to consider the making of automata as  
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the realisation of this linearity. There, movement is generated by a 
set of sequential actions executed by elements installed inside the 
automaton. For example, springs turn gears which then drive another 
component initiating the automaton’s movement. Indeed, Descartes’s 
fascination with automata is well known. They are regularly referred  
to in the “Second Meditation” of his Meditation on First Philosophy, in 
which the philosopher looks out of the window and asks if the people 
passing by are not automata wearing coats and hats and powered  
by springs (Vizier 1996).
 The Defecating Duck (1738) by the Frenchman Jacques Vaucanson 
and Mechanical Turk (1769) by the Hungarian engineer Wolfgang von 
Kempelen are examples of applying Cartesian thinking to automation 
at the time. They are also examples of confining technological thinking, 
and to a large extent philosophical thinking, to a linear and rational 
mode of thinking. Such an attitude partly comes out of material and 
energy constraints, that is to say, these conditions limit the types of 
discursive relations2 to be realised as physical contacts. Even though 
Descartes distinguishes man from automata for the reason that the 
former has soul while the latter doesn’t, we must also notice that 
the linearity of operation is applicable to both of Descartes’s dual 
substances, res cogitans and res extensa. As Gilbert Simondon pointed 
out, “the ‘long chains of reasons’ carry out a ‘transport of evidence’ from 
the premises to the conclusion, just like a chain carries out a transfer of 
forces from the anchoring point to the last link” (Simondon [1961] 2009, 
17). This does not mean at all that non-linear thinking didn’t yet exist, 
but rather that linearity as cognitive schema of machines was dominant 
because of its compatibility with classical physics supported by the 
limited material resources and conditions available at the time. Marx’s 
famous critique of Proudhon’s The Poverties of Philosophy, where he 
says “the handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-
mill, society with the industrial capitalist” (Marx 1971, 109; Mackenzie 
1984, 473), carries the same sense: the compatibility between material 
condition and techno-scientific development produces a specific 
economical structure. This critique can be extended and today it can 
also include the current computational and networked infrastructures 
which give us society with platform capitalists.
 Indeed, we must acknowledge that there is a temporal gap 
between philosophical and scientific thinking and technical realisa-
tion. This gap constantly creates antagonism and melancholia, which 
to some extent is inherited in what we call critique today. Indeed, 
non-linear thinking present since the eighteenth century could be  
seen as a reaction against the animal-machine and man-machine meta-
phors set up respectively by Descartes and Julien Offray de La Mettrie.  
It was demonstrated by new discoveries in the natural sciences that 
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gave rise to a new discipline which was later named as biology in 
1802 by the German naturalist Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (1776–
1837). During the same time period another German biologist Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach (1753-1840) had a great influence on Kant’s 
Critique of Judgement. He provided Kant with the scientific resources to 
inquire into the concept of beauty as “purposiveness without purpose” 
(Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck) in the first part of the critique and the 
relation between biology and teleology in the second part.3 The Post-
Kantian philosophies such as romanticism and idealism embraced the 
notion of the organic form (notably in the work of Schelling, Hegel and 
the Schlegels) as the foundation of philosophical systems and mobil-
ised it as a fierce critique against the mechanistic model of Descartes.
 Nevertheless, the linear time of execution foregrounds a 
non-linear historical temporality and functions as a decisive factor of 
a future to come. The cognitive schema of linear operation provided a 
temporally stable foundation for social and economic analysis during 
the modern period, as evident in the work of Adam Smith, Charles 
Babbage and later Karl Marx. A sufficient example of this can be 
witnessed in the memorable and well known passage in Adam Smith’s 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, in which 
a boy transforms the linear execution of his labour into a mechanical 
execution:
In the first fire-engines, a boy was constantly employed to  
open and shut alternately the communication between the 
boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended 
or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his 
companions, observed that by tying a string from the handle 
of the valve which opened this communication to another part 
of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his 
assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his 
playfellows. One of the greatest improvements that has been 
made upon this machine, since it was first invented, was in this 
manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own 
labour. (Smith [1776] 2005, 13)
This is paragraph eight of the first chapter “On the Division of Labour”, 
where the concept of automation is introduced. Thanks to this anony-
mous boy who stretched the ideas of the inventors of the fire-engines 
to a new terrain, work took another rhythm and the factory another 
form of organisation. If the temporality of the “machine assemblage” 
of the boy and the fire-engine consists of a homogenous linear system 
now, it is because of the desire of the boy to have time to play with his 
companions. Such a temporal structure is bifurcated in the way that  
the time of the boy and the time of the machine are separated because  
the mechanical energy of the fire-engine is recycled and thus replaces 
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the labour-energy of the boy. Yet, what is interesting in this passage is 
the relation between automation and freedom, which remains a very 
actual question for us today concerning the arrival of full-automation, 
as some ideologists have claimed (Mason 2015).
 The question of automation bifurcated into two opposing thoughts 
that can be found later in the work of Karl Marx. On the one hand, 
there is a possibility of the liberation of workers from labours as well 
as professions, so that they can become free. This joyful picture of the 
“free man” is described by Marx and Engels in the German Ideology, 
where they say that communism “makes it possible for me to do one 
thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have 
a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic” 
(Marx and Engels [1846] 2005, 53). There is a similarity between the 
desire to hunt, fish and rear cattle, and the boy’s desire to play with 
his companions. Yet, as Marx argued in the “Fragment on machines”, 
there is a great danger embedded in this mode of production, as 
“not-yet-full-automation” reduces workers to merely “conscious 
linkages” (bewußte Glieder) (Marx [1857] 1973, 620). On the one hand, 
alienation of workers and Marxist humanism find their common root in 
the automation of technology. And on the other, the same technology 
generates sentiments that lead to condemnation and sabotage of 
machines as a reactionist politics.
*  *  *
It is evident today that non-linear thinking has pervaded into different 
domains such as physics, chemistry, economy, etc. and consequently 
has become a paradigm. It becomes more important to look into 
the specificity of non-linear thinkings and their compatibilities with 
each other across different domains. The French philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon, in an essay entitled “Technical Mentality” (believed to have 
been written in the early 1960s), suggests cybernetics to be a second 
cognitive schema in addition to the Cartesian one. The concept of 
feedback in cybernetics introduced a new temporal structure, one that 
was no longer based on a linear form but rather was more like that  
of a spiral. In this schema, the path towards the telos is no longer linear 
but rather one of a constant self-regulatory process, which Simondon 
himself described as “an active adaptation to a spontaneous finality” 
(2009, 18). Simondon was fascinated by the concept of feedback, 
translating it differently on various occasions as “internal resonance”, 
“contra-reaction”, “recurrence of causality” and “circular causality”.4 
These distinct explanations of feedback are important to his theory 
of individuation and individualisation. However, as a result of these 
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different translations, it is sometimes confusing that these notions are 
separate from those of cybernetics and as such should be considered 
as alternatives to the cybernetic notion of “feedback”.
 It is from this second cognitive schema described by Simondon 
that another concept of execution is proposed, one that is very different 
from the automation described by Smith and Marx. The question that 
I would like to raise concerning Simondon’s classification, and I have 
tried to respond to it in my own work (Hui 2015a, 2016b), is to move 
from feedback to recursion. One reason for this is because I see 
recursive functions as concrete and formal expressions of the concept 
of feedback5 which is realised in every computational device today.
 Indeed, it always appears to me rather surprising that Simondon 
didn’t engage with the concept of recursion. This could be due to the 
fact that Simondon paid more attention in his research on individuation 
to quantum physics, biology and psychology than to logic and 
mathematics (though Simondon also recognised that cybernetics has 
its foundation in mathematics) (Simondon 2009, 18). In effect, what 
can be noticed is that in his work, Simondon prioritises transduction 
over inference in classical logical thinking (2009, 18). And this might 
also be an explanation for why Simondon had never (at least not in his 
posthumous publications) elaborated on the concept of “algorithm”.
 Let us firstly establish the rapports between execution and 
algorithm. Instead of following the conventional interpretation of 
Wienerian cybernetics, it is important to re-read Kurt Gödel when 
addressing our question concerning execution and algorithm. 
The mathematical development on the question of recursion and 
its realisation in the universal Turing Machine during the 1930s 
corresponds to the emergence of what I call “algorithmic thinking” 
(Hui 2015b). Many people, including computer scientists and social 
scientists, when explaining what an algorithm is, often compare it 
to recipes. This is not completely wrong, since an algorithm does 
specify certain procedures and rules that it has to follow; but it is 
also absolutely incorrect, since a recipe cannot explain at all what an 
algorithm of our time is. Algorithm belongs only to the first cognitive 
schema that we have discussed above.
 I would like to put forward that algorithmic thinking should 
be understood from the concept of recursion. A recursive function 
simply means a function that calls itself until a halting state is reached. 
Douglas Hofstadter, in his Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, 
explains with a joke that, if we were to imagine a German professor 
giving a lecture in one long sentence with a lot of Nebensätze, in the 
end he would only have to pronounce verbs in order to complete each 
interaction (Hofstadter 1999, 131). To explain further, let us consider 
a simple example of computing the Fibonacci number (1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 
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8, 13, 21…): in the recursive step, the function calls itself, and enters 
a “spiral” operation until it arrives at its halting status, e.g. when the 
value of the variable number becomes 0.
long bonacci(long number) {
if ((number == 0) || (number == 1))
return number;
else // recursion step
return bonacci(number - 1) + bonacci(number - 2);
}
In the non-recursive way, the function will have to create a repetitive 
loop repeating n times (n being equal to the value of the input 
variable, e.g. a long number). From mere repetition to recursion there 
is a significant change in the cognitive schema. By referring back to 
Kurt Gödel’s work on recursive functions, we may be able to simplify 
here. His consists of two important steps. Firstly, he developed what 
is now known as Gödel numbering to arithmetize the quantifiers and 
operators of the logical propositions in the Principia Mathematica of 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. This decisive move to 
numeration turns all symbolic operations into numerical operations 
and here we observe that it is no longer the physical contacts between 
different physical parts concretising the discursive relations, as in  
the example of automata, but rather data. Secondly, Gödel developed  
what he calls general recursivity, which considers logical proofs 
as arithmetic calculations, or more precisely, as a set of number 
theoretic functions whose values can be recursively derived. Gödel’s 
development of the recursive function can originally be found in his 
1931 paper titled “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia 
Mathematica and Related Systems”, and later the general recursive 
function that he pronounced in Princeton in 1934 can be seen to 
anticipate the papers from Alan Turing and Alonzo Church (also 
invoked in this collection by David Gauthier).6 It is in the question of 
recursivity that we encounter the notion of computability, since if a 
natural number is not computable it means that it cannot be recursively 
deduced from an algorithm, and hence runs into infinite looping,  
which finally leads to the exhaustion of resources such as memory.
 We may want to say: to execute is to compute. This dictum is 
almost self-evident in many domains of our everyday life: financial 
markets, social networks, online marketing, etc. What lies in recursivity 
is another temporal complex which I call computational hermeneutics 
(Hui 2016a, 238–244). It differs from the machine-boy assemblage  
and from the linear automation implemented by the boy. Computa-
tional hermeneutics has its own dynamics resembling a self-regulating, 
self-learning process (in this sense, we clearly see that all machine 
learning algorithms are recursive). The paths towards the telos are not 
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predefined, rather they are heuristics which are more or less like trial 
and error, like reason coming back to itself in order to know itself.
 In various recursive functions, there is often an opacity into which 
the human capacity of calculation cannot penetrate. It produces a 
cognitive opacity which is known under the notorious name of “black 
box”. It is an illusion to ask for more advancement of technology and 
finer division of labour while longing for the transparency of a society 
whose existence is no longer sure. Something other than the opposition 
between transparency and opacity has to be sought. Let us raise the 
question in another way in light of the shift in the cognitive schemas: 
which role do human beings occupy in executions characterised by 
recursivity, especially recursivity of machines? Users is the intuitive 
answer that we may want to give. We are all users.
 Intuitively we may notice that users are part of an algorithm.  
Not only is the temporality of each user recorded as part of a data-
base, but the existence of the user constitutes partly the executability. 
In addition, the users are also responsible for dealing with any cata-
strophic consequences due to errors and contingencies. For example, 
in the “flash crash” of a financial market, it is not the algorithms but 
the users (though probably in the end it is the non-users) who are 
responsible for the aftermaths. Instead of an illusory intimacy, the rela-
tion between human and machine has to be accessed from a higher 
cognitive level and a generalised “algorithmic thinking”. It is on this 
question of execution and algorithm that we find Gilles Deleuze’s 1990 
essay “Postscript on the Societies of Control” relevant. Deleuze might 
not have thought about algorithms as we do today, but his philosoph-
ical intuition allowed him to see a new form of organisation based on 
a “modulation” that was taking place and that had to be distinguished 
from the governmentality that Foucault had analysed.7 Modulation 
is distinguished from the rule imposition paradigm characteristic to 
the disciplinary society, because it operates not on constraints but on 
“freedom”, or more precisely, “free space”.8 In other words, modula-
tion relies on an operation consisting of different heuristics that orients 
itself towards a certain goal without strictly predefined rules. We may 
want to point out here that it is executability (we can also consider it as 
“recursivity”) rather than “data empiricism” that constitutes the foun-
dation of an “algorithmic governmentality”, as the Belgian researchers 
Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns (2013) have convincingly argued.
*  *  *
To conclude let us go back to the classical opposition between  
“free man” and “conscious linkages” (or slaves) — two different conse-
quences of the application of automation that we have seen in  
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the first part of this essay. A question that is worth asking is whether 
this opposition continues in the automation-execution paradigms that  
we witness today, which are largely different to those observed by 
Marx in the nineteenth century? Or, does the shift of the cognitive 
schemas (from linearity to recursivity) in the last centuries displace 
or transform these oppositions (freedom/slave, opacity/transparency) 
and the binary choices available to us? For the latter, perhaps we will 
need a Nietzschean transvaluation [Umwertung] of these values in 
order to proceed further without prisoning ourselves in the choices 
already given in the last centuries due to the limited understandings  
of automation and the limitations of automation itself. This transvalua-
tion will also be the beginning of a re-appropriation of automation  
in order to invent new choices (Stiegler 2016).
Notes 
1. I take the concept of concretisation 
from Gilbert Simondon, in Du mode 
d’existence des objets techniques  
[On the Mode of Existence of Technical 
Objects]. He developed this concept to 
understand the evolution of technical 
objects and their relations to norms 
and schemes, in hope of re-integrating 
technology into culture (Simondon 
2012, 15). To Simondon the relation 
between technology and culture was 
completely broken in the 18th century 
and consequently gave rise to an 
antagonism originated from ignorance 
and misunderstanding.
2. I develop the concept of discursive 
relations and existential relations in 
On the Existence of Digital Objects. The 
former refers to relations that can be 
said, while the latter refers to temporal 
relations which escape formalisation; 
they are the reformulation of the notion 
of relationes secundum dici (relations 
according to speech) and relationes 
secundum esse (relations according to 
being) in medieval philosophy. 
3. Kant wrote to Blumenbach in a letter 
dated august 1790, “Your works have 
taught me a great many things; indeed 
your recent unification of the two princi-
ples, namely the physico-mechanical and 
the teleological — which everyone had 
otherwise thought to be incompatible —  
has a very close relation to the ideas that 
currently occupy me but which require 
just the sort of factual confirmation that 
you provide” (Lenoir 1980, 78).
4. For Simondon’s relation to 
cybernetics, see Yuk Hui, “Qu’est ce  
que la marge d’indétermination” 
(2016b), and also Yuk Hui, “Simondon et 
la question de l’information” (2015a).
5. The role of recursivity (as concrete 
expression of “feedback”) is even 
more obvious when we consider 
the recursivity in the second order 
cybernetics, for example system theory 
and autopoiesis. 
6. For a more detailed analysis of 
this history, see Hui, On the Existence of 
Digital Objects, Chapter 6.  
7. For a detailed explanation on the 
concept of modulation and its relation 
to Deleuze’s philosophy in general and 
to the societies of control in specific, 
please refer to Yuk Hui, “Modulation after 
control” (2015c). 
8. Retrospectively, if we want to 
understand that modulation is a concept 
taken from Simondon, then the analysis 
of the societies of control according to 
modulation still has to be supplemented 
by another dimension, since modulation 
is only one of the two parts of what 
Simondon calls allagmatic, which is 
a theory on the dynamics between 
operation and structure.
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Modifying the Universal
Roel Roscam Abbing, Peggy Pierrot, Femke Snelting
In 2015, The Unicode Consortium decided to add five “skin tone 
modifiers” to the Unicode 9.0 core specifications, a standard that 
encodes more than a thousand emoji characters. This event triggered  
a series of reflections and collective actions through which we tried  
to address how specific entanglements of technology, representation 
and normativity (re)appear.
  While you could consider emoji a pop curiosity — a light-hearted 
way to inject some humour, emotions or flirtation into otherwise dry 
text messages — their popularity has coincided with a rising awareness 
of issues associated with identity politics, resulting in, for example, the 
implementation of custom gender options in Facebook.1 With the surge 
of instant messaging on both mobile and desktop-based applications, 
the significance of emoji have moved far beyond smiley faces or 
emoticons typed in e-mails by combining semicolons and brackets.
This text documents a period of collective inquiry into the various 
mechanisms involved in establishing emoji standards. It follows the 
discussions and conversations that emerged between us while we were 
trying to intervene into the process via the official channels for public 
feedback provided by the Unicode Consortium. The text reflects upon 
how various concerns developed as we tried to decode what  
was happening before our eyes.
  Emoji are one of many examples where technological systems 
intensely interact with diverse physical bodies. In this allegedly “post 
racial” and “post gender” era, we witness a racist and sexist backlash, 
in terms of the intensified discrimination of minorities and women on 
one side, and the development of affirmation strategies on the other 
side. In times of Black Life Matters and with Gamergate still raging,  
the emoji case shows how we might need to radically rethink what it 
means to say “everyone”. It is no surprise though that the very compa-
nies that provide the infrastructures for on-line expression (Facebook, 
Twitter, Google, etc.) avoid engaging in the issue by employing an 
a-politicised and egalitarian discourse of diversity, and this with 
increasing ease and success.
 The process of implementing emoji modifiers stages race, gender 
and technologies in a way that seems exemplary of how identity poli-
tics is being transformed from a cultural issue into a technical chal-
lenge and eventually into a commercial asset. It shows how “identity 
washing” operates not only in city marketing or official international 
politics, but also at the level of inter-personal electronic commu-
nication. Throughout this process, the politics of anti-racism and 
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anti-sexism are being emptied out of their sense and meaning for the 
sake of a commodified version of equality.
 The two subsequent changes to the emoji standard that we report 
on in this text are an example of how identity politics have been 
appropriated by global capitalism, and are being used to supplement 
and strengthen commercial strategies. Our collective inquiry was 
also an opportunity to test the (im)possibility for intervening into the 
formation of technologised representation.
The Unicode Standard
Unicode is a non-profit organisation concerned with universal char-
acter encoding standards and responsible for a key infrastructure that 
impacts all use of text on computers, mobile devices and the web.  
Figure 1. Left: Japanese website written and displayed in a Japanese language 
encoding. Right: the same website displayed with the American ASCII encoding 
applied.
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The Unicode standards are designed to normalise the encoding of 
characters, to efficiently manage the way they are stored, referred to 
and displayed in order to facilitate cross-platform, multilingual and 
international text exchange. The Unicode Standard is mammoth in  
size and covers well over 110,000 characters, of which only around 
1,000 are technically considered emoji. Despite their relative marginal 
presence in the set, emoji currently generate most of the public atten-
tion for the Unicode standard and the activities of the Consortium.2
 The process of standardisation within Unicode is presented as 
open to discussion. The procedure for adding new characters, for 
example, relies on a public reviewing of issues and feedback, and 
the Consortium welcomes proposals for new additions. However, 
voting members that have the power to decide if a proposal is 
accepted or rejected each pay $18,000 per year.3 Most of the current 
individual members work for one of the nine organisations that hold 
full membership in the Consortium, and seven of these are US-based 
technology companies: Adobe, Apple, Google, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle 
and Yahoo. The Consortium primarily communicates in English,  
which is the language spoken at most companies involved in Unicode.4 
An obvious bias in this so-called universal project can be found at the 
heart of the standard itself. With English as an exception, many writing 
systems use special combinations of letters and accents. Only with 
some effort can they fit into a single character based paradigm that  
the Consortium decided to be the basic organisational grid of the 
Unicode standard. As a result, most languages other than English 
struggle with the standard to some degree (Jacquerye 2015, 261–268).
 More generally, the problem of universality begins with the 
assumption that anything can and should be encoded in symbolic  
logic (Blas and Cárdenas 2013). The idea of universality underlies  
all things software and computer related, such as programming 
languages and internationalisation processes. This latent universality 
permeates all layers of communication technology and is strongly 
normative (MacKenzie 2008, 156).
 The universal ambition of Unicode itself can be traced back to 
its inception in the late eighties. As electronic text was increasingly 
being exchanged online and between language areas, issues emerged 
when text encoded in one language was shared and read on systems 
assuming an encoding in another language. Unicode was a response 
to the incompatible text encoding standards that were proliferating. 
When different encodings assign the same binary numbers to different 
characters, this results in illegible documents. The solution, partly 
made possible by increased computing capacity, was to strive for a 
single universal encoding which would encompass all writing systems 
in the world. This encoding can be thought of as a single gigantic 
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table that indexes all available characters to unique binary numbers, 
thus circumventing the issue of different encodings with overlapping 
character assignments.
 Maintaining this table and deciding what should be stored in it  
and where is still the core activity of the Unicode Consortium. It is 
crucial to understand that the Consortium only deals with the assign-
ment of numbers to characters and not with the way they are rendered. 
In other words, what Unicode maps is the “idea” of, for example, 
the Latin capital “A” to a specific binary number. How that “A” itself 
is represented (italic, Gothic type, big, small, etc.) is the responsi-
bility of glyph and font designers, and not the Unicode Consortium. 
Furthermore, the standard is non-binding and the actualisation of  
its universality depends on the willingness of soft- and hardware  
manufacturers to implement the recommendations of the Consortium.
Because one face does not fit all
The proliferation of smart-phones and fierce competition between 
vendors accelerates the attention given to emoji. The cute characters 
became a surprisingly important argument for buying a new iPhone, 
iPad or Android phone. In 2015, Apple launched their latest model with 
a completely redesigned emoji set, now proudly featuring emoji for 
gay and lesbian couples. The updated Apple designs were breaking 
with the flat, graphic rendering of emoji images and expressed volume 
and realism. They cemented the impression that emoji had evolved 
from visual aids to communicate emotion towards representations of 
the self. It was also painfully clear that these stand-ins for the human 
body looked very pale.
 Once Apple had launched its high-resolution, pink-hued emoji  
set, discussions flared up all over the web. The supposed realism 
of these renderings made people feel “not represented” and 
subsequently users started to question the yellow base-color of emoji 
as well. Several petitions asking Apple to increase the diversity in its 
emoji set attracted thousands of signatures.6 
 The demands to technology giants to fix emoji diversity fell on 
fertile ground. The protest happened at a moment when US-based 
Figure 2. The difference between a code point, a character and a glyph.  
The Unicode Consortium only concerns itself with the allocation of codepoints  
to characters and not with glyphs. Pierre Huyghebaert (2015).
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technology companies such as DropBox, Pinterest, Airbnb and Twitter 
had published statistics on the lack of women and people of colour 
in their workforces, thereby publicly acknowledging their issues 
with diversity.7 Each of the companies had hired so-called diversity 
managers that were tasked with correcting these problems.
 The Unicode Consortium, made up of several of these same 
companies, was put in charge of responding to the pressure.8  
A problem that in essence was caused by an awkward design-decision 
from Apple, conveniently became a problem to be solved on the 
abstract level of the Unicode standard. In this meta-context it was clear 
that the issue could only be addressed through technological means.9 
 
 The solution that the Unicode Consortium decided to implement 
was to add “skin tone modifiers”, six new characters that could  
modify only a designated set of emoji that they considered to represent 
or include humans. Using essentially the same mechanism that is  
used to create ligatures,10 these skin tone modifiers allow users to 
specify any of six different shades of brown for emoji faces. If the 
device of the sender or receiver has a modifiable icon set available,  
the emoji is rendered with that shade of brown. If not, the “default”  
face will be shown next to the selected colour swatch.
 The Consortium based the shades on the Fitzpatrick scale, an 
existing standard developed for measuring the sensitivity of skin to 
sun exposure. From the little documentation of this surprising choice, 
we understand that it was believed that the Fitzpatrick scale could  
pass without triggering a complicated debate on the representation  
of ethnicity.11 Using any scale to differentiate people according to  
the colour of their skin already implies a colonial gaze, since the 
modelling of “racial types” has been used to de-humanise whoever 
was not viewed as a white European. Additionally, the Consortium 
conflated a medical standard for the sensitivity of human skin to UV 
exposure with a way to represent skin colour.12 By carelessly merging 
the two lightest skin tones, Type 1 and 2, into one single modifier,  
the Consortium underlined that light skin functions outside this 
colonial gaze.
 The introduction of the modifiers meant that the yellow emoji 
began to function as a white base, with darker skin colours positioned 
Figure 3. Yellow base character with FITZPATRICK TYPE-5 modifier.  
Screenshot from the Unicode Technical Report 51: http://www.unicode.org/
reports/tr51/.
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as an add-on. After Apple had started this confusion between yellow 
and white, it hardly comes as a surprise that the modifiers were seen  
as a “blackface” move and a bastardised version of white superiority.13
 Unlike the rigour that the Consortium usually applies to changes 
in the standard, the skin tone mechanism was implemented in a 
relatively short time. The documents available at the Consortium 
website avoid any reference to possible problematic consequences, 
and the argumentation for the mechanism comes across as hastily put 
together. The sub-committee involved with its implementation judged 
it sufficient to bring in entrepreneur Katrina Parott as an expert, in 
lieu of the usual dialogue with a supposed user-community. Parrott 
developed the successful iDiversicon project in response to the on-line 
protests, but can hardly be considered to single-handedly represent 
the complex issues of representation that were at stake.14 
 The users’ demand for the diversification of emoji points to the 
way in which on-line representations might operate on the actual 
through the virtual, and opens up possibilities of representation that 
are not available in the physical world. But should we see the addition 
of modifiers as an example of such a potential? Is it a successful  
form of user-agency, of powerful citizen action? Does the mechanism  
of skin tone modifiers really bring diversity to the emoji project?
Cross-platform consistency
In April 2015, as soon as the updated Unicode standard was released, 
Apple integrated the skin tone options on their iPhones. It was 
celebrated as a victory that vendors were finally taking diversity into 
account.15 
Figure 4. Google’s Android has depicted the same emoji characters in different 
ways over the years.
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 Interestingly, Google did not implement the modifiers on their 
Android platform and continued to render all humanoid emoji as 
Barbapapa-style blobs in unrealistic yellow. A Google spokesperson 
indicated that this was a deliberate choice: “[Google’s] emoji faces are 
playful and are all about conveying the emotion you’re feeling. They 
aren’t designed to look human or reflect human characteristics”.16 
The characters in Unicode that are tagged “emoji” are in fact a hybrid 
collection of images, each with their own visual language and culture  
of use. It includes icons originally designed to be displayed on 
Japanese broadcast screens, map symbols used in institutional 
communication, typographic dingbats, cute decorative elements and 
e-mail emoticons for inter-personal messages. At first the heightened 
presence of emoji on communication devices and applications gave 
prominence to the expression of emotions. Down the slippery slope, 
emoji have become a pre-coded form of identification. The skin tone 
modifier mechanism insists that you are what you type. You are typed.
 Standardising this solution for diversity had another unexpected 
normative consequence. Vendors such as Google, who chose to use 
less humanised renderings of emoji, or Microsoft, who kept with the 
Unicode design specifications and rendered the characters with grey 
skin, came under pressure to normalise their set. A widely published 
research article into the cross-platform use of emoji claimed that 
different renderings of the characters could lead to misunderstandings 
(Miller et al. 2016, 9). A smiling blob + modifier did not render in 
the same way as a smiling face + modifier. The message you send or 
receive is altered by those different renderings not only in style,  
but also in meaning.
 At this point, Google changed its position, as explained by  
Jeremy Burge on Emojipedia:
While cross-platform consistency was one reason for getting  
rid of the blob-people, another was to pave way for support  
of skin tone modifiers. It stands to reason that the blobs look 
great in yellow, but would look a bit weird if they had skin  
tones applied.17 
In essence, the implementation of skin tone modifiers forced emoji 
representations into another level of realism, reduced the possibility 
for different renderings and eventually had the effect of making 
all emoji look like Apple Color Emoji. In this context, the space for 
imagining other characters narrowed dramatically, forcing users  
into labelling themselves according to pre-set categories of gender 
and ethnicity.
 As long as the emphasis is on the action or emotion expressed 
by the cute yellow, asexual characters, thoughts about gender, 
race and ability might go away. But the project to encode diverse 
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representations into Unicode can only work if we assume that emoji are 
representing humans to begin with. Who or what is the template for this 
“universal” character? Should these complex questions be in the hands 
of the Unicode Consortium, specialised in finding technical solutions 
for implementing “all the living languages possible”?
 We felt that the blobs and grey characters were at least attempts  
to widen the possibility for representation in digital communication. 
And now, even that space is gone.
Technologies for segregation
In March 2016, Facebook proudly announced their use of ethnic  
affinities profiling, a thinly veiled form of racial market segregation.18  
For the promotion of the Universal motion picture Straight Outta 
Compton, two trailers were edited. One was targeting “general popu-
lation (non-African American, non-Hispanic)” and another “African-
American” audiences. The commercially successful campaign was  
the result of a close collaboration between diversity teams in both 
companies.19 Despite users’ refusal to provide information on their 
ethnic background, Facebook felt entitled to guess their “ethnic 
affinity” through analysis and categorisation of the data that they have 
access to. Segregation based on personal electronic communication 
had become “marketing as usual”.
 Emoji skin tone modifiers have of course been used to construct 
racist comments20 and there is a documented case of an Instagram 
search that returns different results depending on emoji with the skin  
tone modifier applied.21 Should a Unicode compliant search engine 
offer to sort results the same way? While Russia investigates if it 
Figure 5. Different implementations of Emoji Modifiers based on the Fitzpatrick 
scale. The distinction between skin Type 1 and 2 has been conflated into one 
single “pink” modifier.
41
MODIFYING THE UNIVERSAL
can sue Apple for their representation of sexual diversity,22 app 
stores refuse sex-positive emoji because they do not permit “sexual 
content”.23 Activists from Turkey were arrested because of their  
social network accounts, while Libya used Big Data to target its 
opponents (Manach and Nicoby 2015, 38, 47-48). When social networks 
can target ads based on the content of messages and user preferences 
apparently representing an ethnic profile, where will the use of 
modified emoji lead us?
 Despite the apparent commitment to implement encryption,  
we have seen Facebook, Google and Apple all too easily comply with 
police or intelligence services to aid the global war on terror. In such 
a charged landscape, it is difficult to think about the way standards 
are being handled without a sense of paranoia, and the willingness of 
these companies to implement diversity through cute emoji should  
be met with at least some reservations.
 The responsibility for instituting the potential for segregation lies 
not (only) with the vendor who implements such systems, but also with 
the one who initiates, negotiates and defines the standard. Unicode 
cannot neglect to consider such consequences.
Pandora’s box
In February 2016, following the perceived success of the modifier 
mechanism, the Unicode Consortium introduced TR#52, a proposal  
to allow further customisations of Unicode emoji characters.24  
If accepted, it would ensure that gender variants (such as female 
runners or males raising a hand), hair colour variants (a red-haired 
police woman) and directional variants (pointing a gun or a crocodile 
to the right, rather than only to the left) could be encoded.
 The mechanism would use the same principle as the skin tone 
modifiers, allowing only certain emoji to be altered by certain 
modifiers. But even if one could now type a message with a female 
Figure 6. Sketches on emojipedia.org speculating about 
gender modifiers. Screenshot from http://blog.emojipedia.org/
unicode-and-the-emoji-gender-gap/.
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police officer or construction worker, why is there no female dancer 
wearing a sari, or is U+1F473, MAN WITH TURBAN the only man able 
to wear a turban? What about hairstyles and different traditions of 
gesturing, let alone representation? 25 
 In their proposal, the Consortium insists on using a limited palette 
for haircolour because of the “cartoon style” nature of emoji and refers 
to the US Online Passport application form as the “standard” to follow 
when choosing this limited palette.26 The way the U.S. State Department 
chooses to view and categorise people is a particular expression 
of how the border control agency sees a person. The aggressive 
border-profiling that targets young brown men, for example, should 
not have to make its way into our daily communications. Additionally, 
the implementation of the proposed gender variants (male, female, 
neutral) does not address more complex gendered formations such  
as transgender or transsexuality.
 By further expanding the modifier mechanism, the Consortium 
persisted in addressing diversity through altering a so-called  
“neutral” base. One only has to imagine the consequences of adding 
“disability” as a modifier to future Unicode specifications in order 
to understand this tension. Disability should obviously never be 
conceived of as a condition of modification to a base-line standard.  
In practice however, it would have to be implemented exactly in this 
way. By continuing to naively treat these images as “just like any  
other character”, the Unicode Consortium opened a Pandora’s box  
of implications even wider.27 
 It was with this observation that we arrived at the Execution  
event in Malmö, a three day study session where academic researchers, 
practitioners and artists from around Europe gathered to question  
“the cultural, material and political implications of execution”.28  
We contributed with a talk and a workshop around the question of  
skin tone modifiers and emoji. At the workshop, participants brought 
their own expertise and perspectives on the emoji project within 
Unicode. We proposed to use the space of the workshop to write a 
collective response to TR52, using the channel for public feedback 
provided by the Unicode Consortium. After some initial reservations 
about the way critique would be possible or impossible within the 
confined space proposed by the Consortium, we began writing as  
a group.29 
 We agreed on arguing against implementing the proposal  
based on four points, leaving out a fifth comment on the commercial 
drive of the Unicode Consortium that we feel is actually at the root  
of the problem.
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1. By positing a “normal” baseline against which difference 
is to be measured, the mechanism sets up problematic 
relations between the categories that act as modifiers and the 
pictographs that they modify.
2. To express diversity as a “variant” is a reductive response  
to the complexity of identities and their representational  
needs.
3. The Consortium should take into account how, once imple-
mented, the modifiers will function in today’s media environ-
ment. Should Unicode-compliant search engines differentiate 
results according to modifier categories?
4. The proposed modifiers for skin tone and hair colour are  
both based upon questionable external standards. In the  
case of the Skin Tone Modifiers, the Consortium has chosen  
to use the Fitzpatrick scale in an attempt to find a “neutral” 
gauge for skin tone.
With the comment, we attempted to argue that it does not make 
sense to fix these issues by finding a less controversial standard for 
expressing skin tone, or to solve the problem by adding yet more 
variables, as the mechanism of varying between binary oppositions 
itself is fundamentally flawed. We felt that the combination of the 
representational turn and market pressure produced unavoidable  
and unsolvable problems that the Unicode Consortium tried to respond 
to through the warped logic of the modifier mechanism. By holding 
on to the extended modifiers as if they were actually moving in the 
right direction, the Consortium demonstrated a lack of commitment to 
actual, complex needs for human communication.
 We sent the comment as soon as the workshop ended, a day 
before the request for comments closed. To our surprise, besides a  
confirmation of receipt, we did not receive any response. Soon after-
wards, we realised that the work on the new mechanism had been 
suspended:
Work on UTS 52 will be suspended for now in favour of an 
alternative (ZWJ) approach, focusing on female emoji,  
that allows for shorter development time and better fallback 
behavior on older systems.30 
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It is all about implementation
But why was the work really suspended? The following is a reconstruc-
tion, based on documents available on Unicode.org:
 Between the 9th and 13th of May 2016, the Unicode Technical 
Committee met in San Jose, California in a meeting hosted by Adobe. 
Among the things up for discussion was the Technical Report #52 
on the Emoji Modifiers. In the weeks leading up to the meeting, the 
members of the Unicode Consortium had asked for and received 
public input for TR#52 and the proposed meetings, including our 
comment. On the 10th of May the Emoji Subcommittee and the voting 
members of the Consortium went through the agenda, reviewing the 
proposals and comments. This happened during the lunch-break in a 
so called “ad-hoc session” of which there are no minutes. During this 
session, Google presented a document which reads as a press release 
rather than a technical document. It was entitled “Expanding Emoji 
Professions: Reducing Gender Inequality”31 and was simultaneously 
released to the public. The Guardian and several other major news 
outlets ran a story on Google’s proposal that same day.32 After a short 
break, a consensus was reached to suspend any work on UTR#52 and 
to pursue “an alternative approach using ZWJ for representing female 
emoji”, referring to Google’s proposal.33
Figure 7. More resolution is no solution
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 These events interestingly shifted the responsibility and agency 
for implementing diversity back to the vendors themselves and away 
from the Unicode Consortium. This time Google had made sure that 
the spotlight for making diversity happen, pointed on them, and 
not on Apple. The proposed change was in favour of using the ZWJ 
(Zero-Width-Joiner) mechanism rather than a “modifier” or modifier 
tag mechanism, as was originally proposed. The ZWJ is an invisible 
character already used in Unicode to denote the combination between 
two separate characters. This is being used for example in the family 
emoji, where the Unicode characters for man, woman and child 
are written in combination with ZWJ. It is then up to the vendor to 
implement this as a family emoji and to decide on how it shows up on a 
device. The important shift here is that new emoji can thus be created 
by making combinations of existing symbols, rather than having to 
propose new modifiable emoji. This means that any new emoji can 
be invented (and implemented) by vendors, without having to go 
through the Unicode Consortium. In effect this is a de-politicization of 
Unicode, since any move towards representing “diversity” via emoji 
can now happen through the vendors themselves. Google, for example, 
“claims” gender with their hyper-mediated introduction of gendered 
professions and the addition of a rainbow flag.34 
 The event also represents a typical case of do-ocracy, in which a 
(nominally) open and discursive process of negotiation is sidelined  
by presenting faits-accomplis. Do-ocracy is a mode of decision-making 
popular in technical circles for its speed and decisiveness. Having 
done the task also becomes the justification and validation for it:  
“Why do we actually use ZWJ emoji? because Google just did it!” 
Do-ocracy assumes that everyone is able to “act” with the same power 
and when you want to oppose a decision, you just “do” something else. 
Whereas Unicode nominally leaves space for individuals and small 
organisations to participate in the discourse and creation of standards, 
Figure 8. Detail from the Google proposal/press release demonstrating the 
technological fix where the ZWJ mechanism could be used to quickly  
create additional diversity without having to deal with the lengthy Unicode 
process. Screenshot from http://unicode.org/L2/L2016/16160-emoji- 
professions.pdf.
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these individuals and small organisations can never compete with the 
power of Google do-ocracy. It turns the Unicode Consortium into  
what so many open standards bodies have become, a rubber-stamping 
entity to validate unilateral decision-making by large commercial 
players.
Solutions or diversity and potential for multiplicity
The Unicode Consortium is largely made up of technology giants like  
Apple and Google. It seems that the Consortium offers them an 
institutional front in a game of smoke and mirrors. The companies hide 
behind the limitations of the standard if necessary, and break out of  
its confines when desirable.
  Our participatory observation (and practice-based research) of 
the decision making process at the Unicode Consortium allowed us 
to study the technical and social implications. On the one hand, we 
looked at emoji as a language and how it is perceived, and on the other 
hand, at the processes at work in social and economic terms. As socio-
technical objects, emoji are at the heart of a biopolitical framework. 
They materialise in the space of communication at a moment when 
representational policies and politics are being reorganised according 
to ethnic faultlines with the help of, for example, the big-data-isation  
of real, marketed or perceived identities.
  We observed how major economic actors in the field of commu-
nication technologies operate, adapt to external constraints or impose 
their choices. Technical decisions are sometimes taken without  
thorough reflection on their implications, whether historical or scien-
tific, let alone on their social consequences. The proposals by the 
Unicode Consortium are merely techno-centric patches, engineering 
solutions in response to the increasing complexity of cross-device  
and cross-cultural computing that actually demands a rethinking of 
compatibility/translation in terms of difference.
 Our collective enquiry was an opportunity to analyse how the 
Unicode Consortium slid from dealing with cross-language document 
exchange to a sort of creative political position, without demonstrating 
any self-awareness of the political nature of its actions. Yet the Unicode 
Consortium operates as much more than just an IT standardisation 
of existing languages. Through the encoding of emoji, it creates and 
normalises a set of representations of humanity. It projects how human 
bodies must be for them and for numerous other computing compa-
nies: industrious, athletic, healthy, stable and classifiable in distinct 
market categories. As a consequence, possible projections of the body 
and non-standardised languages are being reduced to stereotypes 
while sexual or sexually connoted deviant uses of emoji are controlled. 
Meanwhile, racism and ethnic profiling are not only allowed but 
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encouraged and valued for the sake of their economic potential.
 We observed how in our techno-capitalist society identity 
politics is recycled and reduced to the most congruous, superficial 
representation of a projected self for marketing purposes. We can only 
wonder how this will be further used in a changing political context 
where cultural or “ethnic” profiling of Internet users has become 
normal. Superficial colour-blindness abounds while a wide wave of 
reactionary movements—from anti-gay marriage rallies to Alt-rights, 
Tea Parties and National Fronts of all kind—appear with newly 
polished faces. Meanwhile, in reaction to radical Islamic bombings all 
over the world, restrictions of civil liberties are implemented through 
social media and communications technology. Not at any moment 
are the colonial assumptions underlying the system of encoding 
being questioned: the assumption that everything can and should be 
encoded into the same system.
  It is urgent that we develop possibilities for multiplicity, but this 
means a shift of paradigm. We cannot expect to buy solutions for 
diversity with the next update because the one-dimensional relation 
between client and vendor is precisely what produces such superficial 
implementations in the first place. We need to collectively engage in 
rigorous discussions about device platforms and the consequences  
of standardisation processes. Unicode could provide such a platform  
if it took its own potential more seriously and opened up the process  
of technology making and standard-forming to the larger public.  
This is not about having a voice in which emoji should be included into 
the standard. It is a plea for getting involved in the way technological 
systems are being drawn up, and to demand more from communication 
standards than appeasement or soothing ways to solve difference.
 When we get together to finish this text a few months later, after  
a few hours of browsing Unicode repositories, we find the agenda  
for the meeting in which our comment should have been discussed. 
The emoji subcommittee has dismissed it with a cryptic: “Snelting et al:  
Too late for ESC 36 response” .37
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RuntimeException()
— Critique of Software Violence 
Geoff Cox
There is an inherent violence of software.1 Our network operations 
are dominated by violent acts against us in the form of viruses, spam, 
phishing and botnets, and more to point, violence is encoded in 
software itself. As with language, we enter informational infrastructures 
antagonistically — echoing Judith Butler’s observation that we come 
into language antagonistically from our beginnings (Butler 1997, 1; 
Cox & McLean 2013).2 Butler’s point is that violence is embodied in 
language, not simply in the way it might be used to incite a violent 
action or in the ways that language reflects social domination more 
generally — such that it can be injurious, as in the case of hate speech 
(against refugees, for instance). But, as Slavoj Zˇizeˇk has also pointed 
out (after Hegel), language also is violent in the way that it produces 
meaning. There is something inherently violent in the capacity of 
language to represent a thing, what he calls “its essencing ability” 
(Zˇizeˇk 2008, 52), equivalent to its symbolic death. As it stands in for 
something, “it dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity”, 
and forces the thing into a field of meaning that is outside of itself (58). 
This also happens at the level of software, and perhaps in a more overt 
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manner, as programming languages extend natural languages through 
their protocological address to humans and machines. With program 
code, it not only symbolises but enacts violence on the thing during 
runtime: it quite literally executes it. 
 The term execution combines parallel understandings of 
violent, computational and legal acts, including, for instance: putting 
a condemned person to death; the act of performing something 
successfully; the process of carrying out an instruction by a computer 
during the runtime phase; the completion of a legal instrument  
such as a contract so that it becomes legally binding and enforceable;  
a routine court order that attempts to enforce a legal judgment; the 
act of accomplishing some aim or executing some order, unlawful 
premeditated killing of a human being by a human being, and so 
on.3 Beyond symbolic violence and the deadly assault on meaning, 
it indicates how the completion of an action, order or instruction can 
produce violent consequences with real effects on living bodies.  
This is perhaps what artist Martin Howse signals with his work 
pain registers (2011), in which a pin penetrates human flesh as a 
consequence of instructions from the computer’s processor when 
performing the simple operations of web browsing.4 
 In this essay I want to draw out some of these tensions between 
execution and decision-making at an operational level — where cultural 
and computational logics collide — or, in other words, my aim is to 
examine the intersection of sovereign code and law, and moreover, 
how contemporary forms of sovereignty execute commands or indeed 
refuse to execute them. The example from Mladen Dolar’s book  
A Voice and Nothing More comes to mind, in which a group of soldiers 
repeatedly fail to execute the order of their general to attack their 
enemy and instead contemplate the beauty of his voice (2006, 3). 
 In terms of further reference points, and at the time of writing,  
it is also hard not to be distracted by recent terrorist events that make 
parallels between execution at the level of a successful completion  
of a task and its deadly consequences. When does the logic of one  
form of execution serve the other? Incidents in Paris and Brussels and 
the empathetic hysteria that ensued come to mind (#prayforparis/
brussels),5 as does the French-speaking context more generally 
invoking the republican use of the guillotine to execute the ruling  
elite as well as anti-fascist and anti-imperialist revolutions in North 
Africa. One of the famous scenes from the film The Battle of Algiers 
makes the inherent duplicity of the moral order apparent: a reporter 
asks the captured terrorist leader Ben M’hidi: “Isn’t it cowardly to  
use your women’s baskets to carry bombs, which have taken so many 
innocent lives?”; he responds, “Isn’t it even more cowardly to attack 
defenseless villages with napalm bombs that kill many thousands  
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of times more? Obviously, planes would make things easier for us.  
Give us your bombers, sir, and you can have our baskets” (1966).  
The assumption in this essay is that software offers the potential to  
be a parallel response.6 
*  *  *
But before discussing these issues with respect to software, I will 
firstly introduce the subject of violence in more detail. As is probably 
clear at this point, the subtitle of this essay refers explicitly to Walter 
Benjamin’s 1921 essay “Critique of Violence” (1996).7 For Benjamin, 
at issue is not whether violence is a means to a just or unjust end, but 
whether violence can be a moral means in itself. As he puts it, “a more 
exact criterion is needed, which would discriminate within the sphere 
of means themselves, without regard for the ends they serve” (1996, 
236). So rather than simply reconciling just ends by a justification of  
the means, or vice versa, the required focus becomes “the question  
of the justification of certain means that constitute violence” (237). 
 As far as the state is concerned, violence exercised by individuals, 
or its legal subjects, is a threat to the legal system that uses violence 
for legal ends that the law itself legitimates (such as police or military 
violence). This indicates the law’s “monopoly on violence” as Benjamin 
puts it, in not simply preserving legal ends but more importantly in 
preserving the institution of the law itself. It also affirms the threat  
of actions that are outside of the law, and how even oppositional kinds 
of action or protests are tolerated because they affirm the power of 
the law to guarantee certain freedoms. The right to free speech is an 
example of this technique of power for example and I will return to  
this later in the essay. 
 Another important exception has been the right of workers to 
strike, conceded by the state in recognition of the inevitability of 
antagonism in the workplace. Whether overtly violent or not, the 
motivation to strike is to address the violence already imposed on  
the worker by the employer. In this way, and as Leon Trotsky pointed 
out in his essay “Terrorism” (1911), arguments against the use of 
violence are inherently hypocritical: “And the only question remaining 
is whether the bourgeois politicians have the right to pour out their 
floods of moral indignation about proletarian terrorism when their 
entire state apparatus with its laws, police, and army is nothing but  
an apparatus for capitalist terror!”
 On the one hand terrorist violence is seen to be inadmissible by 
the moral order, and yet on the other, in exceptional circumstances 
it is seen to be necessary according to the self-interest of the state 
apparatus. 
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 Much the same duplicity applies in contemporary discussions, 
wherein the “state of exception” becomes the justification for the 
erosion of human rights and freedoms in the paranoid context of secu-
ritisation.8 The duplicity is evident in the way those deemed a danger 
to national security can be taken into custody and detained without 
trial or other sovereign states can be invaded in contravenence with 
international law. The examples are well known by now. This paradox-
ical condition has been discussed in depth in Giorgio Agamben’s State 
of Exception (2005), extending Carl Schmitt’s Politische Theologie of 
1922 that established the contiguity between sovereignty and the state 
of exception (“the sovereign is he who decides on the exception”). 
Agamben argues that the state of exception, although first described 
as a provisional measure in exceptional circumstances, has become 
the working paradigm of modern government (2001).9 Under this 
logic, state power uses violence against an identifiable enemy — often 
preemptively—so that its use of power appears necessary and legit-
imate despite the active contradiction with its own legal and natural 
laws. When the required ends cannot be guaranteed by the legal 
system alone, the repressive state apparatus further exercises violence 
in the name of counter-terrorism or interests of national security. 
 If the parallel development of security and liberalism has already 
been well established (by Foucault), the issue of security today 
seems almost reducible to the challenge of managing the inherent 
vulnerability of networked relations. Software running over networks 
is increasingly regarded as a threat to security in this way and prof-
itable commercial industries support this strategy of governance. 
In The Exploit, Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker identify 
how networks and sovereignty are indeed not incompatible but 
exceptional — together related as “sovereignty-in-networks” (2007). 
Correspondingly, the recommendation to those developing opposi-
tional tactics is to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in networks 
by exploiting power differentials that are inherent to the networked 
system (Deleuze 1992). This is precisely how software developers  
and malware (malicious software) developers operate, as they exploit 
vulnerable operating systems, internet service and security software. 
 Software violence and counter-violence is propagated through 
such means to exploit known and potential vulnerabilities. Malware 
is usually installed via worms, trojan horses or backdoors under a 
common command and control infrastructure. For instance, a program 
installed by a botnet can violate a system’s hard disc and monitor 
user’s keystrokes to gather private data (such as sensitive financial 
information, including credit card numbers and passwords for bank 
or Paypal accounts) and then distribute the retrieved data over the 
internet back to the computer running the malware (a so-called  
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zombie computer). In the example below, the function names and 
keywords below are taken from a popular bot with packet sniffing 
capabilities to capture online credentials and other information  
(Ianelli & Hackworth 2005). 
bool IsSuspiciousVULN(const char *szBuf) – looks for keywords  
that indicate vulnerable server versions. Examples include:
• “OpenSSL/0.9.6”
• “Serv-U FTP Server”
• “OpenSSH_2”
bool IsSuspiciousHTTP(const char *szBuf) – may attempt 
to gather HTTP based authentication credentials and other 
valuable data. In this sample bot, the keywords appear to  
target paypal cookies.
• “paypal”
• “PAYPAL”
• “PAYPAL.COM”
• “paypal.com”
• “Set-Cookie:” 
There are countless other examples that illustrate how vulnerabilities 
can be exploited and how botnets can cause severe disruption to 
targeted sites. A botnet can control a set of “hijacked” systems to 
target systems (e.g. a commercial or government website) with 
information requests in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.10 
The hacktivist tactics of Lizard Squad, Anonymous, or of LulzSec, 
the splinter group of Anonymous who have been “Laughing at your 
security since 2011!” exemplify such an approach (Coleman 2014). 
These loosely associated networks of activists and hactivists have 
coordinated various DDoS attacks using forums and social media 
websites, where instructions were disseminated on how to download 
attack software to bombard websites with data to try to throw them 
offline. “Operation Payback” is one such example from 2010, targeting 
sites that had cut ties with WikiLeaks (such as MasterCard, Visa and 
PayPal).11 More currently, Anonymous considers itself to be “at war” 
with the Islamic State following the recent terrorist attacks in Europe  
as a continuation of its “#OpISIS” campaign.12
 These computational lines of attack, whether overtly violent or  
not, address the violence already imposed on the user if we follow 
the logic of the argument thus far. In what Angela Mitropoulos has 
referred to as “softwar” (2007), violence is exerted on software users 
in everyday circumstances, not least forcing them to pay and upgrade 
regularly when there are viable free alternatives as in the case of 
proprietary forms, and thus demanding a response. Mitropoulos 
refers to the issue of intellectual property and related conflicts over 
sharing digital content, such as those over P2P file sharing. Double 
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standards are expressed when the user agrees to the terms of service 
that disallow certain actions that are inherent to the technology. 
Furthermore, the moral ambiguities of software licenses and duplicities 
of the law are plain to see, and at the heart of all terms of service 
agreements and copyright regimes. To break a contract thereby is  
to activate the threat of violence enforced by the law, whereas — as I am 
arguing — the greater violence has already been committed and gone 
unpunished in the first place. Whistleblowing is another good example 
of this faulty logic, or the Wikleaks project more broadly that stresses 
the ethical position of many who choose to break the law for the 
greater good. When no other choice is possible, software insurgency 
might be a justifiable response, founded on some of the ethical 
standards that the hacker movement has strived to promote:
* Access to computers — and anything that might teach you  
something about the way the world really works — should be  
unlimited and total. Always yield to the Hands-On Imperative!
* All information should be free.
* Mistrust authority — promote decentralization.
* Hackers should be judged by their acting, not bogus criteria 
such as degrees, age, race, or position.
* You can create art and beauty on a computer.
* Computers can change your life for the better.
* Don’t litter other people’s data.
* Make public data available, protect private data..13
In following these principles, it should be stressed that the majority  
of hackers condemn malign attacks. The use of non-violent direct  
action and tactical media is more commonplace, such as the FloodNet 
DDoS software developed in 1998 by the Electronic Disturbance 
Theater, and used by the Zapatistas against Mexican and American 
governments websites.14 Although for many hackers the ethical 
practices of free software represent a move away from the use of overt 
violence, the paradoxes of power simply cannot be avoided as violence 
is inherent to software. Perhaps more contemporary examples of 
online violence serve to emphasise how software itself contains active 
contradictions that oscillate between truth and falsity (like Boolean 
logic), between violence and non-violence, and yet where both states 
are necessary for logical relations in networked sovereignties. 
 Lizard Squad’s DDoS attack on the free software Tor browsing 
network in January 2015 makes another good example.15 The attack 
aimed to highlight vulnerabilities with respect to Tor’s ability to 
enable anonymity on the Internet and thereby to remain outside the 
reach of government monitoring agencies like the NSA. By attacking 
nodes used to relay information between peers, and setting up new 
relays called “LizardNSA”, Lizard Squad could begin to piece together 
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communications that were transmitted under the belief that the 
information was anonymous. The action enraged other hacker groups 
such as Anonymous who released the following Twitter message:  
“Hey @LizardMafia don’t f--k with the Tor network. People need 
that service because of corrupt governments. Stand the f—k down” 
(Plummer 2015).
 Responding to debates about Internet freedom in such a way 
operates in parallel to the paradoxes of free software and free speech 
as if they were not already problematic concepts.16 The ethics of free 
software emerged out of the hacker communities yet the ambiguities  
of free speech as the central analogy have not been critically 
developed inasmuch as it is enshrined in the liberal tradition that 
recognises that suppressing freedom of speech is a crude tactic 
of governance. Instead the state, for the most part, opens up the 
widest possible domains for the expression of opinions that become 
constituent of its own exercise of power protected under international 
law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless 
of frontiers.”17 Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
similarly provides the right to freedom of expression, but like Article 
19 is also subject to certain restrictions that are deemed “necessary  
in a democratic society”.18 Certain restrictions are implemented  
when deemed necessary in the interests of national security, or public 
order, or protection of public health and morals, and so on. 
 This leaves freedom on the Internet, as with life in general, subject 
to both state and (free) market regulation, further compromised by 
the pervasive use of filtering software and dataveillance practices. 
Antoinette’s Rouvroy’s notion of “algorithmic governmentality” reso-
nates with these practices and our (in)ability to intervene in processes 
of government (2013). Subjectivities are produced in relation to  
what algorithms understand about our intentions, gestures, behaviours, 
opinions, or desires to be, through aggregating massive amounts 
of data and machine learning. She refers to this as “personalisation 
without subjects” and identifies the mistake of discussing concerns 
over personal data when what more crucially is at stake are the 
processes of subjectification through data mining and profiling. Under 
contemporary conditions, it is clear that governments exert forms 
of violence on their citizens in quite subtle ways that do not appear 
directly violent. The “violence of participation” (Meissen 2007), for 
instance, is a form of violence that doesn’t appear violent at all and 
inherent antagonisms are hidden from view (that Schmitt would identify 
as essential to our understanding of politics).19 
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 Therefore — and this is my point — it becomes necessary to 
produce paradoxes at the level of software in recognition of its central 
role in the structural logic of contemporary capitalism. The violence 
embodied in software is inherent to the way it prescribes and deter-
mines certain ethical decisions and actions as well as how subjectiva-
tion operates in societies of control. Like the myth of freedom of  
choice or participation, violence is demonstrated at multiple levels of 
execution, and exerted against information that wants to be free and 
code that wants to remain undead. 
*  *  *
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” described the potential for “pure 
immediate violence”—human action that neither makes nor preserves 
law, but is outside of the law altogether. The idea of pure violence 
does not apply to any violent action in itself, but in its relation to the 
conditions under which it is constituted. The concept is complex and 
draws together class violence with the theology of divine violence 
represented by Judaic Messianism20—where redemption is provided 
by pure divine violence. So rather than promote terrorist violence, 
Benjamin instead calls for “collective political action that is lethal not  
to human beings, but to the humanly created mythic powers that  
reign over them” (Buck-Morss 2003, 33).
 The concept of pure violence is a violence that appears to come 
from nowhere—from beyond the law—in which “killing is neither a 
crime nor a sacrifice”, because law applies only to the living: “Divine 
violence is an expression of pure drive, of the undeadness, the excess 
of life, which strikes the ‘bare life’ regulated by law” (Zˇizeˇk 2008,  
168). The explanation makes reference to Agamben’s Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) that questions the nature of law 
and biopower (thus again extending Foucault). To explain briefly, 
under Roman law, someone who committed a certain kind of crime  
was banned from society and rights as a citizen revoked: “Homo  
sacer” (sacred life) was excluded from law itself, while being included 
at the same time. Agamben explains how this figure is the inverse  
of the sovereign who stands, on the one hand, within law and outside  
of the law—since they have the power to decide the state of exception 
where law is “suspended”—the exception. According to Agamben, 
biopower, which takes the bare lives of the citizens into its political 
calculations, may be more marked in the modern state, but has 
essentially existed since the beginnings of sovereignty in the West, 
since this structure of exception is essential to the core concept of 
sovereignty. Referring to Schmitt’s view of sovereignty and the rule of 
exception, Agamben explains this as “the condition of being excluded 
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through an inclusion, of being in relation to something from which  
one is excluded” (1998, 26-7). Because politics has been contaminated 
with law in the state of exception according to Agamben, and because 
only human action is able to cut the relationship between violence 
and law, it becomes increasingly difficult for humans to act effectively 
against sovereign power. Hence we get all kinds of desperate actions 
that are symptomatic of more general and paranoid aspects of 
contemporary culture — from suicide to mass killings (Berardi 2015; 
Cox 2013). 
 Agamben is drawing upon Benjamin’s formulation of the necessity 
of a politics of pure means in order to develop an idea of life as pure 
immanence. His own formulation of this, in Means without End, empha-
sizes that: “Politics is the sphere of pure means, that is, of the absolute 
and complete gesturality of human beings” (Agamben 2000, 59).  
To Agamben, gesture (or pure means) is not action as a means in itself 
but a pure and endless mediality that disrupts the false distinction 
and presents means without end. The event of language, for instance, 
is political in as much as it relates to the free use of pure means. It can 
perhaps be seen how software operates in a similar manner, making 
means more apparent and thus opening up the political dimension  
of coding. 
 It is the undeadness of code that seems to allow for this, as action 
in excess of violence. Both the undeadness of information and the 
(undead) logic of programmability are attempts to reanimate dead 
materials, highlighting the potential to draw together instruction and 
execution across multiple layers of operation.21 Think, for example, 
of a forkbomb,22 a denial-of-service attack wherein a process 
continually replicates itself in an infinite loop to deplete available 
system resources, causing resource starvation and eventually killing 
the system. When there is no other choice, one might speculate further 
about how software might express pure means in such ways once 
directed at the sovereign technical infrastructures that already exert 
forms of violence upon us. This seems necessary to balance the ways  
in which life now operates under contemporary conditions and in 
order to introduce further and more ethical exceptions to sovereign 
rule. 
 :(){ :|:& };:
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Notes
1. A version of this article was 
published in Spanish, “Crítica de la 
violencia software” (2015), itself based 
on an even earlier version, “Critique of 
Software Security” (2009, 27–39). 
  2. Butler is referring to Althusser’s 
notion of interpellation (see Cox & 
McLean 2013).
3. See http://www.thefreedictionary.
com/execution.
4. See Eric Snodgrass’s “What is 
executing here?” in this volume for a 
more detailed description of Howse’s 
pain registers. 
5. I refer to the attacks in Brussels 
(22 March 2016) and the Charlie Hebdo 
shootings in Paris (7 Jan 2015) provoked 
by satiric images of Mohammad and 
their earlier re-publication of the 
Jyllands-Posten cartoons of Muhammad 
in 2006; and the shootings at the public 
event “Art, Blasphemy and Freedom of 
Expression” at the Krudttønden cultural 
centre, Copenhagen (14–15 Feb 2015), 
where Swedish artist Lars Vilks was in 
attendance and thought to have been the 
main target because of his drawings of 
Muhammad.
6. Much the same was said by 
Deleuze in “Postscript on the Societies 
of Control”: “Computer piracy and 
viruses, for example, will replace strikes 
and what the nineteenth century called 
‘sabotage’ (‘clogging’ the machinery)” 
(1992, 3–7).
7. In addition, the question of violence 
has been addressed by many others, 
such as: Hannah Arendt’s “On Violence” 
(1969); Pierre Clastres’s “Archaeology 
of Violence” (1979); Frantz Fanon’s 
The Wretched of the Earth (published 
in French as Les damnés de la terre, 
1961) in which violence opposes the 
violence of colonialism; Georges Sorel’s 
“Reflections on Violence” (1915); Irving 
Wohlfarth’s “Critique of Violence” (2009), 
which charts the connections between 
Benjamin’s essay and the Red Army 
Faction operating in Germany during the 
1970s.
8. It is worth noting that although 
terrorism is a legitimate concern of 
course, it is Far-right terrorism, right 
wing extremism, we should really fear. 
It is a fact that “Right-wing extremists in 
the United States still kill more people 
than jihadis” (Nettime mailing list, 24 Nov 
2015).
9. In response to 9/11, Agamben 
writes: “A state which has security as 
its sole task and source of legitimacy 
is a fragile organism; it can always be 
provoked by terrorism to become itself 
terroristic.” (2001; Cox & Sützl 2009, 
23–25).
10. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack 
is an attempt to make a machine or 
network resource unavailable to its 
intended users, such as to temporarily 
or indefinitely interrupt or suspend 
services of a host connected to the 
Internet. A distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS) is where the attack source is 
more than one, and often thousands of 
unique IP addresses.
11. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Operation_Payback. 
12. See http://thehackernews.
com/2015/11/anonymous-hacker-isis.
html. 
13. Available at http://www.ccc.de/
hackerethics?language=en. In general, 
hacker simply refers to a person 
who is capable of creating hacks, or 
demonstrating technical virtuosity. 
Hackers are generally understood as 
those who attempt to penetrate security 
systems on remote computers, but this is 
a pejorative use of the term. To clarify, a 
hacker is someone with proficiency and 
practical understanding of the structure 
and operations of computer networks 
and systems, whereas crackers or system 
intruders are hackers with malign 
intentions (likened to terrorists even). 
14. The Electronic Disturbance 
Theater (EDT) initially executed 
FloodNet in April and December 1998 
on Mexican and American government 
sites respectively. FloodNet can also 
be downloaded from http://www.thing.
net/~rdom/ecd/floodnet.html. Also see 
Stalbaum (2002).
15. Tor is a web browser that prevents 
others from learning your location or 
browsing habits. See https://www.
torproject.org/.
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16. To be clear, I am referring to how 
the Free Software Foundation define 
freedom: “‘Free software’ is a matter 
of liberty, not price. To understand the 
concept, you should think of ‘free’ as 
in ‘free speech’, not as in free beer.”) 
Also see Cox & McLean (2013), for an 
elaboration on this issue. 
17. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (adopted in 1948) is 
available at http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/.
18. The European Convention on 
Human Rights (adopted in 1950) is 
available at http://www.hri.org/docs/
ECHR50.html.
19. Further evoking Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of enmity, from The Concept of 
the Political, of 1927. Schmitt’s critique of 
liberalism lies in its inability to recognize 
antagonism as inevitable in human 
societies, and the political differentiation 
of friend or enemy is at the centre  
of this. The foregrounding of ‘friendship’  
in social media is arguably part of 
the same logic where the inherent 
antagonisms of software are made 
relatively invisible.
20. Discussion of Benjamin’s essay and 
its rejection of the law for “messianic 
anarchy” appears in Wohlfarth’s 
“Critique of Violence: the deposing of 
the law” (2009).
21. Wendy Chun refers to ‘undeadness’ 
in her comments on the time dimension 
of instruction and execution. Source 
code becomes a source only after the 
action has taken place. She is referring 
to Derrida: “Source code becomes a 
source only through its destruction, 
through its simultaneous nonpresence 
and presence. Code (both biological 
and technological), in other words, is 
“undead” writing, a writing that — even 
when it repeats itself — is never simply a 
deadly or living repetition of the same.” 
(Chun 2011, 192)
 22. The example that follows was 
written by Jaromil in 2002, available 
at https://jaromil.dyne.org/journal/
forkbomb_art.html. The user executes 
the fork bomb by pasting the following 
13 characters into a UNIX shell. Below  
is an explanation of how it executes:
:() # define ‘:’ -- whenever we say ‘:’, do 
this:
{     # beginning of what to do when we 
say ‘:’
:      # load another copy of the ‘:’ function 
into memory...
|     # ...and pipe its output to...
:      # ...another copy of ‘:’ function, which 
has to be loaded into memory
# (therefore, ‘:|:’ simply gets two copies 
of ‘:’ loaded whenever ‘:’ is called)
&    # disown the functions -- if the first ‘:’ 
is killed, all of the functions 
# that it has started should NOT be 
auto-killed
}        # end of what to do when we say ‘:’
;        # Having defined ‘:’, we should 
now...
:        # ...call ‘:’, initiating a chain-
reaction: each ‘:’ will start two more.
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On Commands and Executions:
Tyrants, Spectres and Vagabonds 
David Gauthier
It is difficult to address the notion of command and execution without 
addressing that of tyranny. The concept of execution is an eerie 
construct that at once implies a prescription and a proscription in its 
suggestion that a rule or command is imposed and enforced on an 
indeterminate substrate (subjects, objects, matter or otherwise).  
Thus, it also suggests a certain type of violence that is at once effected 
and effaced, or, differently put, execution insinuates a despotic 
foreclosure. In that sense, the problematics of execution are central 
to the notion of control, which speaks both to the order of reason that 
it imposes and by which it is assessed. It also points to moments and 
milieux of erasure where a given order vanishes in indeterminacy —
intervals and gaps that the order itself creates and forbids, its 
necessary residual exterior. 
 While the software/hardware divide has been a recurrent topic 
of conversation within the field of Software Studies, I argue that the 
subject needs to be pushed forward to consider the under-theorised 
notions of command/execution. Moving from a conception of soft-
ware as ideology to a conception of software as tyranny, this article 
shows how the symbolic order of the law, which underpins notions 
of command and instruction, leads to an impasse when confronted 
with the question of execution. In turn, rather than seeking an under-
standing of execution from the despotic perspective of commands  
and instructions, the current inquiry identifies the various loci  
where such a perspective collapses and it petitions for a practice of 
execution that conceives of it as an event in its own right rather than  
a mere afterthought.
Software as Ideology
In order to illustrate the problematic the notion of execution entails,  
I will first focus on a particular debate about source code and  
ideology that took place between Wendy Hui Kyong Chun (2005, 2008) 
and Alexander R. Galloway (2006). This debate was partly prompted  
by the nascent field of Software Studies which elected “software”  
as the prime object of study of New Media discourse (Fuller 2006). 
In her articles, Chun warns that in divorcing software from hardware 
and in focusing on its discursive and semantic aspects, one effects 
an epistemological and political move since “software perpetuates 
certain notions of seeing as knowing ... creating an invisible system 
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of visibility. The knowledge software offers is as obfuscatory as it is 
revealing” (2005, 27). To further grasp the arguments of the debate, 
it is worth highlighting how the advent of Computer Science, with its 
emphasis on symbolic programming languages, drastically changed 
the ways in which computing was conceived from the 1950s onwards. 
Programming and coding practices, prior to the advent of computing 
languages, were affairs of crafty local conventions and customs 
that were highly tailored for individual machines across various 
sites (Nofre et al. 2014, 49). With the growing commercialisation of 
computing machinery, the concept of programming languages came 
about as a means to standardise these local conventions and customs, 
encapsulating them into syntactic and semantic forms that would 
present traits of both mathematical notations and natural language:
The notion of a programming language, which is connected 
to the idea of universality, became central to this exercise 
of boundary work that sought to disengage the activity of 
programming from local conventions, and to transform it into 
a transcendent and universal body of knowledge. From this 
endeavour, programming languages and algorithms emerged 
as epistemic objects stripped of any marks that would associate 
them with specific hardware. (Nofre et al. 2014, 66)
The consequence of the advent of “universal” languages was not  
only that programming acquired a type of “machine independence” 
(source code able to be built and executed on a variety of machines), 
but more importantly, it brought about an amassing of linguistic 
objects written in various “universal” programming languages, and 
which, in turn, developed an epistemic and discursive life of their own.
Programming languages could thus carve out their own computing 
invariant — a transcendent “island of semantic stability” (66) — by 
rendering invisible the machine that was once literally in plain sight. 
It is clear, then, that the universalisation of programming as language 
produced a kind of stratification and disjunction of computing that  
cut off the tacit and innate relationship programming had, and indeed 
still has, with the material, processual and “crafty” aspects of hardware 
which, consequently, became an invisible and illegible “black box” 
(Brown and Carr qtd. in Nofre et al. 2014, 54).
 Speaking of this disjunction between the legible symbolic 
programming language and the illegible “black box”, Chun posits that,  
as a result, “software is a functional analog to ideology” (Chun 2005, 
43). This analogy between software as an object in itself and as an 
ideology stems from the fact that software instantiates a strict division 
and upholds an illusory dialectical logic of cause and effects (input  
and output) between infrastructure — the obscure and illegible  
“black box”— and superstructure — manifest and legible programming 
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languages. This rupture speaks to the foreclosure of language over  
the matter of computing, an operation that totalises the linguistic 
regime of programming by concealing the totality of its material 
substrate. Inevitably, then, questions of operations and meaning are 
(re)claimed by this linguistic regime alone in that it is the only regime 
capable of lending itself to “objective” interpretations and, in so doing, 
legitimatises itself. By locating the birth of symbolic programming 
languages at the grave of material hardware, Computer Science put 
forth a type of “source” (code) reading of computer programs solely 
based on human-readability, as opposed to machine-readability, 
for instance. Addressing this divide, Chun concludes by noting that 
“because of the histories and gazes [it] erase[s]; and because of the 
future [it] points toward[s] … [s]oftware has become a commonsense 
shorthand for culture and hardware a shorthand for nature” (46).
 To grasp the potency of Chun’s warning, it is important to turn 
to Galloway’s intervention and show how his framings, according 
to Chun, further highlight the illusory conflation of code (software) 
and execution (hardware). In his article “Language Wants To Be 
Overlooked”, Galloway (2006) acknowledges that code necessitates 
a hardware infrastructure in order to function; he writes, “code exists 
first and foremost as commands issued to a machine. Code essentially 
has no other reason for being than instructing some machine how to 
act” (326). We can clearly see how Galloway’s concept of code sustains 
this split between infrastructure (the machine) and superstructure 
(code as written commands issued to control the machine) when he 
famously declares that “code is the only language that is executable” 
(325). The paramount problem with this conception of command and 
control, instruction and execution, code and machine is that, as Chun 
rightly puts it, “[in making] the argument that code is automatically 
executable, the process of execution itself must not only be erased,  
but source code also must be conflated with its executable version” 
(2008, 305). This erasure of execution, by conflating linguistic 
commands and machine operations, has the corollary of reducing 
notions of contingent computing events and processes solely to  
written instructions which command them. In other words, in conflating 
code and execution one conflates logos with action, explicitly erasing 
all the problematics, discrepancies and variations action entails (303). 
Going further with her analysis, as I will discuss in the next section, 
Chun posits that symbolic code thus becomes law wherein executive, 
legislative and juridical power coincide to establish a pure state of 
exception—“code as law as police”, where the gap between word and 
force, and logic and praxis is effectively effaced (2011, 101). 
 Leaving aside Chun’s discussion of the law for now, I would like to 
emphasise that Galloway’s concept of software as language or machine 
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(2006, 327) is solely concerned with the manipulation of symbols. 
The symbolic order of the command, to put it this way, is put in a 
prescriptive relationship with its physical “support”. The processual 
and temporal gap existing between the issuing of a command and 
the return of results is denied any agency whatsoever as the logic of 
symbols and codes supersedes the one of their entropic medium, 
a non-processual or eventless notion of execution that seems to be 
symptomatic of some software oriented media theories. In this regard, 
both Galloway’s and Lev Manovich’s (2001) notions of transcoding 
are worth examining. For Manovich, “to ‘transcode’ something is to 
translate it into another format” (47). Similarly, for Galloway, software  
is a prime exemplar of “technical transcoding without figuration” 
(2006, 319), where the various “lower level” layers composing the 
subsystems of the machine (logic gates, registers, etc.) are put into a 
relation of pure equivalence. As Galloway notes, “one of the outcomes 
of this perspective is that each layer is technologically related, if not 
entirely equivalent, to all the other layers” (327).1 We thus can clearly 
see that for both theorists the temporal and material process by  
which the machine codes and decodes is completely bracketed since 
their concept of transcoding solely privileges the outcome of this 
process, that is, the resulting written format or data structure (323).  
For Galloway, “there is a privileged moment in which the written 
becomes purely machinic and back again” (319), for which, then, 
everything that is machinic ought to be equivalent. While Galloway 
does not develop his notion of “machinic” further than simply alluding 
to a complex aggregate of “‘lower’ symbolic interactions of voltages 
through logic gates” (319), he does differentiate between conceiving  
of software as language and conceiving of software as machine (327)  
in positing that “code is machinic first and linguistic second” 
(326). While it can be argued that software commands differ from 
“illocutionary” commands and that software is dissimilar to “speech 
acts”, the point of the current inquiry is to examine the notion of 
command as such. It aims at problematising how this notion relies 
on a given symbolic order (arithmetical, logical, algorithmic, legal, 
machinic, etc.) that substitutes itself for the event that is execution, 
which, I argue, has nothing to do with symbols alone but rather points 
elsewhere.
Software as Tyranny
While arguments depicting software as being the “machinic turn” 
of ideology, in the case of Chun’s earlier essays (2005, 2008), or 
allegory, in the case of Galloway (2006), seem convincing, I intend 
to look elsewhere to account for the tension between command and 
execution, word and action. I find it peculiar, to say the least, that 
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the Church-Turing thesis in its physical form, which I believe lurks 
underneath these discussions about symbolic algorithms and their 
physical instantiation, is framed in terms of ideology or allegory. 
Therefore, in what could be considered a bold move, I follow the 
conviction that “ideology has no importance: what matters is not 
ideology … but the organisation of power” (Guattari and Lotringer 
2009, 37). Thus, rather than seeking inspiration from a critique of 
ideology, as do Chun and Galloway, I turn to critiques of violence and 
theories of law and authority that address how concepts of law are 
enforced through rules, instructions and commands. While Chun’s  
later essay (2011) does turn to a critique of violence, in which she 
develops the notion of software as law, or code as law, she does not 
address and focus on the intricacy of the tandem command-execution 
in the manner I am suggesting here.2 To be clear, my aim is not to  
reify a false idea that symbols are immaterial constructs and 
thus unreal, or to reduce software to hard-ware, or to argue that 
infrastructure supersedes superstructure, but rather to theoretically 
look at how symbolic commands are made to operate in the first  
place.
 According to the mathematical form of the Church-Turing thesis, 
which is mainly concerned with effective procedures, executability  
and reliability can be defined as such:
Executability: the procedure consists of a finite number  
of deterministic instructions (i.e. instructions determining  
a unique next step in the procedure), which have finite  
and unambiguous specifications commanding the execution  
of a finite number of primitive operations.
Reliability: when the procedure terminates, the procedure 
generates the correct value of the function for each argument 
after a finite number of primitive operations are performed. 
(Piccinini 2011, 737)
From these informal descriptions, it is worth examining how  
a command (instruction) is necessarily active in the sense that it is 
prescriptive: it requests and constrains action to fulfil the promise 
of its execution which, in turn, should shed expected effects. Yet the 
command itself does not act per se, but rather prescribes an action  
that it, in turn, assesses or judges (“correct value”). A distinction  
must thus be made between what Jacques Derrida calls “performative” 
and “constative” (1990, 969), where the former denotes the act of 
execution and the latter the part of judgement that assesses the  
effects of the former in light of its initial commanding. In short, the 
constative, which both definitions of executability and reliability 
speak to, forms a hermeneutic loop (interpretation, action/execution, 
interpretation), where the central moment of action — the primitive 
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operation — is at once effected and effaced by interpretation itself.3 
Hence, the constative always presumes the performative, “that is to  
say [its] essential precipitation, which never proceeds without a certain 
dissymmetry and some quality of violence” (969). 
 According to the aforementioned definitions, to do justice to an 
instruction, a primitive operation has to generate a correct output. 
However, as Derrida points out, there is no justice of the performative 
as such, but only just-ness, that is, performing according to prior 
conventions, methods, or protocols; the performative, he writes, 
“cannot be just, in the sense of justice ... it always maintains within 
itself some irruptive violence, it no longer responds to the demands 
of theoretical rationality” (969). The implicitness and precipitateness 
of the performative buried within the constative hermeneutic loop 
speaks, in more general terms, of the conflation of command and 
execution as discussed in the previous section. What this conflation 
does, I argue, is to veil the “irrational” violence of the performative  
that still, necessarily, constitutes the core of the constative. While  
there may be rules, methods and protocols prescribed by a given 
command or instruction, the urgency and precipitateness of the 
performative make it act, nonetheless, “in the night of non-knowledge 
and non-rule” (967). What the notion of execution harbours then is an 
act that is at once a “non-knowledge”, a “non-rule”, a “non-protocol”,  
a “non-method”. In other words, the concept of execution points to  
the reverse side of the law, that is, its necessary primitive exterior.
 The rapport between the interior and exterior of the law begs 
further nuancing. For Derrida, “violence is not exterior to the order of 
droit [law]. It threatens it from within” (989). Yet, as I argued above,  
the violence of execution stands as a primitive outside to the symbolic 
order of law; it operates in an inordinately different register as “non- 
knowledge” and ultimately as “non-law” or “out-law”. The order of 
law, the hermeneutic loop of the constative, as I discussed above, may 
well comprise a certain placeholder for the moment of action/execu-
tion, but it nonetheless is articulated by a totally different language 
(if actual language there is), which at once prompts execution as such 
only to efface it after the fact by substituting it with an interpretation of 
its deciphered effects: a correct instruction for a correct value. Yet the 
moment of action/execution still remains illegible from the perspective 
of the constative. The problematic of the symbolic order is its despotic 
attempt to codify, and therefore foreclose everything by means of 
substitution, giving it the grounds and monopoly to justify itself as a 
righteous transcendental order capable of “decreeing to be violent, 
this time in the sense of an outlaw, anyone who does not recognize it” 
(987). 
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 There are thus two types of outlaws I want to unearth here: (1) 
the heretic outlaw that has been judged as such for not recognising 
the law’s order (not following conventions, method, protocol, etc.) 
and consequently ruled “outside” by decree — an error or “miscom-
putation” (Piccinini 2007, 505) — and (2) the “autochthon” outlaw that 
executes and hence founds the constative loop outright, and who  
therefore stands “outside” the law by necessity — primitive operations. 
Both vouch for, from the perspective of the law, a sense of legible  
illegibility, or “foreignness”, since they both imply a passage to action 
as a moment of non-law, a transgression of order.
 For Derrida, the moments of action/execution are, by themselves, 
moments of “mystique”. He writes, “[these] moments supposing we 
can isolate them, are terrifying moments … [They] are themselves, 
and in their very violence, uninterpretable or indecipherable. That is 
what I am calling ‘mystique’” (1990, 991). What Derrida points to with 
“uninterpretable” and “indecipherable” is the limit of interpretation 
as such. Derrida’s “mystique” speaks to the event that is execution 
and how symbolic instructions feign “that of which is in progress” 
during the event; he writes “[i]t is precisely in this ignorance that the 
eventness of the event consists, what we naively call its presence” 
(991). This ignorance [non-savoir] as a moment of deferring or drifting 
of interpretation, as a suspension of the law, is paradoxically equated  
to its own presence and fosters its own becoming. Law is a spectre 
during the moment of execution, it is a presence in absence. As a  
result, execution always exceeds its interpretation or interpretation 
tout court: “[it] is the moment in which the foundation of law remains 
suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure 
performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone” 
(991–3). Thus, the first aforementioned outlaw may well be condemned 
as heretic — the position of the error or miscomputation — but it 
nonetheless harbours an eccentricity that exceeds the law and its 
instruction, an eccentricity that has to answer to or before no one.
 Unpacking the term heresy sheds light on what the becoming of  
the law entails at the moment of action/execution. Etymologically, 
heresy is derived from the greek αἱρετικός [hairetikos], which, accor-
ding to Thayer’s Greek-English lexicon, denotes at once “fitted or able 
to take or choose” and “schismatic, factious, a follower of the false 
doctrine”. The former sense of the term designates an action (taking 
or choosing) that, as mentioned above, exceeds interpretation, while 
the latter denotes an interpretation or judgement as such, which takes 
place after the fact/action. Both senses thus speak to the becoming of 
heresy from action to its judgment. As a result, at the moment of action/ 
execution, the becoming of the law coincides with the becoming 
of heresy. In fact, Derrida tells us, these two becomings are exactly 
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the same. The moment of conservation of the law, by which the 
hermeneutic loop is instantiated and heretic positions are decreed as 
such, is the same as the moment of the founding the law. Any position 
before the law, such as the heretic position, calls for a potential 
repetition of itself: “[a] position is already iterability, a call for self-
conserving repetition” (997). In other words, a position before the  
law permits and promises, it defies and puts forward a vow to repeat 
and iterate. 
 Thus what I have termed the heretic outlaw above is in fact the 
same conceptual personage as the autochthon outlaw. The figure 
of the outlaw, then, “would no longer be before the law, rather [it] 
would be before a law not yet determined, before the law as before 
a law not existing yet, a law yet to come” (993). Put differently, law’s 
transgression is before the law in the sense that it is an infringement 
of an existing law yet, at the same time, it points to the potential 
commencement of another: a proscription becoming prescription. 
There is no pure founding position of the law as such, only iterations  
of it, as “conservation in its turn refounds, so that it can conserve what  
it claims to found” (997). Hence, the heretic position is at once a 
position of commencement and commandment, a promise of a new 
order; and “even if the promise is not kept in fact, iterability inscribes 
the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of foundation”  
(997). In this way, the law threatens outlaws, always necessarily, as 
much as outlaws threaten the law from within, always necessarily. 
Besides, isn’t the heretic position a key position in that it allows for  
a critique of violence and the law in the first place? 
 What this amounts to, following Derrida’s notion that there is  
no strict opposition between the conservation and foundation of the 
law, no position before the law that does not necessarily imply its  
own iteration, and vice versa, is that the position of the heretic is as 
forcible as the one of the police, which, by decree, is supposed to 
enforce the law. In fact, the terms heretic and police are metonyms 
that refer to mere positions during the moment of action/execution. 
As stated above, during this event, the whole order of the law is 
suspended, interpretation deferred, and “that of which is in progress” 
during this interval equates to a symbolic void, a moment of  
“non-law”. There can only be symbolic substitutes for what amounts  
to mere positional acts during execution. At this level of reality, 
betrayal and enforcement are both in states of becoming, that is,  
not yet individuated or, rather, judged as such. This is precisely  
the paradox of law: the insurmountable distance it creates between  
its prescriptive instructions and its actual “presence-in-action”,  
or, rather, “absence-in-action”.
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 In light of this, Chun’s insight of conceiving code as law can  
be thought of anew. In equating code to law and law to police, thus 
producing a triad of code as law as police, she writes, “[code] as  
law as police, like the state of exception, makes executive, legislative 
and juridical powers coincide. Code as law as police erases the gap 
between force and writing … in a complementary fashion to the state 
of exception” (2011, 101). I beg to differ from this perspective and  
keep the moment of execution as a moment of suspension of the law,  
a moment of “non-law”, a moment of “non-writing”, yet a moment  
of force and intensity, as I argue in the next section. What Derrida 
shows us, by equating law’s conservation and foundation, is that the 
legislative and executive powers already coincide, albeit in a strange 
way, and thus, that the state of exception is no exception after all.  
Yet, the strangeness and clandestinity of the coinciding of the legal  
and executive comes not from their coinciding as such but more  
from the fact that law is always necessarily non-present at the moment  
of action/execution. Derrida talks about the spectre of the law to 
account for this non-presence, or absence. Thus, Chun’s motto of  
code as law as police can be refactored as code as law as spectre.  
A position of law is a promise at the moment of execution, a becoming 
yet to shed the iteration that will “conserve what it claims to found” 
(Derrida 1990, 997). 
Outlaws, Itinerants, and Vagabonds
So far, I have shown that the notion of execution from the perspective  
of the law merely points to its primitive exterior. What if this perspec-
tive were to be reversed? What would a practice of execution then 
entail, rather than producing a sequence of instructions? It is not 
because the law loses its ground and becomes phantom-like that “that 
of which is in progress” during the moment of execution amounts to 
nothing, a pure void. There is nothing particularly profound in effecting 
this reversal of perspective, taking the viewpoint of the heretic outlaw, 
so to speak. In a sense, that is precisely what Gilbert Simondon’s 
critique of hylomorphism is all about. 
 To be rather brief at this point, the hylomorphic scheme 
conceives of both organic or inorganic individuals as engendered 
by the conjugate of form and matter. One of the classic examples 
used to illustrate the form-matter dynamic is that of a brick. Simply 
put, according to the hylomorphic scheme, the production of a 
brick would be as follows: give a passive lump of clay (potential) a 
parallelepiped form (actualisation). In other words, a pure form —
the parallelepiped — is applied to an indeterminate raw lump of 
material — the clay — so the lump itself undergoes a transformation and 
takes the shape of a parallelepiped and, in turn, sheds an individual 
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brick. In this scheme, the form itself is of prime importance since it 
directs matter in its process of transformation from an undetermined 
shape to a determined one; put differently, form actualises matter’s 
latent potential. Form is thus the sole source of actualisation that 
governs the transformation of the lump of raw clay — it determines the 
indeterminate. 
 Simondon acknowledges that there is a notion of a genesis, or 
more precisely of an ontogenesis, involved in hylomorphism, yet it 
is an “ontogenesis in reverse” (2013, 23).4  What Simondon does is to 
reverse this reverse, so to speak, by devising concepts that allow for 
“knowing the individual through individuation rather than [knowing] 
individuation from the individual” (24). Instead of conceiving of 
ontogenesis as a restricted and narrow concept denoting the genesis 
of a given individual (as hylomorphism does), Simondon conceives 
of it as a “partial and relative resolution manifesting itself in a system 
containing potentials and involving a certain incompatibility in relation 
to itself, incompatibility composed of forces and tension” (25). In a 
sense, Simondon’s notion of individuation stands against the telos of 
hylomorphism, that is, against erecting the Individual as a privileged 
origin (form) and finality (brick). The individual he puts forth is  
thus grasped as a relative reality, never fully realised, and the process 
of individuation perpetual rather than transitive.
 The tension and contrasts between the form-matter couple of 
hylomorphism are even more clearly and vividly exposed by the 
discourse on the instruction-execution divide I have critiqued.  
As argued earlier, positions before the law are always mere potentials 
at the moment of action/execution, and thus the law itself is always  
in a process of becoming rather than final, as it can never truly be 
founded once and for all. Because of this problem of origin and  
finality of the law — its incompatibility in relation to itself — a rapport 
can be drawn here with Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism.  
For Simondon, the technical operation that “imposes a form to a passive 
and indeterminate material” is not only a phantom-like operation,  
but more importantly is tyrannical. He writes:
[It] is not only an abstract operation considered by the  
spectator that sees what comes in and out of the workshop  
without knowing what the actual elaboration is. It is essentially  
an operation commanded by a free man [of the Republic]  
and executed by the slave … The true passivity of matter  
is its abstract availability under the given order that others  
will execute. (51)
Simondon’s image of the spectator (or should I say spectre) who 
remains outside of the workshop is most evocative here: the work-
shop is hylomorphism’s own “outside”—“[t]he hylomorphic scheme 
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corresponds to the knowledge of a man who remains outside of the 
workshop and only considers what comes in and what comes out of it” 
(46). The same outside perspective could be said of a programmer who 
considers digital execution solely from his computer’s command line. 
His remark of the situation of the slave can be linked to the one of the 
outlaws and the heretics depicted in the previous section. The hylomor-
phic scheme, like that of the law, is necessarily founded on primitive 
external entities that it appropriates by despotic means. Yet, in his trea-
tise, Simondon argues that to truly grasp the process of form-taking, 
such as the moulding of a brick, “it is not enough to enter the workshop 
and work with the artisan: one should enter the mould itself to follow 
the operation of form taking at different levels of magnitude of physical 
reality” (2013, 46).
 Moving from question of law to questions of science, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari engage with notions of interiority and 
exteriority of the law, and frame the aforementioned perspectival 
reverses in these terms:
A distinction must be made between two types of science, or 
scientific procedures: one consists in “reproducing,” the other 
in “following.” The first involves reproduction, iteration and 
reiteration; the other, involving itineration, is the sum of the 
itinerant, ambulant sciences … following is not at all the same 
thing as reproducing, and one never follows in order  
to reproduce … Reproducing implies the permanence of a  
fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced: 
watching the flow from the bank. But following is something 
different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just 
different. One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the 
“singularities” of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out  
to discover a form. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 372)
What thus becomes clear is how software as law institutes this tran-
scendental fixed point of view — the aforementioned constative 
loop — by isolating, stratifying, discretising, categorising and fore-
closing the spatiotemporal continuum the process of execution 
articulates. Computer Science, as the science that legislates, is thus 
responsible for abstracting moments and locales from this continuum 
and structuring logical concepts and categories out of these abstrac-
tions. Yet the theorematic coordinates such a science puts forth  
are based on various spatiotemporal cuts and erasures; in other words, 
from a spatiotemporal continuum a logical series is extracted that,  
as a result, features as many forbidden zones or vanishing points as 
there are terms in the series. The theorematic power of Computer 
Science comes from its given authority in decreeing laws and concepts 
that produce the sacrosanct apodictic apparatus of empty repetition  
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— that is, the repetition of the same and the similar. Without this  
apodictic apparatus, Computer Science would be destined to follow 
the progression of a given spatiotemporal phenomenon at ground  
zero and thus lose its transcendental, and fixed, point of view.
 Execution asks to be followed, not iterated. Practices of execution 
entice an itineration within the residual outside of software, that is, 
an itineration at ground level where the theorematic coordinates 
of software are projected on the ground. In order to account for 
the spatiotemporal individuation of the event of execution proper, 
one has to step out of Computer Science’s apodictic apparatus of 
categorisation and traverse the zones of indeterminacy this apparatus 
constructs. To follow is to cross the interstice’s in-between states, 
in-between commands and in-between rules and laws. It is to traverse 
these moments of non-law, non-knowledge, non-rule, non-protocol, 
non-method; in short, to follow is to transgress the imposed dominant 
order and, in so doing, to problematise the rationale behind its 
disposition of minoring an outside. The reason I have, in the previous 
section, focused on the notion of outlaw and positions of heresy  
before the law is to call attention to power relations inherent in this 
process of minoring. The problem of execution concerns the domain  
of epistemology as well as that of work and labour, be it human  
or non-human. Not only does the creation of a residual outside raise 
questions of legibility and illegibility in terms of knowledge, but 
further, it promulgates certain types of social practices and work 
hierarchies that perpetuate types of despotism and tyranny based 
on certain valuations of work and systems of visibility and invisibility 
based on this very outside.5
 While one may be lured into looking for notions of execution 
in Computer Science books or to practice execution from his/her 
computer’s command line, I suggest one has to look elsewhere and 
engage differently with code and circuitry to truly grasp and follow 
the event that is execution. As short concluding remark, I would like 
to suggest that luckily, another type of heretic “science” of execution, 
or rather a practice, already exists that is not usually featured in 
Computer Science literature per se but is, nonetheless, always and 
necessarily performed when producing a piece of hardware or a piece 
of software — that is the practice of debugging. True “occult science”, 
debugging requires one to follow the thread of execution of a given 
program, that is, to follow the itineration and vagabonding of signs  
and signals within the architecture of a given machine at a given 
time. A bug, error, failure, or miscomputation necessarily begs to be 
followed. It is an event itself, or, rather, speaks to the individuation of 
execution in and for itself. It requires that the illusory disjunction or 
stratification of instruction and execution, signs and matter, and the 
75
discretised dynamics this disjunction puts forth be suspended and 
problematised. What the practice of debugging highlights is the fragile 
conjunction of signs and signals in focusing on the technical operations 
that mediates them in time and space. To debug is to open bare the 
foreclosure of the aforementioned symbolic order of the law and  
enter Simondon’s mould, so to speak: to observe and intervene during 
the event that links the two technological half-chains of the sign and  
the signals, the opcode and the dipole. 
 Debugging, as liminal and vagabond science, as well as an effec-
tive practice of execution, is potent in problematising and debunking 
the tyrannic minoring of an outside some Computer Science concepts 
necessarily produce, and, in turn, that some Software Studies 
discourses reproduce. After all, debugging is about problems and 
problematisation, may it be of a piece of machinery or a piece of 
theory. In fact, problematics is its only mode of operation. There are no 
software stacks nor interfaces along the path of the vagabond outlaw, 
only curious spectres.
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Notes
 1. The same emphasis on the 
symbolic outcome of an execution can 
be said of Galloway’s equating two 
quadratic equations written in a “high-
level” and “low-level” programming 
languages (2006, 319). Surely both 
equations, expressed differently, shed 
the same numerical solution, yet their 
respective technical unfolding during 
execution are nothing but equal, as Chun 
points out (2008, 306–7).
2. See the present collection’s 
contribution “RuntimeException() —  
Critique of Software Violence” by  
Geoff Cox, who also discusses software 
in terms of violence, in a different,  
albeit complementary, way to this 
chapter. 
3. The notion of interpretation here 
does not necessarily denotes a semantic 
interpretation as a comprehension of the 
meaning of a command or result  
in a mathematical or linguistic sense.  
The loop structure I am describing here 
holds for purely mechanistic conceptions 
of computing such as the one put forth 
by Piccinini (2008, 2007). Interpretation, 
in this case, thus relates to notions of 
internal semantics rather than external 
ones (Piccinini 2008, 214–5).
4. All citations from Simondon are my 
translations.
5. See Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter’s 
contribution “BUGS IN THE WAR ROOM 
— Economies and /of Execution” in the 
present collection, where she addresses 
on question software maintenance 
and labour in terms of neo-colonial 
hegemony.
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Deadly Algorithms: Can legal
codes hold software accountable
for code that kills?
Susan Schuppli
Algorithms have long-adjudicated over vital processes that help to 
ensure our wellbeing and survival, from pacemakers that maintain 
the natural rhythms of the heart, genetic algorithms that optimise 
emergency response times by cross-referencing ambulance 
locations with demographic data, to early warning systems that track 
approaching storms, detect seismic activity, and even prevent genocide 
by monitoring ethnic conflict with orbiting satellites.1 However 
algorithms are also increasingly being tasked with instructions to kill: 
executing coding sequences that quite literally execute.
Computing Terror
Guided by the Obama Presidency’s conviction that the war on  
terror can be won by “out-computing” its enemies and pre-empting 
terrorists threats using predictive software — no doubt bolstered by  
the President’s reliance on big data and social media to return him 
to office in 2012 — a new generation of deadly algorithms is being 
designed that will both control and manage the “kill-list,” and along 
with it decisions to strike (Crider 2014).2 It is noteworthy to recall 
that the language of computation is already deeply informed by the 
history of certain legal processes, such that the term “execute”, as in 
“to execute a coding script”, heralds from the fourteenth-century legal 
reference to carry out or accomplish a course of action: to prosecute,  
to issue a warrant, or to sentence. Within the context of this essay  
the term “execute” gains yet further meanings: it is only by executive 
decision that the US President can execute the kill order, which in turn  
executes a coding script that operates the remote-controlled drone, 
that is itself engaged in acts of summary execution. Indeed, the now 
terminated practice of “signature strikes”, which employed data-
analytics to determine emblematic patterns of “terrorist” behaviour 
which in turn were used to identify potential targets on the ground 
already points to a future in which intelligence gathering, assessment, 
and military action, including the calculation of who can legally be  
killed, will largely be performed by machines based upon an ever-
expanding database of aggregated information. However this transition 
to execution by algorithm is not simply a continuation of killing at  
ever-greater distances inaugurated by the invention of the  
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bow that separated warrior and foe, as many have suggested.3 It is  
also a consequence of the ongoing automation of warfare, which 
can be traced back to the cybernetic coupling of Claude Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of information with Norbert Wiener’s wartime 
research into feedback loops and communication control systems.4  
As this new era of intelligent weapons systems progresses, operational 
control and decision-making will increasingly be out-sourced to 
machines.
 In 2011 the US Department of Defence (DOD) released its 
“roadmap” forecasting the expanded use of unmanned technologies, 
of which unmanned aircraft systems — drones — are but one aspect  
of an overall strategy towards the implementation of fully autonomous 
Intelligent Agents. It projects its future as follows: 
The Department of Defense’s vision for unmanned systems  
is the seamless integration of diverse unmanned capabilities 
that provide flexible options for Joint Warfighters while 
exploiting the inherent advantages of unmanned technologies, 
including persistence, size, speed, maneuverability, and 
reduced risk to human life. DOD envisions unmanned systems 
seamlessly operating with manned systems while gradually 
reducing the degree of human control and decision making 
required for the unmanned portion of the force structure.  
(DOD 2001, 3)
The document is a strange mix of cold-war caricature and Fordism  
set against the backdrop of contemporary geopolitical anxieties,  
as it sketches out two imaginary vignettes to provide “visionary” 
examples of the ways in which autonomy can improve efficiencies 
through inter-operability across military domains, aimed at enhancing 
capacities and flexibility between manned and unmanned sectors  
of the Army, Air Force and Navy. In these future-scenarios the scripting 
and casting are familiar, pitting the security of hydrocarbon energy 
supplies against rogue actors equipped with Russian technology. 
One concerns an aging Russian nuclear submarine deployed by a 
radicalised Islamic nation-state that is beset by an earthquake in  
the Pacific, thus contaminating the coastal waters of Alaska and 
threatening its oil energy reserves. The other involves the sabotaging 
of an underwater oil pipeline in the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of 
Africa, complicated by the approach of a hostile surface vessel capable 
of launching a Russian short-range air-to-surface missile (1–10). 
These action-film vignettes — fully elaborated across five pages of the 
report — stand in perplexing counter-part to the claims being made 
throughout as to the sober science, political prudence and economic 
rationalisations that guide the move towards fully unmanned systems. 
On what grounds are we to be convinced by the vision and strategies 
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being advanced? On the basis of a collective cultural imaginary that 
finds its politics within the CGI labs of the infotainment industry or  
via an evidence-based approach to solving the complex problems 
posed by changing global contexts? Not surprisingly, the level of  
detail (and techno-fetishism) used to describe unmanned responses 
to these risk scenarios is far more exhaustive than the three primary 
challenges the report identifies as specific to the growing reliance  
and deployment of automated and autonomous systems. Implementing 
a higher degree of autonomy faces the following challenges, the  
report suggests:
1. Investment in science and technology (S&T) to enable  
more capable autonomous operations.
2. Development of policies and guidelines on what decisions  
can be safely and ethically delegated and under what 
conditions. 
3. Development of new Verification and Validation (V&V)  
and T&E techniques to enable verifiable ‘trust’ in autonomy. 
(DOD 2011, 27)
The delegation of decision-making to computational regimes is of 
crucial consideration in so far as it poses significant ethical dilemmas 
but also raises urgent legal concerns as to whether existing juridical 
frameworks are even capable of attending to the emergence of these 
new algorithmic actors and their machine-executable formats. This 
is especially concerning given that the logic of precedent which 
organises much legal decision-making (within common law systems) 
has operated according to the same logic that organised the drone 
programme in the first place: namely the justification of an action 
based upon a pattern of behaviour that was established by prior 
events. This legal aporia intersects with a parallel discourse around 
moral responsibility; a much broader debate that has tended to 
structure arguments around the deployment of armed drones as an 
antagonism between humans and machines. As the author of the  
entry on “Computing and Moral Responsibility” in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy put it: 
Traditionally philosophical discussions on moral responsibility 
have focused on the human components in moral action. 
Accounts of how to ascribe moral responsibility usually 
describe human agents performing actions that have  
well-defined, direct consequences. In today’s increasingly 
technological society, however, human activity cannot be 
properly understood without making reference to technological 
artifacts, which complicates the ascription of moral 
responsibility. (Noorman 2012)
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When one poses the question, under what conditions is it morally 
acceptable to deliberately kill a human being, one is not asking 
whether the law would permit such an act for reasons of imminent 
threat, self-defence or even empathy for someone who is in extreme 
pain or in a non-responsive vegetative state. The moral register 
around the decision-to-kill operates according to a different ethical 
framework that doesn’t necessarily bind the individual to a contract 
enacted between the citizen and the state. Moral positions can thus 
be specific to individual values and beliefs whereas legal frameworks 
permit actions in our collective name as citizens contracted to a 
democratically elected body that acts on our behalf but with which  
we might be in political disagreement. While it is much easier to take  
a moral stance towards events that we might oppose — US drone 
strikes in Pakistan—than to justify a claim as to their specific illegality 
given the anti-terror legislation that has been put in place since 
9/11, assigning moral responsibility, proving criminal negligence 
or demonstrating legal liability for the outcomes of deadly events 
becomes even more challenging when humans and machines 
interact to make decisions together, a complication that will intensify 
as unmanned systems become more sophisticated and act as 
independent legal agents. In addition, the outsourcing of decision-
making to the judiciary as regards the validity of scientific evidence 
since the 1993 Daubert ruling — in a case brought against Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals — has also made it difficult for the law to take 
an activist stance when confronted with the limitations of its own 
scientific understandings of technical innovation. At present it would 
be unreasonable to take an algorithm to court when things go awry, 
let alone when they are executed perfectly, as in the case of a lethal 
drone strike. By focusing upon the legal dimension of algorithmic 
liability as opposed to more wide-ranging moral questions I do not 
want to suggest that morality and law should be consigned to separate 
spheres. However, it is worth making a preliminary effort to think  
about the ways in which algorithms are not simply re-ordering  
the fundamental principles that govern our lives, but might also be  
asked to provide alternate ethical arrangements derived out of 
mathematical axioms.
Algorithmic Accountability
It is my contention that law, which has already expanded the category 
of “legal personhood” to include non-human actors such as corpora-
tions, also offers ways to think about questions of algorithmic account-
ability (Dewey 1926, 656, 669). Of course many would argue that legal 
methods are not the best frameworks for resolving moral dilemmas, 
but then again nor are the objectives of counter-terrorism necessarily 
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best serviced by algorithmic oversight. Shifting the emphasis towards 
a juridical account of algorithmic reasoning might prove useful when 
confronted with the real possibility that the kill list and other emer-
gent matrices for managing the war on terror will be algorithmically 
derived as part of a techno-social assemblage in which it becomes 
impossible to isolate human from non-human agents. It does however 
raise the “bar” for what we now need to ask the law to do. The degree 
to which legal codes can maintain their momentum alongside rapid 
technological change and submit “complicated algorithmic systems 
to the usual process of checks-and-balances that is generally imposed 
on powerful items that affect society on a large scale” is of consider-
able concern (Data & Society Research Institute 2014). Nonetheless, 
the stage has already been set for the arrival of a new cast of juridical 
actors endowed perhaps not so much with freewill in the classical 
sense (that would provide the conditions for criminal liability), but 
intelligent systems which are wilfully free in the sense that they have 
been programmed to make decisions based upon their own algo-
rithmic logic (Teubner 2006). While armed combat drones are the most 
publically visible of the automated military systems that the DOD is 
rolling out, they are but one of the many remote-controlled assets that 
will gather, manage, analyse and act on the data that they acquire  
and process. 
 Proponents of algorithmic decision-making laud the near instanta-
neous response-time that allows such Intelligent Agents — what  
some have called “moral predators”— to make micro-second adjust-
ments to avert a lethal drone strike should, for example, children 
suddenly emerge out of a house that is being targeted as a militant 
hideout (Strawser 2010). Indeed robotic systems have long been 
argued to decrease the error-margin of civilian casualties that are  
often the consequence of actions made by tired soldiers in the field. 
Nor are machines overly concerned with their own self-preservation, 
which might likewise cloud judgement under conditions of duress.  
Yet, as Sabine Gless and Herbert Zech ask, if these “Intelligent Agents 
are often used in areas where the risk of failure and error can be 
reduced by relying on machines rather than humans … everywhere, 
the question arises: Who is liable if things go wrong?” (2014)
 Typically when injury and death occurs to humans, the legal 
debate focuses upon the degree to which such an outcome was fore-
seeable and thus adjudicates on the basis of whether all reasonable 
efforts and preemptive protocols had been built into the system to 
mitigate against such an unlikely occurrence. However, program-
mers cannot of course run all the variables that combine to produce 
machinic decisions, especially when the degree of uncertainty as to 
conditions and knowledge of events on the ground is as variable as the 
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shifting contexts of conflict and counter-terrorism. Werner Dahm,  
Chief Scientist at USAF, stresses the difficulty of designing error-free 
systems: “You have to be able to show that the system is not going  
to go awry — you have to disprove a negative” (Agence-France Presse 
2012, 2). Given that highly automated decision-making processes 
involve complex and rapidly changing contexts mediated by multiple 
technologies, can we reasonably expect to build a form of ethical  
decision-making into these unmanned systems? And would an 
algorithmic approach to managing the ethical dimensions of 
drone warfare — for example, whether to strike sixteen-year old 
Abdulrahman al-Awlaki in Yemen because his father was a radicalised 
cleric; a fate that he might inherit — entail the same logics that char-
acterised signature strikes, namely that of proximity to militant-like 
behaviour or activity?5 The euphemistically rebranded kill list known 
as the “disposition matrix” suggests that such determinations can 
indeed be arrived at computationally. As Greg Miller notes: “The 
matrix contains the names of terrorism suspects arrayed against an 
accounting of the resources being marshaled to track them down, 
including sealed indictments and clandestine operations” (2012).
 Intelligent systems are arguably legal agents but not as-of-yet 
legal persons, although precedents pointing to this possibility have 
been set in motion. The idea that an actual human being or “legal 
person” stands behind the invention of every machine who might 
ultimately be found responsible when things go wrong, or even  
when they go right, is no longer tenable and obfuscates the fact that 
complex systems are rarely, if ever, the product of single authorship, 
nor do humans and machines operate in autonomous realms. Indeed, 
both are so thoroughly entangled with each other that the notion of 
a sovereign human agent functioning outside the realm of machinic 
mediation seems wholly improbable. Consider for a moment only 
one aspect of conducting drone warfare in Pakistan — that of US flight 
logistics — in which we find that upwards of 165 people are required 
just to keep a Predator drone in the air for 24 hours, the half-life of 
an average mission. These personnel requirements are themselves 
embedded in multiple techno-social systems composed of military 
contractors, intelligence officers, data-analysts, lawyers, engineers, 
programmers, as well as hardware, software, satellite communication, 
operation centres (CAOC), and so on. This does not take into account 
the R&D infrastructure that engineered the unmanned system, 
designed its operating procedures and beta-tested it. Nor does it 
acknowledge the administrative apparatus that brought all of these 
actors together to create the event we call a drone strike.6
 In the case of a fully automated system, decision-making is reliant 
upon feedback loops that continually pump new information into 
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the system in order to recalibrate it. But perhaps more significantly 
in terms of legal liability, decision-making is also governed by the 
system’s innate ability to self-educate: the capacity of algorithms 
to learn and modify their coding sequences independent of human 
oversight. Isolating the singular agent who is directly responsible —  
legally — for the production of a deadly harm (as currently required  
by criminal law) suggests, then, that no one entity beyond the 
Executive Office of the President might ultimately be held accountable 
for the aggregate conditions that conspire to produce a drone strike 
and with it the possibility of civilian casualties. However, given that 
the US doesn’t accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court and Article 25 of the Rome Statute governing individual criminal 
responsibility, what new legal formulations could, then, be created 
that are able to account for indirect and aggregate causality born out 
of a complex chain of events including so called digital perpetrators? 
American tort law, which adjudicates over civil wrongs, might be one 
such place to look for instructive models. In particular, legal claims 
regarding the use of environmental toxins, which are highly distributed 
events whose lethal effects often take decades to appear, and involve 
an equally complex array of human and non-human agents, have been 
making their way into court, although not typically with successful 
outcomes for the plaintiffs. The most notable of these litigations are 
the mass toxic tort regarding the use of Agent Orange as a defoliant 
in Vietnam and the Bhopal disaster in India.7 Ultimately, however, 
the efficacy of such an approach has to be considered in light of the 
intended outcome of assigning liability, which in the cases mentioned 
was not so much deterrence or punishment, but, rather, compensation 
for damages. 
Recoding the Law
While machines can be designed with a high degree of intentional 
behaviour and will out-perform humans in many instances, the 
development of unmanned systems will need to take into account a  
far greater range of variables, including shifting geopolitical 
contexts and murky legal frameworks when making the calculation 
that conditions have been met to execute someone. Building in fail-
safe procedures that abort when human subjects of a specific size 
(children) or age and gender (males under the age of 18) appear, 
sets the stage for a proto-moral decision making regime. But is the 
design of ethical constraints really where we wish to push back 
politically when it comes to the potential for execution by algorithm? 
Or can we work to complicate the impunity that certain techno-social 
assemblages currently enjoy? As a 2009 report by the Royal Academy 
of Engineering on Autonomous Systems argues,
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Legal and regulatory models based on systems with human 
operators may not transfer well to the governance of 
autonomous systems. In addition, the law currently distinguishes 
between human operators and technical systems and requires  
a human agent to be responsible for an automated or 
autonomous system. However, technologies which are used 
to extend human capabilities or compensate for cognitive or 
motor impairment may give rise to hybrid agents … Without a 
legal framework for autonomous technologies, there is a risk 
that such essentially human agents could not be held legally 
responsible for their actions — so who should be responsible? 
(Royal Academy of Engineering 2009)
Implicating a larger set of agents including algorithmic ones who  
aid and abet such an act might well be a more effective legal strategy, 
even if expanding the limits of criminal liability proves unwieldy. 
As the 2009 ECCHR Study on Criminal Accountability in Sri Lanka 
put it: “Individuals, who exercise the power to organise the pattern 
of crimes that were later committed, can be held criminally liable 
as perpetrators. These perpetrators can usually be found in civil 
ministries such as the ministry of defense or the office of the president” 
(ECCHR 2010, 88). Moving down the chain of command and focusing 
upon those who participate in the production violence by carrying 
out orders has been effective in some cases (Sri Lanka), but also 
problematic in others (Abu Ghraib) where the indictment of low-level 
officers severed the chain of causal relations that could implicate 
more powerful actors. Of course, prosecuting an algorithm alone for 
executing lethal orders that the system is in fact designed to make  
is fairly nonsensical if the objective is punishment. The move must 
rather be part of an overall strategy aimed at expanding the field of 
causality and thus broadening the reach of legal responsibility. 
 My work as a researcher on the Forensic Architecture project, 
alongside Eyal Weizman and many others, in developing new methods 
of spatial and visual investigation for the UN enquiry into the use  
of armed drones, provides one specific vantage point for considering 
how machinic capacities are reordering the field of political action 
and thus calling forth new legal strategies.8 In taking seriously the 
agency of things, we must also take seriously the agency of things 
whose productive capacities are enlisted in the decision to kill. 
Computational regimes, in operating largely beyond the thresholds 
of human perception, have produced informatic conjunctions that 
have redistributed and transformed the spaces in which action occurs, 
as well as the nature of such consequential actions themselves. 
When algorithms are being enlisted to out-compute terrorism and 
calculate who can and should be killed, do we not need to produce a 
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politics appropriate to these radical modes of calculation and a legal 
framework that is sufficiently agile to deliberate over such events? 
 Decision-making by automated systems will produce new 
relations of power for which we have as of yet inadequate legal 
frameworks or modes of political resistance — and, perhaps even 
more importantly, insufficient collective understanding as to how such 
decisions will actually be made and upon what grounds. Scientific 
knowledge about technical processes does not belong to the domain 
of science alone, as the Daubert ruling implies. However, demands 
for public accountability and oversight will require much greater 
participation in the epistemological frameworks that organise and 
manage these new techno-social systems and that may be a formidable 
challenge for all of us. What sort of public assembly will be able to 
prevent the pre-mature closure of a certain “epistemology of facts” 
as Bruno Latour would say, that are at present cloaked under a veil of 
secrecy called “national security interests”— the same order of facts 
that scripts the current DOD roadmap for unmanned systems? 
 In an ABC radio interview titled “The Future of drone strikes 
could see execution by algorithm”, Sarah Knuckey, Director of the 
Project on Extrajudicial Executions at New York University Law School, 
emphasised the degree to which drone warfare has strained the 
limits of international legal conventions and with it the protection of 
civilians.9 The “rules of warfare” are “already hopelessly out-dated”, 
she says, and will require “new rules of engagement to be drawn up”. 
“There is an enormous amount of concern about the practices the  
US is conducting right now and the policies that underlie those 
practices. But from a much longer-term perspective and certainly 
from lawyers outside the US there is real concern about not just what’s 
happening now but what it might mean 10, 15, 20 years down the track” 
(Quince 2013, 2–3). Could these new rules of engagement — new  
legal codes — assume a similarly preemptive character to the software  
codes and technologies that are being evolved—what I would 
characterise as a projective sense of the law? Might they take their 
lead from the spirit of the Geneva Conventions protecting the rights 
of non-combatants, rather than from those protocols (the Hague 
Conventions of 1899, 1907) that govern the use of weapons of war and 
are thus reactive in their formulation and event-based? In short, a set  
of legal frameworks that is not determined by precedent — by what  
has happened in the past — but, instead, by what may arguably take 
place in the future.
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Notes
This article first appeared in Radical 
Philosophy (187, Sept/Oct 2014, 
Commentary 2–8), and appears here 
with permission. It has been updated in 
response to issues discussed within this 
edited collection.
1. See, for example, the satellite 
monitoring and atrocity evidence 
programmes: “Eyes on Darfur” 
(http://www.eyesondarfur.org) and 
“The Sentinel Project for Genocide 
Prevention” (http://thesentinelproject.
org).
2. See also the flow chart “How Obama 
Decides Your Fate if He Thinks You’re a 
Terrorist” (in Byman and Wittes 2013).
3. For a recent account of the 
multiple and compound geographies 
through which drone operations are 
executed, see Derek Gregory’s “Drone 
Geographies” (2014).
4. Contemporary information theorists 
would argue that the second-order 
cybernetic model of feedback and 
control, in which external data is used 
to adjust the system, doesn’t take into 
account the unpredictability of evolutive 
data internal to the system resulting 
from crunching ever-larger datasets 
(Luciana Parisi 2013, Introduction). For a 
discussion of Wiener’s cybernetics see 
Reinhold Martin’s “The Organizational 
Complex: Cybernetics, Space, 
Discourse” (1998, 110).
5. When questioned about the drone 
strike that killed sixteen-year old 
American-born Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, 
teenage son of radicalized cleric Anwar 
Al-Awlaki in Yemen in 2011, Robert 
Gibbs, former White House Press 
Secretary and senior adviser to President 
Obama’s re-election campaign, replied 
that the boy should have had “a more 
responsible father”.
6. “While it might seem 
counterintuitive, it takes significantly 
more people to operate unmanned 
aircraft than it does to fly traditional 
warplanes. According to the Air Force, 
it takes a jaw-dropping 168 people to 
keep just one Predator aloft for twenty-
four hours! For the larger Global Hawk 
surveillance drone, that number jumps 
to 300 people. In contrast, an F-16 fighter 
aircraft needs fewer than one hundred 
people per mission.” Medea Benjamin, 
Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control 
(2013, 21).
7. See Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange 
on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the 
Courts (1987). See also: www.bhopal.
com/bhopal-litigation. 
8. Notable members of the Forensic 
Architecture drone investigative team 
also included Jacob Burns, Steffen 
Kraemer, Francesco Sebregondi and 
SITU Research. http://www.forensic-
architecture.org/case/drone-strikes/. 
9. See Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, “Get the Data: Drone 
Wars”. www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/category/projects/drones/
drones-graphs. 
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Executing Micro-temporality
Winnie Soon
Loading webpages, waiting for social media feeds, streaming videos 
and content, are mundane activities in contemporary culture. Such 
mundane activity includes network-connected devices that transmit 
and distribute data across multiple sites — referred to as data. In these  
scenes, data are constantly perceived as a stream (Berry 2011, 3; 
2012, 388; 2013, n.p; Fuller 2003, 52), indicating characteristics of vast 
volume, speed of update, continuous flow and delivery. The concept of 
streams characterises the Internet rather than web pages (Berry 2011, 
143). The web is a dynamic stream of information in which users can 
participate and follow. It is fast-changing and generative, data records 
are continuously updated and executed in a manner in which an end 
cannot be foreseen. There is a temporal dimension to the data stream 
and in today’s networked communication data streams indicate events 
that are regarded as instantaneous in capitalised economies. The now 
that we are experiencing through perceptible streams is entangled 
with computational logic. 
 From social media feeds to playback video to mobile applications, 
users encounter a distinctive spinning icon during the loading, 
waiting and streaming of data content. This spinning icon represents 
an unstable streaming of the now. A graphical animation known as 
throbber tells users something is loading-in-progress, but nothing 
more. A similar yet very different form of a process indicator, such as  
a progress bar, expresses more information than a throbber. In contrast 
to a progress bar, which is more linear in form, a throbber does not 
indicate any completed or finished status and progress. It does not 
explain processual tasks in any specific detail when compared with a 
progress bar.1 With a throbber, all that is presented is a spinning icon, 
perceived as repeatedly spinning under constant speed, as well as 
indicating invisible background activities for an indeterminate and 
unforeseeable timespan. If one looks up the dictionary definition of  
the verb “throb”,2 it is defined as a strong and regular pulse rhythm 
that resonates with a throbber’s design and in regards to how it 
performs on the Internet today. But such design can be seen to 
oversimplify the micro-operations of networked technology, making 
one believe that the network is working with a certain regularity 
and that all data are queuing underway, thus rendering the network 
conditions of the now. 
 This chapter investigates data processing that takes place behind 
a running throbber. In particular, it examines the temporal complexity 
of data streams, in which data processing and code inter-actions are 
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operated in real-time. The notion of inter-actions references computer 
science’s understanding of “interaction” (Beaudouin-Lafon 2008; 
Bentley 2003; Murtaugh 2008; Wegner 1997) as well as the notion of 
“intra-actions” from philosophy (Barad 2003, 2007). The term I develop 
here, code inter-actions, highlights the operational process of things 
happening within and across machines through different technical 
substrates, interacting with each other via running code. In contrast to 
the understanding of technical interaction, process emerges through 
“entangled agencies” (Barad 2007, 33). Barad’s notion of intra-actions 
refers to the entanglements of material relations that are not only 
technically and scientifically specific, but also with mixed factors and 
domains of operations that are regarded as social, political, economical 
and cultural (2007, 232–233). 
 In the following session, I will illustrate how a cultural and 
operative reading of an abstracted form of throbber allows an 
examination of data streams in contemporary computational culture. 
This chapter will first unfold a cultural reading of a throbber, then 
continue with a detailed discussion and analysis of the underlying 
operative and technical processes. It opens up the cultural and 
computational logics that are constantly rendering the pervasive  
and networked conditions of the now.
A (brief) cultural reading of a throbber
With its distinct design characteristic of a spinning behaviour hinting 
at background processing, the throbber icon acts as an interface 
between computational processes and visual communication. One 
of the earliest uses of the throbber can be found in the menu bar of 
a Mosaic web browser in the early 1990s, developed by the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), with the browser 
interface designed by scientist Colleen Bushell (Albers 1996; Roebuck 
2011, 348–349). This throbber3 contains a letter “S” and a globe that 
spins when loading a web page. This kind of a spinning throbber with 
the company’s graphical logo can also be witnessed in subsequent 
software browsers, such as Netscape and Internet Explorer. While 
the throbber spins, it visually indicates actions are in progress. These 
actions, from a user’s point of view, could be interpreted as the loading 
of web data or connecting to a website by a software browser. From 
a technical perspective, it involves Internet data transmission and a 
browser that renders the inter-actions of code. The spinning behaviour 
stops when a webpage is finished loading within a browser. A web 
browser is software able to render and display requested content, 
making network calls and requests, and storing data locally (Garsiel 
and Irish 2011). In this respect, the spinning throbber icon represents 
complex inter-actions of code under network conditions. A throbber, 
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with its spinning characteristic, can therefore be said to be rooted in, 
and specific to, Internet culture.
 More recently, the throbber icon is no longer only attached 
to software browsers, appearing also on different web and mobile 
applications, including social media platforms in particular.  
The contemporary throbber transforms into a spinning wheel4 that  
consists of lines or circles that are arranged in radial and circular  
form, moving in a clockwise direction. A throbber is animated and 
spun, or throbbed, with a constant rate, demonstrating a regular tempo.  
Each individual element of a wheel5 sequentially fades in and out 
repeatedly to create a sense of animated motion. These spinning 
wheels appear after a user has triggered an action, such as swiping  
a screen with feeds in order to request the latest information. They  
also appear after a user has confirmed an online payment or is waiting 
for a transaction to complete. Perhaps most commonly of all, a throbber 
is seen when a user cannot watch a video clip loading smoothly over 
an Internet connection. As a result, an animated throbber appears as 
a spinning wheel on a black colour background, occupying the whole 
video screen while the video is buffering.
 A throbber represents the speed of network traffic that is also  
tied to our affective states and perception of time. Emotionally,  
it can be frustrating to encounter buffering, as it involves interruption.  
Things do not flow smoothly and users become impatient in waiting  
for an unknown period of time or for something yet to come. Taiwanese 
artist Lai Chih-Sheng exhibits his throbber animated icon, titled 
Instant7 (2013), with a minimalistic presentation, expressing the relation 
between waiting and time. This waiting is considered as unproductive, 
in that it consumes time. As artist-researcher James Charlton describes 
it: “It is a gaze that goes beyond the screen to an event not yet here” 
(2014, 171). The loading time of the throbber appears wasted and 
unproductive, as it is often associated with the perception of slowness 
of a network. 
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Figure 1. Throbber in the form of circles and lines, used with permission 2016.6
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 On September 10, 2014, a campaign called “Internet Slowdown 
day”8 was launched as part of the “Battle for the Net”, promoting net 
neutrality and Internet freedom. Customised loading icons, similar to a 
throbber, were put up on different websites, symbolising the potential 
impact of controlled traffic that would be implemented by Internet 
Service Providers in the name of increasing profit. In other words, the 
campaign argued for Internet speed equality across all websites and 
that no unequal conditions, such as fast-lane traffic, should be given to 
any prioritised website. More than 10,000 corporations showed support 
by putting up self-designed throbber icons. As is evident in this 
context, the throbber has a significant and symbolic meaning within 
cultural and political realms. 
 In contemporary art,9 the throbber as cultural icon is remade  
by artist Aristarkh Chernyshev, showing the spinning behaviour 
through customised LEDs in a physical installation. The LEDs formu-
late the word “loading”, circulating in a motion directly reminiscent of 
a spinning throbber. Chernyshev’s artwork LOADING (2007)10 aims to 
present this icon and its data exchange process as cultural phenomena, 
with the cultural icon of a throbber expressing various dimensions of 
time — from the loading time of a browser to the regular tempo of a 
spinning throbber to the slowness of the Internet network — in under-
standing data streams. Beyond different cultural instances, however,  
the operative and technical dimensions of a running throbber should 
not be undermined, as they can provide a specific perspective for 
further understanding how the now is being organised computationally 
as streams. 
 Drawing from a method proposed by Wolfgang Ernst in the 
field of Media Archaeology, the meaning of data streams can be 
analysed and understood via an application of a “cold gaze” upon data 
streams. Ernst’s approach is used to engage with the mechanical and 
operational logic of computation, and the method of “cold gaze” aims 
to describe cold facts in a distinctly material-oriented, as opposed to 
narrative-based, approach (Parikka 2011, 2012; Ernst 2013). In taking 
into consideration the operative and technical perspectives of network 
transmission, Florian Sprenger provocatively argues that the concept  
of stream is a metaphor. He says: 
The network structure of today’s communication channels  
and of their information stream is often understood as providing 
a direct connection between users and services or between  
two communication partners, even though there cannot be  
any direct connections on digital networks. The metaphor of  
the flow conceals the fact that, technically, what is taking place 
is quite the opposite. There is no stream in digital networks. 
(Sprenger 2015, 88–89)
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Sprenger highlights the possible misconception of a flow or a stream, 
suggesting that there is a gap between the experienced and operative 
streams. He reminds us that two widely used concepts — flow and 
stream — in digital media are metaphors that potentially mislead 
anyone looking to understand the actual technical processes that 
take place beneath a stream. Drawing upon Ernst’s (2013, 186–189) 
notion of micro-temporality, the focus of such approaches is with the 
nature and operation of signals and communications, mathematics and 
digital computation within its deep internal and operational structures. 
The added prefix “micro”, therefore, addresses the micro-operative 
processes that are not apparent within an immediate human register. 
Ernst’s notion of micro-temporality draws (after Foucault) on the 
concept of discontinuity (2006, 105). In Foucault (1972, 3), discontinuity 
offers an alternative perspective to understanding knowledge beyond 
its stable form of narration and representation. Both Foucault and Ernst 
use discontinuity as a means to examine the gaps and ruptures of 
things that go beyond signs or representational discourses. 
 To bring together concepts of discontinuity and micro-temporality 
is to offer an alternative perspective in examining streams behind 
a planetary scale global economy which renders the now. Streams 
can be understood as highly capitalised and as operating in massive 
scales under globalised processes that disseminate into every part of 
the world as cultural and economic phenomena. In the words of Peter 
Osborne, the now “is primarily a global or a planetary fiction” (2013, 
26). Thus, the notion of discontinuous micro-temporality highlights 
the micro-processes and gaps of a stream that is manifested within 
networked presence-oriented feeds and their regular interruptions 
by a throbber. The concept of discontinuous micro-temporality points 
towards the temporal dimension of streams that present the now. The 
following section will take a micro-temporal analysis to foreground 
the notion of discontinuous micro-temporality that takes into account 
operative processes.
Micro-temporal analysis
Following the Von Neumann Architecture that was first initiated in  
1945, mathematician and physicist John von Neumann designed a 
computer architecture consisting of a processing unit that contains an 
arithmetic logic unit, a control unit and a memory unit for performing 
arithmetic operations, operational sequence control and data and 
instruction storage respectively, also known as a stored-program 
computer (von Neumann 1945, 1–2). In this setup, a central clock11 
coordinates these units, executing computer instructions in a precise 
manner. 
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 The appearance and disappearance of a graphical throbber is 
rendered by code, instructing when a throbber should be displayed  
on a screen. However, computer instruction is more than source code. 
In Computer Science and Engineering, the “Fetch-Execute cycle”  
is used to describe how a Central Processing Unit (CPU) performs 
code instructions through a series of steps that are executed within 
clock cycles (Burrell 2004, 135; Frabetti 2015, 153). The high-level 
instruction breaks into many micro-instructions by fetching and 
executing values from and in the memory space. The micro-instructions 
are highly ordered. The instruction pointer (also known as program 
counter) is used to keep track of the instruction sequence. This pointer 
is incremented after fetching an instruction and storing the memory 
address of the next instruction to be executed. The computer will 
continue repeating the cycles that fetch instructions and data from 
memory and then execute them one after another in sequence until  
the final instruction is reached (see also Frabetti 2015, 150–159).  
In short, executing code instructions involves the reading and writing 
of memory,12 generating a sequence of micro-operational steps 
and the actual computation. The appearance or disappearance of a 
throbber on a screen is not an exception. All of the code instructions 
are operated across on/off states, generally known as “flip-flops” and 
logic gates used to store and control data flow. Underneath a graphical 
throbber is the inter-action of data, code and micro-instructions. 
The micro-temporality of instructions is driven by the internal clock 
as there are things that have to be done exactly at a specific time. 
Importantly, the machine clock forms a basic infrastructural activity of 
contemporary technology, organising and maintaining the sequences 
and components of computation that are essential in performing 
operational tasks. This micro-perspective allows us to be attentive to 
how time is structured and organised computationally and differently. 
Packet switching and data buffering 
Networked data are streamed over a technological network. This also 
relates to how data transfers and operates geopolitically across devices 
that are constrained by structures, infrastructures and “micro-
decisions” (Sprenger 2015) along a transmission process. The following 
discussion will focus on the processes of packet switching and data 
buffering that are operated behind a running throbber.
 In the late 1960s, the world’s first packet switching network,  
called the ARPANET, was introduced, laying the groundwork that led to 
the development of the Internet as it has developed today. The concept 
of packet switching was fundamental to understanding how data  
are organised and flow. A data stream was chopped into smaller blocks 
as “packets”, which were then sent via a communications channel in 
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and through different routes, rates and sequences, known as packet 
switching (Baran 2002). Between the two connection points — sender 
and receiver — data, indeed, does not have a direct connection. 
According to Paul Baran, one of the inventors of the packet switched 
computer network, real-time connections between sender (transmitting 
end) and user (receiving end) are an illusion. Instead, the fast-enough 
data rate gives only a sense of real-time connection between a sender 
and receiver. Fundamentally, the routing of a data packet transmits 
through different sites. Although a selected path is based on “adaptive 
learning of past traffic” (44), there are real-time decisions that have to 
be made to locate the shortest path13 due to the dynamics of network 
conditions. In other words, data travels “via highly circuitous paths that 
could not be determined in advance” (43).
 It is worth noting that data packets pass through intermediate 
devices like gateways, switches and routers in their journey. According 
to the Protocol specifications (RFC 793 and RFC 791), there is a field 
called “Time to Live” (TTL) that limits the lifespan of data within a 
connection (Postel 1981b, 51, 1981a, 14). Data packet routing means 
that a connection between sender and receiver contains multiple 
switching computers and a route is made up of multiple “hops”.14  
TTL is defined as the number of hops that a packet has to pass through 
before reaching its destination. This also means that if a packet passes 
through more than a defined number of hops, that particular packet 
is being discarded, alluding to the time to die, as opposed to live. 
Therefore, each packet has its own lifespan. The idea behind having 
the TTL field is to prevent any instances of endless circulating of 
data packets within the network. These decisions are monitored and 
executed in real-time. This real-time execution is similar to what  
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun describes within the context of hardware and 
software systems in which computation responds to the live condition. 
She says, 
[H]ard and software real-time systems are subject to a  
‘real-time’ constraint — that is, they need to respond, in a forced 
duration, to actions predefined as events. The measure of 
real time, in computer systems, is its reaction to the live — its 
liveness. (Chun 2008, 316)
The notion of liveness can be understood as the decisions and reac-
tions that are required to execute beneath various real-time constraints. 
To Chun, liveness is expressed at the temporal level in which a system 
is required to react and respond according to its user input and output. 
But in the case of technological networks, the response may not include 
direct human intervention, and machines take charge of decisions and 
in real-time and responses in a forced duration. The micro-temporality 
of a stream involves “micro-decisions” (Sprenger 2015) as well as 
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interruptions in real-time. Every micro-decision, the routing decision 
via multiple hops for example, takes time. Decisions are made not only 
in real-time but also in a micro-temporal interval. This also applies to 
the process of data buffering; we normally understand this by seeing 
a throbber that interrupts a stream. What then are the micro-decisions 
involved in data buffering?
 A buffer is understood as a temporal storage that usually stores  
a small amount of data in physical memory. While some data are stored 
in a buffer, other segments of data are being read and processed.  
This also means that software applications are not required to wait  
for the entire media file to be downloaded. “Just in Time” (JIT) delivery 
is used in streaming media, allowing for the playback of partially 
received data temporarily stored in the client’s buffer (Pereira and 
Ebrahimi 2002, 260). In this sense, both the playback of buffer data 
and the receiving of the remaining data can be made simultaneously 
(and, in addition to the case of video and audio, this is also commonly 
experienced in loading any relatively large size file, such as a PDF  
or an image within a browser). The buffer is where software 
applications, such as a browser or media player, access the input 
data and process it as output data. In other words, the processing 
of data consists not only of the transferring part, but rather, as Ernst 
reminds us, through “a coupling of storage and transfer in realtime”. 
He continues, “[w]hile we see one part of the video on screen, the 
next part is already loaded in the background” (Ernst 2006, 108). 
More precisely, the viewer is not watching the content as data arrives, 
instead, the viewer is watching the processed data that has arrived and 
stored in the buffer. This process of temporal storage and playback 
gives us an understanding of the relation between buffer and streams, 
in which there is latency between data arrival (from the network),  
data storage (within internal memory) and data processing (inside  
a machine) at micro-time intervals. Streaming is essentially “achieved  
by buffering the transmitted data before the actual display” (Meinel 
and Sack 2013, 780). A throbber is entangled with this latency,  
inter-acting with different pieces of data in different ways.
 Ideally, the “buffer empties itself at one end just as quickly as  
it fills up at the other end”, as described by Christoph Meinel and  
Harald Sack (783). If there is transmission delay that is within a 
threshold time t, it is regarded as unnoticeable in playback. However,  
if the delay of the individual segment exceeds the threshold time t,  
a throbber will then display. A program performs to read and  
process the buffer but the data has not arrived yet, and this gap and 
rupture will lead to the appearance of a throbber. This is the instance  
in which we can perceive and experience the discontinuous 
micro-temporality. 
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 Normally, a throbber is seen when loading a big chunk of data, 
which is commonly seen in video sites, mostly due to the instability 
or low bandwidth of a network that causes the delay of data segment 
arrival (exceeds the threshold time t). Buffering is highly related to 
time as it allows different rates to occur simultaneously, decoupling 
“time dependencies” between the input and output of data (55).  
As a result, data can be consumed and processed at a different rate  
by program applications. Data, in the case of streaming, is actively and 
constantly being stored (written) and removed (read) in the buffer at 
different speeds and rhythms, oscillating between the invisible and 
visible. The micro-temporality of buffering transforms the space of 
a buffer that works with both internal and external data. This buffer 
space, as a site of inter-actions, contingently and temporally performs 
variations. Although what has been written in the buffer will be 
automatically read and processed, technology does not guarantee  
that all the data are written in the buffer. 
The absence of data
Dropped frames (frames of video that are dropped during playout)  
are a relatively common experience in real-time communications  
and video streaming. Dropped frames impact upon the user’s viewing 
experience because of frames that disappear within a perceivable 
continuous stream. When an audio-visual is played back at the 
receiver’s side, this introduces gaps in the stream and it is able to 
produce glitches or jittery audible effects. This is different from 
displaying a throbber on a screen, where nothing can be seen on a 
screen despite the animated graphic. When experiencing dropped 
frames, one can still see or hear something, but just not necessarily  
in good quality. 
 In some situations, the issue of dropped frames is seamless 
because it does not create significant quality degradation. Such 
visible and invisible dropped frames are caused by packet loss, the 
absence of certain parts of data during data transmission across nodes 
throughout the journey. Indeed, packet loss is highly relevant to the 
notion of micro-temporality. According to James F. Kurose and Keith  
W. Ross, the delay time for transmitting data does not only include 
“store-and-forward” in each buffer nodes, but also “queuing delays” 
that are subjected to network congestion and are not predictable in 
advance (2013, 25). Packets are required to queue up and wait for  
the transfer while the network is congested. Under streaming 
conditions, data are continuously transmitted across multiple sites. 
However, the amount of buffer space is limited at each site, which 
means a newly arriving packet potentially has no space to be stored 
in while the stored packet is still queuing for its next routing. In this 
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situation, “packet loss will occur — either the arriving packet or one  
of the already — queued packets will be dropped” (25). 
 The robust design of network protocols consists of an automatic 
mechanism to detect and trigger retransmission for packet loss. 
However, for real-time conversational applications and media 
streaming platforms for live concerts, such as Skype and YouTube, 
delay time for each packet is a critical issue as the transmission 
demands to be continuous. Both conversations and live concerts are 
unceasing. On the one hand, the absence of data is crucial as packet 
loss is related to the degradation of quality, and it could immediately 
impact the visual or audio quality in a live environment. On the other 
hand, if data arrives with significant delay, the application design at 
the receiver’s end is then required to determine if such data will still 
make sense in playback, in particular where conversation and data 
are constantly played-back as a stream. In deciding whether the data 
should be played-back or ignored, acceptable latency becomes a 
decision that is inscribed in the software and platform design. During 
streaming conditions, a throbber will be seen for a weak connection 
(as for the case of Skype conversation). A serious data loss may even 
result in the automatic termination of a connection — which also  
means the tolerance is unacceptable from the point of view of software 
design. The technical consequences of data loss is nothing new if  
one has used Skype or other communication applications like 
what’s app, weChat or Line, in which it is not uncommon to have the 
experience of glitches or jitter effects, as well as a throbber display on 
a screen. But what is of concern here is rather the cultural implications 
of these absent data, or the potentiality of packet loss at any moment  
of time. 
 Here the absent data requires our attention. Firstly, the absence  
of data might be caused by a voluntary condition. It is possible for  
an application to discard late-arriving data that are within acceptable 
latency because it is insignificant to the entire user experience. 
Secondly, due to the buffer capacity, data loss can occur anytime  
and at any sites during the entire journey of a data transmission. 
Last, but not least, when the network bandwidth cannot match the 
application’s processing rate, there will be data loss.15 As a result, 
not all data are treated equally and able to arrive at the destination 
and take a perceptible form. Even though the presence of a stream 
is mediatised as audio and visuals through a screen, there is still 
the possibility of absent data. The absence, although it cannot be 
mediatised in its perceptible form at the receiver’s end, is implied in 
the presence of streams, in which conversation or video playback is 
kept running. The point is that the mundane activity that we wait and 
stream through a screen is loaded with unperceivable gaps. 
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 To explain further, the logic of buffering and data processing  
are constantly performed through the presence and absence of data.  
A display of a throbber presents another reality, a reality that is 
conflated with an invisible material infrastructure and the absence of 
material substrates. Furthermore, a throbber and its underlying data 
buffering involve discrete-time signaling—the milliseconds of time  
lost and the absence of data-presenting multiple realities which lie 
at the heart of time-dependent logics. Therefore, reality is not only 
a matter of continuous flow and the immediacy of a stream. Taking 
account of materiality, such a notion of reality refers neither to the 
symbolic meaning of content, the feeling of presence or the immediacy 
of data delivery, but rather a tension is expressed between continuity 
and discontinuity through the performativity of code. That is to say, 
when taking into account packet loss, the liveness or nowness of a 
stream is about an absent present. The notion of discontinuous micro-
temporality explicates the invisibility of computational culture by 
shifting our attention from the cultural understanding of a throbber and 
what is visible on a screen to invisible micro-events that are running  
in the background, events that are not separated but entangled as 
absent present. 
 Absent data are rarely mentioned in the commercial products  
that frame contemporary digital culture, inasmuch as it possibly  
relates to quality degradation or may be regarded as not noticeable. 
Within a stream, there are these discontinuous forces that constitute  
the continuous presence. Sometimes the forces appear to be strong,  
yet at other times they are weak; in some cases more visible, 
and at other times unnoticeable. The notion of discontinuity pays 
attention to the gaps, ruptures and pauses that are interwoven 
within the continuous flow of a data stream. From the display of a 
running throbber to its disappearance while a stream is presented, 
discontinuous micro-temporality highlights the forces and presence  
of micro-decisions and micro-interruptions that reconfigure the 
nowness or liveness of a stream.
Conclusion
A stream is manifested into continuously updating feeds, passing 
through hops and sites, which in part defines the now. The mundane 
throbber calls for a critical attention towards mediated processes 
not only at a planetary scale, but also at the micro-temporal level of 
operations, including clock cycles, instructions execution, packet 
switching and data buffering, which exhibit micro-decisions and  
micro-interruptions. The notion of discontinuous micro-temporality 
takes into account the micro-processes, gaps and ruptures and,  
more importantly, the absence of data that renders present realities. 
EXECUTING MICRO-TEMPORALITY
100
EXECUTING PRACTICES
This sheds light on the understanding of streams in computational 
culture, in particular, on how time is processed and organised to 
present the now under live conditions.
 The existence of a throbber is a by-product of a commercial 
application that informs users to wait for an unknown period of  
time. Through the use of a throbber in developing various 
services — such as live streaming, social media platforms, data and 
transactional applications — this cultural icon offers a critical space  
for understanding how the now is being made operative. A throbber  
is a cultural phenomenon that appears in almost every application  
that operates within a live computational environment. A throbber  
is not only a technical or functional object but also entangled  
with other cultural and micro-processes. This chapter explicates 
the computational logic behind a throbber as well as the real-time 
dynamics of computational networks and, hence, the rendering  
of the pervasive and networked conditionings of nowness.
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Notes
1. Computer operations are usually 
explained in conjunction with the use 
of a progress bar, for example, the 
transferring and copying of specific files 
and directories, or illustrating installation 
procedures.
2. See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/english/throb.
3. The mosaic throbber also allows 
user to click on it to stop loading a 
webpage (Roebuck 2011, 348).
4. The use of lines that indicates the 
progress activity of a computer can be 
found in the early operating system of 
Unix that consists of few string characters 
as ‘[’, ‘—’, ‘\’, ‘|’, ‘/’, ‘]’ (Roebuck 2011, 
349).
5. Coincidently, the visual design of a 
throbber is similar to the design of early 
wristwatches (with crystal guards) that 
were made for soldiers in World War I. 
Both include the concept of a wheel in 
the form of circles or lines of petal shape. 
See: http://www.oobject.com/category/
earliest-wrist-watches/.
6. Source: “18 CSS3 and jQuery 
Loading Animations Solution.” Design 
Modo, May 30, 2015, http://designmodo.
com/css3-jquery-loading-animations.
7. See: https://www.facebook.
com/ESLITE.PROJECTONE/
photos/?tab=album&album_
id=437623016346200.
8. For more details, see: https://www.
battleforthenet.com/sept10th/.
9. Other artists have also explored 
this throbber icon. For example, artist 
Gordan Savicˇic´ explores the perception 
of time through his work Loading (2009), 
that turns an ordinary windowpane into 
a screen (Savicˇic´ 2009). Alongside this 
chapter, I have also developed a project 
called The Spinning Wheel of Life (2016) 
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that explores the micro-temporality of 
computation (Soon 2016).
10. See: https://festivalenter.
wordpress.com/2009/04/09/
electroboutique-by-alexei-shulgin-
roman-minaev-aristarkh-chernyshev/.
11. Thanks to Brian House who first 
introduced the concept of computer 
clock to me in the *.exe (ver0.1) 
workshop (House 2015). 
12. Memory is used here in a broad 
sense that includes computer main 
memory, instruction register and 
memory buffer register, etc.
13. For more details about the 
determination of the shortest path,  
see Meinel and Sack (2013, 350–352).
14. A hop refers to “the leg of a route 
from one end system to the nearest 
switching computer, or between two 
adjacent switching computers, or from 
the switching computer to a connected 
end system” (Meinel and Sack 2013, 451).
15. For example, a 50% data loss is 
encountered when a network has only a 
maximum bandwidth of 5 Mbps and the 
application requires 10 Mbps.
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Synchronising Uncertainty: 
Google’s Spanner and 
Cartographic Time
Brian House
Introduction
In the following text, I discuss contemporary, large-scale, network-
distributed databases, exemplified by the largest of all, Google’s 
Spanner — so named because it circumscribes the entire planet. 
Though largely unknown to the public, Spanner is the infrastructure 
behind Google search, Google’s advertising platform, and applica-
tions like Gmail that billions of people use every day.
 To operate at such scale, Spanner must synchronize time over  
the extent of the globe, and I situate this endeavour within a genealogy 
of Western timekeeping strategies extending from astronomical 
observations in the age of maritime navigation to the various 
electromagnetic media that have coordinated the clocks of railroads 
and satellites. This lineage demonstrates how evolving notions of 
temporality are inexorably bound to geography and to the material 
practice of cartography.
 I argue that random access, a fundamental property of individual 
hard drives, is already cartographic by virtue of how it encapsulates 
the contingencies of time—this is what maps aspire to do. By physically 
extending this principle across the planet, Spanner explicitly links 
such data cartography with geographic mapmaking. 
 Further, random access also marks a shift in the evolution of  
time synchronisation. With Spanner, the ambition to establish an 
absolute measure of time itself is superseded by the need for 
synchronic slices—time is executed as “logical snapshots” of globally 
consistent data. By negotiating a contingent sense of time in order  
to posit a discrete one, Google extends strategic modes of knowledge 
that are inseparable from histories of industrialisation, colonialism,  
and militarism to our everyday interactions with its products.
“Cartographology”
I would like to begin with the hard drive which sits inside every 
internet server and on which, arguably, contemporary network 
culture is predicated. Jacques Derrida famously noted that writing is 
not secondary to spoken language, but that the means of inscription 
produces its own meaning (Derrida 1980). In an essay entitled 
“Extreme Inscription: Towards a Grammatology of the Hard Drive”, 
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Matthew Kirschenbaum extends this notion by articulating the  
material characteristics of the disk as a writing technology. Briefly, 
those are that the drive is 
– a signal processor that converts between digital and  
analog signals
– differential, in that it both depends on the measurement  
of difference in the physical media, and, by extension,  
that it represents difference
– chronographic because the physical act of reading and 
writing data takes time
– volumetric since the disk platters take up space
– rationalized because every part of the disk has an address
– motion-dependent as the read/write head mechanically 
moves
– planographic because “the surface of the disk, in order  
to fly scant nanometers beneath the air bearings, must  
be absolutely smooth”
– and non-volatile because a disk does not forget anything 
when it is turned off
Some of these properties may be more or less relevant with  
newer technologies (solid state drives, for example, have no moving 
parts, so the idea of motion-dependency has to be loosened).  
But it is significant that most of these properties describe temporal 
processes inherent in the operation of the device—it is precisely  
these material contingencies in time that the hard drive encapsulates 
and attempts to conceal.
 Such encapsulation is exemplified by random access1 — another  
of Kirschenbaum’s properties that more or less incorporates all  
the rest. The term refers to how the data of a storage medium can  
be accessed without regard to the order in which the data have been 
written. This differs fundamentally from sequential storage media  
such as magnetic tape in which information is arranged linearly  
and order is directly related to access time (imagine fast-forwarding  
and rewinding a cassette to get to your favourite song). To quibble,  
in any given situation certain data may in fact be quicker to access  
than others. But the goal of random access is to minimize the average 
time taken for a program to read or write an unpredictable sequence  
of data. In effect, this abstracts the details of the storage mechanism  
so that access time can be treated as a constant by the software  
that uses the disk. “Random” as “unpredictable” thus sits alongside  
its colloquial usage as “irrelevant”—constant time means everything  
in the data space is treated the same.
 This planer, addressable, timeless surface functions in a way 
analogous to a geographic map. As Michel de Certeau beautifully  
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puts it, maps transform
the temporal articulation of places into a spatial sequence  
of points. A graph takes the place of an operation. A reversible 
sign is substituted for a practice indissociable from particular 
moments and “opportunities” … it is thus a mark in place  
of acts. (Certeau 1984, 35)
The map gains its power from this atemporality — that the flow of 
time has been deferred elsewhere means it can be “seized as a 
whole by the eye in a single moment” (Certeau 1984, 35), and it is 
this that enables strategic planning. This is not so different from how 
we think of data as a field of knowledge laid out before us. Us, or an 
algorithm — both the search routine that interprets the past and the 
artificially intelligent program that predicts the future depend on a 
static, map-like representation on which they can operate. Therefore, 
what I’m proposing is that what’s at stake with storage technology  
is not only a matter of grammatology, as in the study of writing, but 
of what might be called cartograph-ology and the equally inscriptive 
cultural practice of mapmaking. If Kirschenbaum has elucidated the  
cartographic techniques of the hard drive, what are those of a 
distributed database such as Spanner?
Consistency
Random access is technically straightforward to achieve when it 
comes to an individual disk within a single computer. But consider 
that Spanner is, as Google says, “designed to scale up to millions of 
machines across hundreds of datacenters and trillions of database 
rows” (Corbett 2012, 1). Further, these machines are not in the same 
place — there are data centers on six continents. Data in such a 
distributed system are sharded, which means that a single database 
must be coordinated across a network of storage devices. Sharding 
allows the system to scale — it abstracts the database from the disk 
in order to overcome the inherent size and speed limitations of 
individual pieces of hardware. This means that unlike Kirschenbaum’s 
grammatology of a hard drive, a cartographology of a distributed 
database cannot be done purely on a mechanical level. Rather, it 
must account for the software architecture and processual techniques 
whereby that hardware is organised.
 In that regard, we have to consider the big problem for any 
distributed database — maintaining consistency. A consistent database 
is one that is always in a valid state — that is, all information across  
the network is up-to-date, and at any given time all applications 
and users are accessing the same information. This is a necessary 
prerequisite if it is going to function as a map. Again, that is easy for  
a single disk, but transfer time across the distributed network, 
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especially under global circumstances, makes this extremely  
difficult.
 To address it, Google starts with the idea of the logical snapshot, 
whereby the data across all machines, in all data centres, across  
every continent, is known to be consistent at a given point in time in 
the past. To be able to do that, you need to know the order in which  
the data have been written, irrespective of which shards they have 
been written on. This is easier said than done — techniques developed  
prior to Spanner rely on “complicated coordination protocols” (Metz 
2012) to let each other know about each write — but such complexity 
limits the scalability of the system and its capability to act as a truly 
unified whole.
 Google’s innovation at first seems almost banal — to determine  
the order of the data, simply record the time at which each was written. 
Assuming a “global wall-clock”, a logical snapshot is just a temporal 
slice at some point in the near past — far enough in the past to account 
for the communication delay between all the shards. However, the 
existence of such a clock turns out to be a big assumption. Google’s 
Andrew Fikes declares, “as a distributed systems developer, you’re 
taught from — I want to say childhood — not to trust time” (Metz 
2012). Fikes could also mean any given representation of time, but the 
conflation is revealing. It situates Google’s drive to establish a global 
wall-clock, which is the central ambition of Spanner, within a genealogy 
of Western timekeeping strategies concerned with synchronization 
over expanding geographic areas.
A brief history of time(keeping)
Peter Galison has written a persuasive history tracing the relationship 
between geography, media, and synchronicity (Galison 2003).  
He explains how the emergence of the mechanical clock in Europe 
in the sixteenth century permitted the unbinding of time from 
location — that is, a clock, propelled by its own internal mechanism, 
may indicate what time it is somewhere else. As Galison discusses, 
this was a critical, if incrementally achieved, innovation for navigation 
and cartography. Consider that in order to understand the globe as a 
grid of latitude and longitude coordinates, one’s position on the grid 
has to be observable. Navigation by star position provides a relatively 
straightforward way to determine latitude via the night sky — the 
star Polaris aligns with the north pole, and the Southern Cross can 
be used to triangulate the south. But because of the rotation of the 
earth, longitude can only be reliably fixed given the time of a known 
location. For example, if it is midnight in London and the stars where I 
am are shifted ninety degrees from what I would expect in the London 
sky, then I am a quarter way around the globe. Hence the rationalised 
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sense of time as a constant, independent dimension that is the same 
everywhere also marks the birth of contemporary cartography.  
This continues to resonate in culture: time and space are separately 
thought, but practically bound.
 Galison goes on to trace the progression whereby train routes 
maintained a unified “train time” which gradually reconciled the 
divergent timekeeping of regional metropolitan centres. This 
process was predicated by the emergence of electromagnetic media 
in the form of the telegraph and later the radio that allowed time 
synchronisation to happen over greater distances — the infrastructure 
that is the direct antecedent of the fiber optics and undersea 
cables that carry data today. Progressively, the observatory hubs 
anchoring clocks to local astronomical measurements surrendered 
to the international standard of Greenwich Mean Time and modern 
discrete time zones. And at each step, this was a political negotiation, 
from the municipal level all the way up to the empire-building of 
Britain, industrial expansion in the US, and the extension of French 
Revolutionary values seeking rationalised standards. As Galison puts 
it, “beating overhead in church spires, observatories, and satellites, 
synchronized clocks have never stood far from the political order” 
(Galison 2003, 143).2
 While Greenwich Mean Time was originally directly tied to 
measurements at the Royal Observatory in the UK, it turns out that 
the Earth’s rotation is not constant — tidal friction and changes in the 
Earth’s mass due to melting glaciers cause it to vary. Subsequently,  
a more accurate reference was needed. Decoupling the notion of  
the day from the transit of the sun, which happened on January 1, 1972, 
is a profoundly modernist gesture. 9,192,631,770 cycles of radiation 
from the caesium-133 atom is the current international standard for  
one second, and the atomic clock is the basis for Universal 
Coordinated Time, or UTC.
 Atomic clocks are also the foundation of contemporary 
map-making. Each of the satellites that make up the Global Positioning 
Service, or GPS, contains an atomic clock within it. In many ways, 
GPS — originally deployed by the US military — culminates the 
narrative of terrestrial time synchronization by literally rising above 
the earth. The system broadcasts clock signals to the ground, where 
receivers, ubiquitously embedded in things like mobile devices, 
triangulate their position — minute differences between the received 
times indicate varying distances to the known location of each 
satellite. This temporal negotiation smooths geographic space into 
the Cartesian grid postulated by post-Enlightenment thought — it is 
exemplified by the gesture of looking down at GPS-powered Google 
Maps on your iPhone in order to see the earth from above.3
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True time
How does that iPhone keep time? Computing devices generally make 
use of a real-time clock, or RTC, which is based on a cheap crystal 
oscillator. An RTC will inevitably drift out of synchrony with other 
clocks due to temperature fluctuations and other physical factors. 
However, with systems connected to the internet, the RTC synchronizes 
with a time server using the Network Time Protocol, or NTP. Such 
servers are maintained by governments (time.nist.gov), independent 
foundations (pool.ntp.org), and large corporations (time.apple.com).  
In this case, synchronization happens via internet packets, and as  
such it is subject to network latency. For most systems, though, NTP  
is good enough.
 However, when a Google engineer doesn’t “trust time”, it reflects 
practical experience that much can go wrong with NTP synchronization 
procedures. Communication may fail due to network variability, and, 
critically, machines distributed around the world will experience 
uneven latency in relation to a central time server. Clocks may or may 
not line up, and worse, there is no way to verify after the fact if this  
has happened.
 Hence Spanner. First, Spanner eschews NTP and is linked 
explicitly to GPS — every data centre has a “time master” unit that is 
always receiving GPS time. There are also “Armageddon masters” 
within the system that have their own atomic clocks, in the extreme 
case that GPS should ever fail. Each machine continually updates its 
RTC by continuously polling a variety of these master clocks, both in 
the local data center and from across the network. The slightly differing 
times received from all the masters are combined to produce an 
optimal time estimation, an emergent consensus that is uniform across 
the globally-distributed database. This uniformity, however, comes 
with a level of calculated uncertainty, an artifact of all the aggregated 
network latency together with clock drift on individual machines.
 This negotiated uncertainty is represented by what Google calls 
the TrueTime API. An API, or Application Programming Interface, 
is an essential programming concept based on obfuscation. 
Software components need not — and in fact, should not — know the 
implementation details of other components. Rather, an API provides 
stable terms through which software can reliably communicate while 
hiding the underlying, and potentially variable, mess. Application  
code that uses Spanner does so through the TrueTime API, which 
“explicitly represents time as … an interval” that indicates the earliest 
and latest points that an event could possibly have happened. In other 
words, the brilliance of the TrueTime API is that it “reif[ies] clock 
uncertainty” (Hsieh 2012).
111
 Google describes this strategy as being Rumsfeldian — that is, 
“known unknowns are better than unknown unknowns.” They abandon 
the naïve hope that fast is fast enough — instead, Spanner leverages 
statistical knowledge about its own vast hardware to gauge how 
confident it can be about time. In an industry obsessed with making 
things faster, a counter-intuitive feature of the system is that “if the 
uncertainty is large, Spanner slows down to wait out that uncertainty” 
(Hsieh 2012). All of this is done in service to having a global wall-clock 
that Google can depend on — it is what makes those logical snapshots 
possible.
Random access geography
Finally we can return to Kirschenbaum. Does the scale achieved  
with Spanner exceed the qualities of the individual hard drive?  
This is undeniably the case. Yet, in many ways, such a geographically 
totalising database infrastructure aspires to function as a single  
disk. Revisiting and reformulating Kirschenbaum’s grammatology,  
or our cartographology, elucidates the comparison. 
 Spanner is certainly a signal processor, but that analog-to-
digital conversion now happens multiple times across the network 
switches and undersea cables of distributed infrastructure. It is still 
as differential as its individual disks. TrueTime itself clearly marks 
Spanner as chronographic. If the hard drive is volumetric, Spanner’s 
data centers are extremely so. It is a rationalised system, because 
any data across the space may be addressed, and, significantly, that 
location is also a geographical place. Is Spanner motion dependent? 
If the hard drive has the spinning disk, Spanner adds the orbit of 
GPS satellites, the oscillation of the caesium atom, and the packets 
traversing the network. Non-volatility maps to Spanner’s robustness  
and those Armageddon masters. And planographic speaks to the  
data centers spread out over the surface of the earth. We can therefore 
construct an analog between how Kirschenbaum enumerates the 
technology of inscription that is the hard drive and this far larger 
system, supplementing purely mechanical elements with software  
and geographic processes.
 What about random access? Spanner’s logical snapshots accom-
plish the same thing — they render the notion of time itself secondary 
to a consistent plane of stable data. It is the felt quality experienced  
by the individual or application that is able to call up any piece of 
information from the database at will, regardless of the material condi-
tions of its storage. This is Spanner’s goal, for all data to be available 
from any point and time, at a geographic scale. 
 Spanner makes the isomorphism of a hard drive to a map quite 
literal. This is even reflected by certain representations that Google 
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puts forth, namely, Google Earth and Google Maps. The effortlessly 
spinning globe that one floats above in Earth might well serve  
as a metonym for the random access space coordinated by Spanner,  
as “Google Earth … can be understood as the aesthetic rendering …  
of the logic of Google search” (Munster 2013, 63). Search is, of course, 
the paradigmatic operation of random access and is inseparable  
from the rationalised qualities of the distributed database beneath 
it. A plain link is thus established between representation and 
infrastructure.
Conclusion
Clearly, though, there is a “sense” here, that is missing. Anna Munster’s 
work on how we experience networks and data is particularly compel-
ling in this respect. She explains how there is a difference between 
recognising something that is already within the parameters of what is 
knowable, as one does when pointing something out on a map, and the 
active, contingent process of experiencing some unknown potential 
unfold in time (Munster 2013, 43). The latter is, in short, the uncertainty 
that is exactly what Spanner urgently seeks to obfuscate. Where has 
the time gone? The TrueTime API extends the techniques of time-
keeping in Galison’s history — it is a synchronization procedure. But 
with Spanner, the quest to chase uncertainty down to ever finer inter-
vals — even to the oscillations of the atom—is superseded by a concern 
with a sequence of logical snapshots that bypasses that uncertainty. 
Potential is abstracted away by an engineered lag behind the “now”.
 That the human experience of time is irreducible to modes of 
timekeeping should be self-evident—otherwise we would never have 
to check the clock. Consequently, as a totalising project, Spanner is 
aspirational. We are well acquainted with the “spinning beach ball of 
death” and other aesthetic ruptures we experience when technology 
can’t quite keep up (see Winnie Soon’s contribution in this volume) —  
the unresponsive hard drive, the stutter in the video stream, even the 
tone-deaf targeted ad — these moments reveal material contingencies 
that resist representation. In Spanner’s case, “network lag” is a kind 
of shorthand for the physical resources and social structures required 
to build, connect, and maintain millions of computers across vast 
distances. They are left out of the map even as they are essential to 
the cartographic act. But when Spanner slows down the world to make 
it conform to its strategic view, that elision manifests in the micro-
experiences of billions of users.
 To “keep time” is to mark temporal experience, but to “keep” 
is also to withhold or suspend. To the extent that maps — whether of 
data, geography, or both — accomplish this, they reserve extraordinary 
power. But by understanding the practices of timekeeping that 
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make such abstraction possible, we can rethink them as a particular 
construction of lived time and modulate our participation accordingly. 
After all, “keeping time” is also what drummers do in musical 
performance, and a distributed database, too, is a matter of temporal 
aesthetics rather than absolute measure.
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Notes
1. Not to be confused with Random 
Access Memory.
2. Galison reprints a map of a French 
plan for synchronizing South America, 
with telegraph lines reaching Rio from 
Europe and encircling the continent, 
passing through Lima, and continuing 
north to the United States. It bears a 
remarkable similarity to an image in 
Wired accompanying its article on 
Spanner, an isomorphism which evinces 
similar ambitions. 
3. See the work of Johnathan Hanahan, 
http://www.hanahan.works/pixel_
posters.html.
References
Brewer, Eric. 2000. “Towards Robust 
Distributed Systems.” PODC Keynote, 
July 19. http://www.cs.berkeley.
edu/~brewer/cs262b-2004/PODC-
keynote.pdf.
De Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice 
of Everyday Life. Trans. by Steven 
F. Rendall. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1980. Of Grammatology. 
Trans. by Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Galison, Peter. 2003. Einstein’s Clocks, 
Poincaré’s Maps. New York: W. W. 
Norton.
Hsieh, Wilson. 2012. “Google’s 
Globally-Distributed Database.” 
Paper presentation. See http://new.
livestream. com/accounts/1545775/
osdi12/videos/4646642 and also 
James C. Corbett et al (2012), OSDI: 
Tenth Symposium on Operating 
System Design and Implementation 
Proceedings.
Kirschenbaum, Matthew. 2008. “Extreme 
Inscription: A Grammatology of 
the Hard Drive” reedited from 
Mechanisms: New Media and the 
Forensic Imagination. Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press.
Marzullo, K. A. 1984. Maintaining the Time 
in a Distributed System: An Example of 
a Loosely-Coupled Distributed Service. 
Palo Alto: Stanford University.
Metz, Cade. 2012. “Google Spans Entire 
Planet With GPS-Powered Database.” 
Wired, September 19. http://www.
wired.com/2012/09/google-spanner/
all/.
Munster, Anna. 2013. An Aesthesia of 
Networks. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
114
EXECUTING PRACTICES
115
Loading… 800% Slower 
David Gauthier
Loading... 800% Slower addresses modern deceits and their latest 
scripts. It is concerned with the détournement of web pages’ “critical 
rendering paths” so that browsers can render what they really are: 
timely designed assaults. The project disinters contemporary third 
party algorithmic oddments (http://cdn.krxd.net/controltag?confid=-
JQqG5SW9) that lurk deep in the murkiness of your web browser’s 
script interpreter and which, as non-visual techniques of entrapment, 
act as conduits of a new kind of imperceptible propaganda that  
does away with our too slow affective registers. While some may 
be enticed to believe that the toneless term “data” mainly denotes 
bytes that primarily compose images, texts and, sometimes, sounds, 
it is rather predominantly in the form of machine-interpretable code 
that these bytes are queued and reassembled from end-to-end. 
Contemporary networks are not networks of perceptible images and 
texts but rather ones of ambulant and rampant code and scripts that  
do not warrant direct recourse, let alone signalling, to human sense  
or perception.
 Loading... 800% Slower foregrounds how this non-human 
computational acceleration and automation work towards creating 
zones of felonious interactivity where the automated agency of 
browsers and servers directly supersedes and substitutes itself for 
intentional actions of their sacrosanct users. As human trans-actions  
are now being bolstered by machine-to-machine executions, which 
occur at timescales that completely bypass human consciousness, 
Loading … 800% Slower amplifies this temporal asymmetry between 
machine deliberation time and human deliberation time.
 By slowing down to an excessive degree the bitrate of an internet 
connection while a browser plugin renders audible the various 
invisible and dubious scripts and DOM elements composing a given 
web page, this project feeds forward the uncanny temporality of  
human consciousness in rendering almost still (and loud) the temporal 
signals of the machine. While a given page is protractedly loading,  
it is prepared by Loadingµ... 800% Slower’s plugin which injects 
purpose-built software oscillators into its document object model. 
These various oscillators are then modulated by the type, provenance 
and amount of incoming bytes requested at various times during  
the temporal resolution/execution of the page. This parasitic rendering 
works towards orchestrating a noise composition that climaxes 
coincidently upon the transmission and execution of deceitful  
codes.
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LOADING… 800% SLOWER
Medium: browser plug-in and web proxy server.  
URL: http://gauthiier.info/loading-800p-slower/.
Special thanks to Michael Dieter.
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Excerpt: “666 new letters to the editor”, Bugs in the War Room,  
Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter (2016).
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BUGS IN THE WAR ROOM
— Economies and /of Execution
Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter
Chennai, South India. I am sitting in the office of a senior engineer 
of one of India’s largest IT-companies. It is autumn 2014, but our 
conversation brings us to the years prior to the turn of the Millennium. 
She recalls her experiences of working within one of the many teams 
busy fixing the Y2K bug. The senior engineer describes the “war 
room”, a space in which together with her colleagues over a duration 
of twenty-four hours she observed the world making the transition 
from the 31st of December 1999 to the 1st of January 2000. “Well, they 
thought that on January 1st, 12 AM in the morning all planes will stop, 
all towers will stop, all trains will stop, all the clocks would stop, and  
all systems will come to a standstill …” she says.
 What follows is a close reading of the Y2K bug, which towards  
the turn of the millennium caused a world-wide crisis of computer 
systems, and thus stirred up the global economy. I have been working 
with this crisis over the last years. Part of this work was exhibited in 
my solo exhibition Bugs in the War Room at Overgaden - Copenhagen 
Institute for Contemporary Art in 2016. In this text I wish to elaborate 
further on the reflections presented in the exhibition specifically  
in relation to the notion of execution. Execution is here understood  
as a continuous incomplete process always on the verge of breakdown. 
This emphasises maintenance as an important part of the execution 
process — after all, the algorithms and information architectures 
supporting global flows need to be maintained in order to execute/
flow at all.
Bugs
In the mid 1990s, attention started to be directed towards the so-called 
Year 2000 problem, or Y2K bug, as it was primarily dubbed in the 
Western world. Since the early days of computation, it had been a 
routine as well as a technical standard to indicate year dates with two 
digits instead of four, leaving out the numbers specifying the millen-
nium in order to save costly computer memory. But awareness around 
the potential implications of such a practice began to come to the 
fore: When reaching the year 2000, the computer would not be able 
to distinguish the 00 of 2000 from the 00 of 1900. It was assumed that 
“[u]nless reprogrammed, bypassed or replaced these systems will 
malfunction at the turn of the century, if not before, with wide ranging 
consequences” (Downing 1998, i). The Y2K bug was presumed to 
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lead to failures within major financial institutions like banks or stock 
exchanges, payroll systems, telecommunications and power systems 
(Koskinen 2000).
 The senior programmer explains: “We had set up something 
called the war room to monitor the systems’ changeovers. Because we 
were working across all the verticals like banking, critical transaction, 
transportation, i. e. where the planes have to land — they thought that 
some planes might not even land because of the Y2K problem.”
 Bruno Latour suggests a notion of “reverse black-boxing” to 
illustrate how a bug, by making a system fail, is reverse-black-boxing 
the system, thereby directing the user’s attention away from the  
system as an enclosed object and towards the different parts of  
which the system is composed (Latour 1994, 36). Latour suggests the 
example of an overhead projector, which, when working, appears  
as an integrated closed black-boxed object, but upon breakdown,  
brings forth a network of interconnected objects and actors: lens, 
lamp, cooler, cables and further socio-technical components are made 
visible. In a similar way, Heidegger states that technology only appears 
to us in its breaking down, when it goes from a relatively transparent 
mode of “readiness-to-hand” and being at one’s disposal (Heidegger 
1962, 98) to announcing itself through the break-down, and thus 
becoming “present-at-hand” (52). In Latour’s theory of black-boxing, 
the reversal is mainly about exposing the relations that make up the 
technical object. For Heidegger, however, there was a larger issue  
of the “essence” of technology making itself present as well, relating 
to the overall role of technology in culture and nature as a whole 
(Heidegger 1977, 23–24). Following these lines of thinking, the bug 
that terminates a running process — a process of execution — draws 
attention to the relations which the execution process is part of, as  
well as to the “essence” of the systems that they are formed in, which  
in this case includes neo-colonial divides within global flows.
 At its core the Y2K Bug can be said to be caused due to a practice 
of executing as economically as possible. Leon A. Kappelman, the 
co-chairman of the Year 2000 working group for the Society for 
Information Management, estimated that the “use of two-digit years 
in a program written in the 1960’s would have saved more than $1 
million per billion bytes of data stored over the following 30 years” 
(Feder & Pollack 1998). The Y2K bug thus reflects the socio-economical 
development of three of the computer’s core components: processor, 
memory and storage. The economic aspects of these three parts have 
evolved over different times and scales. The processor was quickly 
made capable of performing faster in relation to its price, i.e. it 
became cheaper to produce faster processors. The same was not true 
for memory, which remained expensive (storage became cheaper,  
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Bugs in the War Room at Overgaden — Institute for Contemporary Art, 
Copenhagen (2016). Photo: Anders Sune Berg.
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but not reliable). Because memory was very expensive it became 
a practice (as well as a technological standard) to reduce the four 
digits of a given year into two digits or one byte, the so called “pack 
decimal”, which at the turn of the Millennium would be labeled  
“Y2K bug”. In other words, a supposedly technical error was initially  
a clever solution to a problem, which over time turned into a new 
problem. Consequently, the Y2K bug highlights socio-economic 
relations, including those of hardware, entangled within the process  
of execution. The Y2K bug reveals a dependency on external  
relations, departing from an understanding of execution as foremost 
enacted code.
War rooms
The senior programmer continues her recollection: “The war room 
was a 360 degree room where everybody was having a terminal to 
monitor the systems, talk to the clients. Then there were Maya phones, 
they thought even the phones would fail, even the phone companies, 
so there were alternative communication methodologies. There was a 
backup link. There was a fiber optic link”, and, she notes, “There were 
not many people in the room. Only the key people, about 50 of us.”
 The engineer’s description of the Y2K war room of the Indian IT 
corporation bears a resemblance to Ken Adam’s set-design for the war 
room scenes in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 black comedy Dr. Strangelove  
or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. It strikes me that 
Dr. Strangelove’s war room equally was equipped with a 360 degree 
table. It also had around 50 people gathered in the room — all with a 
terminal and a phone.
 In “Lessons Learned from War Room Designs and Implementa-
tions”, US military consultant, Steven M. Shaker describes how war 
rooms play an important role in “developing tactics and grand strate-
gies” within the US military (2002). Shaker traces the transformation  
of the war room from “rooms concentrated on maps, and on game 
tables with miniature flags and models representing force disposition 
and movement” (2002, 3), to how “[w]ith the advent of modern commu-
nications and near real-time reconnaissance and intelligence these 
rooms have refocused to concentrate on command and control rather 
than long range planning and strategy formulation” (3). War rooms  
are places of concentrated power, the site from which orders are  
given to be executed.
 Adam’s war room is indeed an iconic manifestation of such power. 
The story goes that when Ronald Reagan became president of the 
United States, he asked his “chief of staff to be shown the war room 
of Dr. Strangelove” (Adams 2009). Reagan assumed that this was a 
real room, placed within the Pentagon. This anecdote might tell more 
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about Ronald Reagan’s skewed relationship with war and reality.1 
Nevertheless, Adam’s war room design with the 360 degree table in the 
centre of the triangular concrete bunker manifests an imaginary image 
of the epicentre of power and control in the Cold War era.
 Dr. Strangelove, however, depicts disturbances within the 
straightforward hierarchy of the execution of top-down orders. The war 
room is the backdrop of desperate attempts to countermand an order 
issued by a mad general enforcing a nuclear air strike against the Soviet 
Union. But inherent discipline coupled with technological malfunctions 
makes it impossible to break the destiny of execution as presented in 
the film. The irony of the film is that the technology does not execute the 
orders perfectly, leaving the individuals committed to the system with 
the task of ultimately carrying out the execution. Eventually one plane 
attacks the USSR as requested, thus triggering the MAD (Mutual Assured 
Destruction) doctrine, presumably leading to complete annihilation of 
the Earth — with the exception of the group of men gathered in the war 
room, who are being moved to a safe place under ground.
 Kubrick insisted that, despite the film being shot in black and 
white, the war room table should be covered with green felt, as he 
wanted to give an impression of how the powerful men gathered 
around the table “were playing for the faith of the earth like a poker 
game” (Adams 2009). If Kubrick had made a film thirty years later 
depicting the paranoia of the Y2K bug, I wonder what material he would 
have chosen for the table of the Indian war room? The table of the 
Y2K war room did not assemble top leaders, or represent a top-down 
hierarchy of order and execution. On the contrary, it was a gathering 
as emergency-brigade, or the caretakers of global information 
architectures, ultimately calling for a different understanding of the 
war room’s relation to power; away from top-down management, with 
orders followed by execution, towards a model of continuous executable 
maintenance and feedback. In this way, the Y2K war room turns out to be 
a crucial site for the understanding of execution’s entanglement within 
a global economy: not because the Y2K war room is a focused centre of 
power and command, but rather on the contrary, because it is the site 
from which information architectures are being maintained and made to 
flow via a continuous maintenance of back end structures.
Anxious flows:
A letter to the editor of the Conservative Christian American magazine 
End Time in March/April 1999 read:
If we let A=6, B=12, C=18, etc. all the way through Z=156. If you 
take the word COMPUTER and apply these values to the  
letters, you will find that they add up to 666. In Revelation 13:18, 
“Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast; 
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Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter (2016). Photo: Anders Sune Berg.
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for it is the number of a man; and his number is six hundred 
threescoreand six.” I don’t believe that this is a coincidence.  
We have speculated that the computerchip will be “the Mark” 
now we have proof! (Briant 1999, as cited in Tapia 2003, 493)
The above letter points to the increasing paranoia around computers 
at the turn of the millennium. It was, however, not only apocalyptic 
Christians, but furthermore the Western business world, which towards 
the end of the 1990s reacted strongly to the increasing ‘threat’ of the 
Millennium bug and the potential economical losses related to it.  
As stated in the April, 1999 issue of The Futurist (as quoted by Fishman 
and Fosket 1999), “If you think your company will be okay because  
all your systems are Y2K compliant, guess again … Just because you’ve 
worked out your Y2K bugs doesn’t mean your suppliers have. If 5%  
of your suppliers go out on you, can your company survive?”
 In “Revisiting the Y2K Bug: Language Wars over Networking the 
Global Order”, Kirsty Best points out how the Y2K bug “illustrated 
the way in which the primacy of the individual within a global order 
is under threat from the contamination of others, the inability to 
seal one’s borders” (Best 2003, 301). Such presumed omnipresence 
corresponds to Ulrich Beck’s notion of the boomerang effect within 
what he calls “the Risk Society”. Beck writes, “The multiplication of 
risks causes world society to contract into a community of danger” 
(Beck 1992, 44 — my emphasis). However, in March 1999, The Financial 
Times reported: “Federal officials have said that if they are not satisfied 
with other countries’ plans for air traffic control, the Department of 
Transportation could ban flights between specified airports and the 
US or prevent US airlines and code sharers from flying over certain 
countries” (Fishman & Fosket 1998). In November of the same year, 
the semi-official private sector body of the UK, the so called Taskforce 
2000, “advised travelers to avoid Italy, Germany, Switzerland and a 
number of other countries2 for a five-week period around 1 January 
2000” (Quiggin 2005, 49). Such divisions between “us” and “them” 
played out on micro as well as macro levels. For example, Kevin 
Quigley quotes a civil servant remarking on the process of correcting 
the Y2K bug within the British Government, saying that, “Given the 
consensus that ‘it had to be done,’ any opposition from within would 
have been the work of a troublemaker, not a team player … becoming 
‘Y2K-compliant’ was a badge of honour; it meant good corporate 
citizenship” (Quigley 2004, 818). This leads to a gap between those 
who are doing their duty, being “good citizens” and not asking any 
questions in opposition to a “few ‘cynical’ civil servants” reflecting 
critically on how Y2K-compliancy is being carried out (818). Hence the 
“us” will by all means attempt to continue the execution, whereas the 
“they” might not care about, be critical towards nor be capable  
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of correcting the Y2K bug, and thus will have to be controlled by 
different means or symbolically excluded from the network.
 At the same time, some developing countries spent enormous 
resources to become Y2K compliant, so as to avoid exclusion on a 
macro level. Later, however, it was revealed that the “speculation that 
computers in developing countries would fail largely was based on 
anecdotal information” (researcher Matt Hotle from Gartner Group,  
as quoted by Hema Shukla 2000). Nevertheless, the enormous 
spendings were hardly scrutinised, but rather justified as a means 
to accelerated development, as for instance in Mexico, where the 
technical secretary of the National Commission for Y2K Information 
Conversion stated, “We’ve come out on top … the quality of equipment 
and infrastructure has improved, and more companies are now using 
computers as a result of this experience” (Faiola 2000, as quoted in 
Best 2003, 303). Or in Southern Africa, where Stephen Mutul, in his 
analysis of the impact of the Y2K problem in a Southern African  
context, concludes by highlighting the benefits of the preparations  
for the Y2K bug (Mutula 2001, 26).3 In this casting of the drive towards 
Y2K compliancy in third world countries as yet another narrative  
of “catching up” with the West, a neo-colonial power structure comes 
to light. Even if the cause is a non-existent problem, the necessary 
compliancy is revealed as lying elsewhere: that of catching up with  
the reliance on networked IT infrastructures within global capitalism.
 In the scrambling of nations to become Y2K compliant, the “risk” 
surrounding the Y2K bug took form as a discourse of the construction 
of the “other” (Best 2003, 302; Fishman & Fosket 1998), as well as 
anxious attempts of escaping such categorisation, rather than a 
“community of danger” as envisioned by Beck. Accordingly, the letter 
to the editor of End Time written in Spring 1999 (as referred to above), 
may read as a manifestation of such anxiety, where the problem of 
dealing with the contingency of the system transforms into a “paranoid 
cybernetics” (Cramer 2016). An absurd arbitrary system is created in 
order to maintain the otherwise sliding grip of control, thus allowing 
the letter writer to satisfyingly announce that “now we have proof!”  
on the basis of a home-invented numerological system in which letters 
of the word “computers” add up to 666. Despite the fact that this 
numerological system of course appears entirely arbitrary. Similarly, 
the Y2K problem was largely arbitrary for most developing countries, 
with the irony being that it was precisely workers in the outsourcing 
industries who ended up doing the main bulk of Y2K debugging  
and maintenance.
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 Economies and/of execution
Back in the office in Chennai, the engineer ends her account:  
“We had to manage the entire 24 hours. Just follow the sun on that day 
… Very few critical problems were there. It had nothing to do with the 
date — the usual production support problems.”
 I keep thinking of the senior engineer’s final remark that there 
were in reality very few problems out of the ordinary. There is a 
tendency to think of execution as an ongoing flow of running processes. 
But as Nathan Ensmenger (2009, 88) points out, “Software is not an 
end-product, but should rather be understood as a ‘heterogeneous 
system’ consisting of social as well as technological components”.  
This means that since the world around the executed code is 
continuously being altered, the software itself has to be maintained and 
updated in order to be kept alive, i.e. to be executable at all. Thus the 
war room of the Y2K bug was not just a one off happening, conversely it 
is taking place all the time. In the senior engineer’s company she and 
her colleagues are steadily making sure that the bugs in the war rooms 
— the usual production support problems — are found, corrected 
and enhanced in order for the networked global economy to continue 
executing.
 Maintenance is about efficiency, and is thus a matter of economy 
and economising, and the Y2K problem could be said to manifest this 
as a problem of execution. Not as a relation between source code 
and executed object code, but in this case of execution as a matter 
of an economy of the hardware. For a brief moment, the mere scare 
of the potential breakdown made our global networked information 
architectures “present-at-hand”, thus opening up for a comprehension 
of the complex internal relations between hardware, execution and 
the maintenance needed in order to make algorithms execute at all. 
But also, importantly, disclosing the role of execution as the main force 
upholding a networked global economy and the neo-colonial divides 
that are maintained and supported within such a drive.
Opposite: Excerpt of COBOL source code for Endless Endtime:  
a complete index of all elements leading to the end of the world, vol I of ∞,  
Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter, Fõrlag Rojal (2016).
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Endless Endtime: a complete index of all elements leading to the end of the world, 
vol I of ∞, Linda Hilfling Ritasdatter, Fõrlag Rojal (2016).
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Notes
1. Or maybe the other way around: 
DARPA’s skewed relation with reality  
and war. After Operation Desert Storm 
(and the wide critique of General 
Norman Schwarzkop’s aperances live  
on TV in the tent, which were seen  
as an embarrassing representation  
of US military command), means were 
taken within DARPA to hire Herman 
Zimmerman, the set-designer of Star 
Trek, to develop a mobile war room 
called ‘The Enterprise’ based on his 
design for the USS Enterprise NCC 1701 
Bridge (Shaker 2002, 3).
2. The full list of countries which 
should be avoided included: Czech 
Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain as 
well as Switzerland.
3. Please see my PhD thesis 
(forthcoming, Malmö University Press, 
2018) for an extensive elaboration on 
the developing countries’ role in relation 
to the notion of development and Y2K 
compatibility during the turn of the 
millennium.
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Erasure 
Audrey Samson
What has been conquered for all has been redefined by 
categories that are addressed to whoever, categories that 
produced amnesia and which are then vulnerable to the  
infernal alternatives concocted by capitalism.
– Isabelle Stengers in Catastrophic Times: Resisting the 
Coming Barbarism
How does erasure execute knowledge production? The following is  
a tour through a collection of erasure that provides a glimpse into the 
many directions that this question may take us, through the lens of a 
series of artistic interventions, academic research, experiments and 
artefacts.
 I present these items from a collector’s point of view. For achieving 
completion of this collection of erasures would be, in the words of Jean 
Baudrillard, like death. That is to say that the desire to complete the 
series, to achieve the perfection of its imaginary ending, is that which 
creates the elusive object of desire. As such, in the same way that a 
collection can always extend itself laterally, or spark a new one ([1968] 
1996, 113), I am presenting it as an object of desire, fuelled by the 
impetus of neoliberal growth, which can never be complete and will 
forever expand into new meanings of execution, always towards the 
elusive erasure of death.
 The collection begins with the archetypal storyteller: memory. 
Human memory is a careful curation of erasure. Most of what is 
experienced is not actualised in long term memory (Kandel 2007).  
It is neither forgotten, nor is it remembered in the first place. Amongst 
the select few moments that are retained, that we call memory, the 
parsimonious organ intently and iteratively erases (Hadziselimovic 
et al. 2014). The work of Estefanía Peñafiel Loaiza repeats this gesture 
in Sans titre (figurants). She deliberately effaces certain personnages 
from newspapers with an eraser. The perseverance of this task, the 
cadavers of erasure, are collected and categorised (Figure 1). This play 
on history, or what is remembered, emphasises the relation to how an 
individual defines herself and acts in the world, namely because we 
think of our future as anticipated memories. According to psychologist 
Daniel Kahneman (2011), one of the major motivations for global 
tourism, for example, is the desire to collect memories. Execution as 
collection.
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 The authoring power of memory is a notion that has been histori-
cally capitalised upon by various regimes. The systematic erasure of 
peoples, national archives and artefacts have been used to strengthen 
specific notions of national (or religious) identity. In the same vein, 
such powers as the Chinese People’s Party, Facebook and Google use 
erasure to obfuscate events that do not fit a certain political narrative 
or a set of private interests (Lim 2014; Travis 2013; Shaker 2006).  
Winnie Soon’s How to Get Mao Experience Through Internet… (2014–15) 
is a monumentalising loop of obfuscations (Figure 2). The repeating, 
centred portrait of Mao blinds us from the surrounding landscape 
changes, itself a reminder of the vision curated by search engines such 
as Google, Flickr and Baidu. Obfuscation through repetition.
 The politics of the archive are a powerful force driving knowledge 
production (Steyerl 2008; Brown & Davis-Brown 1998; Bowker & Star 
1999; Derrida 1995). The Internet’s inherent data transfer and storage 
redundancy model facilitates a sort of hyperthymesia1 where the 
execution of social network sharing can construct fallacies or stain 
reputations. An emblematic case of this being that of the pepper spray 
incident at the University of California Davis (Figure 3). The university’s 
strategic communications office was later found to have employed 
“reputation management firms” to delete an incriminating photo from 
the Internet to avoid negative coverage of the events that took place  
in November 2011 (Jardin 2016). Brute force execution.
Figure 1. Sans titre (figurants) (2009–2011) by Estefanía Peñafiel Loaiza. 
Photo: © Marc Domage, courtesy of the artist. 
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Figure 2. How to get the Mao experience through Internet … (2014–15) by Winnie 
Soon. The above are 9 collated screenshots of the animated GIF sequence.
Figure 3. University of California Davis protest picture (2011).
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 As dissemination channels multiply, ecologies of power adapt  
by attempting to directly manage how representatives are perceived 
and evaluated by those they represent. Daniel Mayrit produced a 
series of photographs, Imágenes Autorizadas (Authorised Images),  
of Spanish police following the implementation of the Law on 
Protection of Public Safety (Ley Orgánica 4/2015). Nicknamed “Gag 
Law”, this legislation makes it illegal to publish any images of forces  
of state security (Figures 4 and 5) (Miró 2016). In Mayrit’s artwork  
the police are portrayed with pixelated faces, or without faces at 
all. The photographs exploit a legal loophole by making the police 
anonymous in the images. Nonetheless, Mayrit’s exploit through 
anonymisation drew unexpected attention from the protagonists.  
Two police officers were noticed in the exhibition, engaged in trying  
to recognise their colleagues in the images. What has been erased  
in this instance is the visible and symbolic disagreement with the  
state (Urbinati 2000). Pics or it didn’t happen … 
 Such censorship has also masked the effacement of ecosystems 
for the extraction of raw material, such as the Alberta tar sands, under 
the guise of national sacrifice zones (Thomas-Muller 2010). These terra-
formed landscapes paradoxically become fodder to fuel the cultural 
machinery manufacturing hegemonic consent of the oil sands as 
sustainable development (Black et al. 2014). Species extinction results 
from the extensive landforming, a radical form of erasure that is both 
a material reality and a cultural discourse that legitimises inegali-
tarian social order (Dawson 2016). Such systems may in turn produce 
Figure 4. Authorised Images (Imágenes Autorizadas), Untitled,  
by Daniel Mayrit (2016), courtesy of the artist.
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devastated landscapes of violence and trauma, such as the aerial 
photography of the Negev desert, depicted in Fazal Sheikh’s Memory 
Trace (2015). Execution of epistemic and violent erasure.
 Meanwhile, deserts and forests are also making way for data 
centres. The materiality of data is terraforming the planet through 
extraction of resources and infrastructures to house data servers. 
Crystal Computing (Google Inc., St. Ghislain) is a video-based 
investigation by Ivar Veermäe into Google’s data centre in Saint-
Ghislain, Belgium, which in 2013 housed 296,960 servers (the second 
largest in the world). In his quest to visit the physical location of  
this monument, what might aptly be described by Shannon Mattern 
(2013) as infrastructural tourism, Veermäe finds that the location  
itself is blurred out of Google maps, and wrongly identified to be in  
Mons (Figure 6).2 This means of erasure is reminiscent of “whiting 
outs” (Weizman and Sheikh 2015), white spots left on maps by colonial 
cartographers that led to the wiping out of entire native cultures.
 The awe inspiring technological sublime (Nye 1996), mono-
liths that once attracted crowds, are now hidden away, fortresses of 
secrecy archiving our every move. Traces of these infrastructures 
are revealed through vestigial Internet lore, such as Ghost Sites of the 
Web, a collection of abandoned “Web 1.0 history” (Figure 7). Itself a 
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Figure 5. Authorised Images (Imágenes Autorizadas), Untitled,  
by Daniel Mayrit (2016), courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 6. Still from Crystal Computing (Google Inc., St. Ghislain) (2014)  
by Ivar Veermäe, courtesy of the artist.
Figure 7. Screen capture from the Ghost Sites of the Web (n.d.).  
http://www.disobey.com/ghostsites/
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deserted platform (its last post issued in 2008), Ghost Sites of the Web 
is described as a site for “forgotten web celebrities, old web sites, 
commentary, and news by Steve Baldwin. Published erratically since 
1996.”3 Execution as haunting.
 Erasure of data, or lack thereof, has important socio-political 
implications, ranging from refused entry to a country based on the 
grounds of decontextualised data that lives on in the network,  
to mass surveillance (Mayer-Schönberger 2009). DEL?No, wait!REW is  
an installation that prompts the visitor to make a decision about 
whether to forever delete or to publish a file publicly online (Figure 
8). The files are recovered from hard drives “without the consent or 
the knowledge of the previous owners, who presume their content has 
been forever deleted”.4 The viewer literally initiates the execution 
of scripts that will either propagate or terminate an information 
set. Personal data is treated as an objet trouvé, fodder for junk art. 
Executing valuation. 
 One of the proposed ethical solutions amidst this data amassing 
megalomania is “privacy sensitive” surveillance. An example of this 
is the Secure Erase Module (SEM), developed as part of an automated 
“suspicious” behaviour detection system, which deletes 95–99% of 
the footage collected (Neyland and Möllers 2016). The design includes 
auto-deletion algorithms that follow a similar logic as the detection 
algorithms. Moving objects are detected from the usual background 
ERASURE
Figure 8. DEL?No, wait!REW (2014) by Michaela Lakova. (Photo: Michaela Lakova). 
Courtesy of the artist.
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and classified according to potentially suspicious parameters (i.e. if  
an object splits it might designate luggage left behind) (Figure 9).  
In practice, however, not all frames were gathered. Some frames  
were left behind undeleted, and the tool produced a continual output 
of partial failure. In addition, the deletion log generator, a sub-module 
of SEM, creates and records metadata, such as filenames of deleted 
objects. Privacy here is equated to the automated (failure prone) 
recognition and deletion of non-relevant data. Privacy as defective 
erasure.
 The datafication of everything, which facilitates surveillance, is 
re-writing the landscape with ever expanding server farms and the 
extraction of resources to fuel data transfer and storage. My obsession 
with erasure was originally inspired by my desire to gain agency 
within these iterative inscription processes. I began by exploring the 
use of blanking, a term I borrow from Russell Thomsen (2015), which 
designates a form of withholding that transforms apprehension and 
communicates the presence of an absence. Thomsen coins this term 
in his description of a memorial design proposal for Auschwitz, an 
emergent ritual that is created through the experience of the absence 
of the site. Similarly, ne.me.quitte(s).pas is a digital data funeral that I 
originally developed with Jonathan Kemp that involves the degradation 
of memory chips with highly corrosive acid, of which the remains 
Figure 9. The image shows the failure of the software detection system,  
mistaking a body for the floor, a bag separated from its owner (though it is not), 
or the wall as a moving entity. Permission from Daniel Neyland.
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evoke the absence of the erased data (Figure 10). The material “data 
remnants” were given back to participants like cremation ashes. 
Erasure as memorialisation.
 The ruins of the erased data represent an agential force of  
erasure within the datafied landscape. Not unlike subtraction, which is 
defined by Keller Easterling (2014) as the disappearance of building 
that is itself a form of growth, a productive force managed by citizens, 
as opposed to the violent gentrification dictated by global financial 
industries.        
 From the public executions endemic to revolutionary propaganda 
to the use of erasure as an imaginative agency, this thought experi-
ment acts as a tool for thinking through different forms of erasure and 
their relationship to knowledge production. It is through this survey 
of instantiations of execution portrayed by various practitioners that I 
hope to establish an ecology of practices of erasure that considers its 
potential for both destruction and cultural re-imaginings. A collection 
of erasures that embodies how execution, or the act of erasing, can 
categorise, divide, kill, heal and re-build systems such as memory, 
national identity, ideological frameworks, economy, ecology, networks 
and architecture.
ERASURE
Figure 10. ne.me.quitte(s).pas (2014). The remains of the digital data funeral.  
All metal is corroded by the acid during a 90 min immersion in Aqua Regia 
(HNO3 + 3HCl).
152
EXECUTING PRACTICES
Notes
1. A very rare condition also called 
Superior Autobiographical Memory, 
characterised by the ability to remember 
the events of any given day with accurate 
detail.
2. These statistics are dated from 2013. 
Interestingly, what was then blurred 
out has now been made visible. Tactics 
of erasure are shifting. See Crystal 
Computing (Google Inc., St. Ghislain) by 
Ivar Veermäe http://www.ivarveermae.
com/CRYSTAL-COMPUTING/.
3. Ghost Sites of the Web. http://www.
disobey.com/ghostsites.
4. See http://www.mlakova.org/works.
html.
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Posthuman curating and its 
biopolitical executions: the case  
of curating content
Magdalena Tyz˙lik-Carver
Content curation seems to differ at every level from a conventional 
understanding of art curation. Not least because everyone is doing it. 
Hal Foster, a distinguished art critic and historian, notices that today 
“everyone who compiles is a curator”, while recalling, not without 
irony, “the utopian days of aesthetic egalitarianism” when everyone 
was a poet and everyone was an artist (Foster 2015). Indeed, curating 
has become a practice available to any user of mobile and networked 
technologies, while also any object, including a salad, is ready to be 
curated.1 Organising personal Facebook walls, curating Instagram 
posts, liking, linking and retweeting are common activities that users 
of social media platforms perform repeatedly every day. Content 
curation generates and organises content online and involves content 
production, management, organisation and collection in a massively 
distributed practice. Content in this essay is not a general category 
for texts, images, films and other digital artefacts. Here, content 
is understood in a wider context that also includes so-called big 
data, and related practices such as mass participation in digital and 
networked media, and the labour (human and nonhuman) involved  
in production of online content/data.
 The two significant features of content curating are: that it is 
performed (often simultaneously) by human and nonhuman actors, 
such as various software and hardware; and that these elements are 
able to perform together through a temporary and localised network 
organised to create, manage and distribute specific content online. 
Such organised networks are different to what Geert Lovink and  
Ned Rossiter (2005; 2010; Rossiter 2006) famously defined as a new 
institutional form. The common cause which, according to Lovink 
(2011), consolidates networks is, I argue, replaced in this case by  
repetitive actions rather than clearly set causes. These are mundane 
practices where free digital labour is executed as linking, liking, 
reposting, aggregating, editing, filtering, semantic analysis, tagging 
and annotating, all of which are performed by people (individuals  
and communities, curators and users), software and social and techno-
logical platforms. According to Lovink, such networks are without a  
cause, yet, I argue that they are affective and driven by ambiguous 
desires while injecting contingency into big data flows.
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 The discussion of curating in this essay focuses on how curating 
becomes posthuman, revealing that it is indeed no longer an activity 
performed by the professional figure of the “curator” but by agents 
of different orders. This is another challenge to subject/object 
distinctions as posthuman curating is performed through algorithmic 
processes of aggregation, RSS feeds, annotation, metadata and/or 
automated curation alongside human-executed content generation 
and circulation of data. In this process posthuman curating becomes 
an apparatus of subjectivation and individuation; it executes complex 
processes of subjectivation while being constantly engaged in 
reaffirming and reproducing the self as data, and as such, it is an  
active biopolitical force. It is this tension between the posthuman 
subject as process of subjectivation and the notion of the self as a  
(re)productive practice based on forms of individuation that is 
discussed here. In other words, the attention is on a biopolitics of 
posthuman curating which, while executing bodies into forms of  
data and affect, brings to the fore the urgency to rethink biopolitics  
in the posthuman condition. Within this discussion that engages 
posthuman curating as its primary subject, execution is considered 
as performing a posthuman biopolitics that results in affective data 
bodies and banal (ir)rationalities of computational culture.
Biopolitics and positive critique
Let us start this reconsideration of biopolitics as posthuman with  
Claire Blencowe’s interpretation of Michel Foucault’s account  
of biopolitical modernity as “a historically specific formulation of 
experience and embodiment” (2011, 1).2 Blencowe’s focus is on the 
positive forms of biopower able to create new embodied experiences  
of life rather than concentrating only on the experiences of the  
body. Unlike Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) forms of biopolitics which 
result from a state of exception, Blencowe uses the biopolitical 
nature of modernity as a way to exercise a “positive critique” which 
recognises experience as “a matter of processuality, connectedness 
and openness of relationships and forces in the world, rather than 
embedding continuity, stability or security of a subject” (2011, 6).  
In this view biopolitics is not limited to the “politics of the body”, 
which in Agamben’s state of exception can only (re)produce refugees, 
prisoners or other bodies of precarious status. Rather, biopolitics is 
defined as a “diverse and malleable” experience of “a multiplicity  
not the totality of modern political institutions, rationalities and  
ethics” (2). The experiential dimensions of biopolitics are recognised 
as multiple experiences. Not one but many, not universal but 
abandoning universals altogether.3
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 Foucault (2008) defines biopolitics as the process that links the 
disciplining of individual bodies with the process of the reconstitution 
of these bodies into a population. Biopolitics is a subjectivising force 
that is at the same time also manifested through bodies. Its concern  
is specifically with the politics of life, where the apparatus can be  
seen as a method that links the archive of knowledge (about bodies) 
with a mode of production of knowledge about life and, we might 
argue, (re)production of life itself. As Blencowe suggests, life, which is 
at the core of Foucault’s biopolitics, is not just contained in “the limits 
of living bodies”, but has as its main concern “the limit-nature of life, 
with experience, and with the role of biological knowledge in the 
formation of modern political problems” (2011, 34); a concern which 
she recognises throughout Foucault’s oeuvre.
 This notion of life as a complex experience generated through 
knowledge and knowledge making is seen as reaching beyond  
the body and thus escaping “the ontology of identity” manifesting 
the “trans-organic nature of life” (34). This experience is defined 
as “bio-mentality”, understood as “biological knowledge that is 
an organiser of experiencing, rationality, truth-games, science and 
embodiment; a horizon of visibility, verifiability and value” (34). 
Knowledge making is for Foucault (1982) related to language and 
discourse and is therefore a human venture. Blencowe’s bio-mentality, 
however, extends this process beyond the human body, recognising 
other bio forms which take part in life making.
 It is this trans-organic knowledge making that is proposed as 
positive critique of biopolitical experience, where experience of life 
is not just an experience of population. Rosi Braidotti defines a similar 
process of “overcoming the self and stretching the boundaries of 
how much a body can take” (2006). Such a comprehension requires 
a pragmatic understanding of “the structures, technologies, embodi-
ments and imaginaries through which we are made as bodies desiring 
and becoming such freedom, transformation and affective capacity” 
(Blencowe 2011, 158). It is both knowledge making and knowledge 
becoming while also becoming life, yet no longer tied to population 
politics defined through categories of bodies. It is the specific and 
empirical relation between the subject and power that defines rational-
ities behind particular practices of subjectivation and their capacity  
to affect and be affected.
 One such rationality that governs subjectivation today is big data. 
Usually defined as large data sets, big data results from exponential 
growth and availability to register people, things and their interactions 
as numbers. A new subject of big data is produced and its identity 
formed through practices of harvesting, accumulating, hosting, 
interpreting and conservation of big data, whose value comes from 
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its relationality to other data and from its networked quality (boyd 
and Crawford 2011). While Information Aesthetics and other forms 
of visualisation identify relations between data and make them more 
evident, some scholars of big data and also artists recognise how  
big data encourages the practice of apophenia (boyd and Crawford 
2012; Steyerl 2016), that is seeing patterns where there are none.
 My interest in big data has a different focus, namely how 
experience and embodiment of big data takes place and what 
consitutes its affective results, or what does it become. In particular, 
I am attracted to the capability of bodies (human and nonhuman) to 
affect data and to the ways in which data affects bodies. I expand the 
figure of bio-mentality to account for relations between big data as 
a form of biopower and the posthuman subject of content curating 
animated by humans and nonhumans. As a result, non-bio forms, such 
as data and software, are included when investigating the kind of 
processuality that is revealed when curating is a posthuman matter 
and when the dealings of curatorial power/knowledge are not just a 
domain of an expert curator, but often result from random, localised 
and relational arrangements of people, machines and code.
Content curating — making the data subjects/objects
In our deeply computational contemporary culture curating is post-
human. Traditionally associated with caretaking, presentation, collec-
tion and display of art objects and other forms of cultural heritage, 
today there is no end to curating. Performed by millions of social media 
users and not just professional curators, as well as nonhumans such 
as code, interfaces, networked systems, computational assemblages 
etc., posthuman curating is a recent development in the genealogy of 
curating. This genealogy, explained in detail elsewhere (Tyz˙lik-Carver 
2016), follows a trajectory which recognises different figures in the 
history of curating. Starting with the curator as a carer of collections,  
it soon moves towards curating as idiosyncratic practices of displaying 
art represented in the novel exhibition making formats of Harald 
Szeemann, Lucy Lippard and Seth Sigelaub, among others, and the 
arrival of the independent curator in the 1960s. Another figure in this 
genealogy is the curatorial, a dominant discourse in the curatorial  
field in the last three decades, recently accompanied by the ambition 
to be understood as the “philosophy of curating” (Martinon 2013). 
Software curating (Krysa 2008) and art platforms (Goriunova 2012) 
define modes of curating that are native to the digital context, linking 
curating to organisational and algorithmic processes that are constitu-
tive of online creativity and participation. Whereas posthuman curating 
(Tyz˙lik-Carver 2016) accounts for human and nonhuman agencies  
that perform curating today.
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 This historicisation of curating, presented here only in outline, 
localises forms of curating regularly excluded from traditional 
curatorial discourse and often developing outside of the institution 
of art. Most importantly, this genealogical approach interrogates the 
traditional notion of what curating is, where, who and what performs  
it, and what is produced as a result of such processes. As practices  
of curating extend far beyond the field of art that often is defined by  
its institutions and performed by artist or curators, curating has 
become a daily activity no longer dependent on an art object to 
be curated, and it now defines a wider field of practice that can be 
referred to as not-just-art curating.4
 Posthuman curating accounts for power/knowledge distributions 
facilitated by curating techniques, technologies and accessibility of 
curating as an everyday networked phenomenon. It is in this context 
that the figure of content curator is situated. Content production, 
accompanied by the constant need to organise and manage its flow 
through curating of digital objects, gives rise to content curators.
 There are various definitions of what content curating is, as well 
as corresponding expectations as to what content curators should be 
doing. While this practice is still in formation, curating content has 
been proposed as “an important participation and collaboration skill 
for digital citizens” (Rheingold 2011), and considered as an “emerging 
literacy” which can help in accessing the content “critically” (DiDi 
2011). Elsewhere, digital curators are seen to be “the future of 
online content” (VanPeursem 2013) and an answer to the amount of 
information constantly generated and distributed online. A content 
curator active on Scoop.it, says this about curators of online content:
In this Age Of Super Abundance, one of the things we need 
more than anything is trusted filters … We need folks whom  
we trust to lead us to where we would not go on our own. 
Ideally, these people will do more than just lead us to good 
work; they will expand our mind, and widen our social circles. 
But where are they? (DiDi 2011)
Online curators deal with information and content, and their aim is  
to organise it in a way that allows audiences quick, just-in-time access 
to the correct and relevant information. Successful curation of content 
requires regular reposting, re-blogging and commenting. At the  
same time, the expectation for personalised news and information 
suggests another function for content curators beyond filtering 
information. Content curators are reimagined as gurus of a kind. Not 
just leaders but also directly influencing users’ personal development. 
They are trusted filters, but most importantly, theirs is a particular role 
and responsibility of care for the social and intellectual and possibly 
spiritual development of content users.
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 This vision of a content curator as explicitly invested in the 
particular form of care for others references an epistemology of 
curating. The care of souls was a concern of the curate, a parish 
priest in medieval England, whose work was to care for the spiritual 
wellbeing of the members of the parish. This kind of pastoral power  
is traced by Foucault (2009) to pre-Christian tradition and Christian 
East and to the shepherd-flock metaphor and relationships 
engendered in these traditions later institutionalised by the Christian 
church. According to Foucault, pastoral power is exercised over a 
“flock” rather than a territory; it is seen as beneficial as it leads to 
“salvation”; and it is also an individualising form of power as each  
soul in the flock counts individually. It is this pastoral logic that Foucault 
recognises as constitutive of the modern political rationality that is  
also behind forms of subjectivation. And it is this pastoral rationality,  
I argue, that is reproduced through curating content, in other words, 
through big data practices which update pastoral power for the 
posthuman condition.
 Taking into consideration these changes and potentials for 
contemporary forms of curating it is possible to see content curating  
as a disciplinary practice. On the one hand, it is a way for digital 
citizens to engage with their institutions (Internet, state, corporations) 
by managing content online through various forms of interaction  
with it. And on the other, it is a practice that creates new subjects  
of content curators and user/digital citizens, where it is the first one 
that is charged with leading and helping users in accessing right 
information. In effect, the value of content curators is often expressed 
through recognition that “in the process of doing ‘serious’, ‘quality’ 
curation, even at the personal level, me and you are helping others 
understand and make sense of their worlds more easily” (Good 2011). 
Curating in this context appears as an affective practice of care that 
is at the same time a practice of data management through subjective 
finding, recommending and presenting links between data objects 
while generating relations with data subjects. Content curators and 
content users are subjects that function on one level, while their labour 
is a resource to big data. Indeed, processes of datafication, which 
turn all into data, allow for new forms of value to be created, and are 
operational to and governed by big data as a meta force.
 In these conditions curating is a method with many applications; 
from a pedagogical tool in education (Mihailidis and Cohen 2013)  
to its use in retail shopping online, where “a tailored experience is 
no longer just a desire for shoppers, it is an expectation” (Whitehead 
2013), making curating in turn particularly suitable for marketing 
purposes. At the same time, curating is reimagined as a method of care 
for one’s own life or/and that of others. As a result, content curating 
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is more than the aggregation of links and comments, as it aspires to a 
production of enlightened minds and socially rich subjects, while at the 
same time it is a disciplinary practice and a practice of subjectivation 
through data management. Processes of data and content creation are 
directly linked to the production and reproduction of new subjects who 
are clearly defined and their functions separated into big data sets.
Wikipedia — the body of data
Posthuman curating points to the fact that curating is no longer a 
domain of a curator but that it is distributed across and performed 
by agents of different orders. The process of posthuman curating 
itself expands beyond the field of art, as content and data are curated 
and managed while incorporating processes of subjectivation and 
individuation. I argue that it is through curating content that links and 
relations between these different processes, things and people are 
established. I propose to think of content as big data, thus recognising 
how it acquires and becomes a number in data sets. In parallel, 
curating itself is a practice that defines managing and organising 
content online, actively influencing what is considered curating and 
what is defined as content.
 To illustrate this, let us look at Wikipedia practices and the very 
first entry under the tag curator registered at 23:19 on 6 December 
2003 and delivered by the IP address 131.211.225.204. At the time it  
was a one sentence description: “A curator of a cultural heritage 
institution (e.g. archive, library, museum) is a person who manages 
the institution’s collection” (2003). A check on the entry in Summer 
2016 brings up seven sections, including one on technology and 
society that defines technology curators as those “able to disentangle 
the science and logic of a particular technology and apply it to real 
world situations and society, whether for social change or commercial 
advantage” (emphasis added). Content curation, a separate entry  
since June 2013, is defined as the “process of gathering information 
relevant to a particular topic or area of interest”, where “services  
or people that implement content curation are called curators”.
 This development of the definition for curator on Wikipedia 
reflects changes in the understanding of what a curator does, what 
the subject/object of the curator’s concern is and how the fields of 
curatorial activities have changed over recent years, with the definition 
itself under constant construction. The changes to the definition, 
additions and forking of concepts and references contextualise 
curating as a massively expanded field. As the entry can be read on 
the page, the very process of generating a Wikipedia page for curator 
contributes to changes in how curating is defined. Data documented 
and archived on the wiki includes a constantly growing number of 
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entries and users, number of edits per each user, dates of their edits, 
IP addresses and links to the profiles of the editors, etc. (Fig. 1) These, 
together with the definition, are constitutive of the semantic entry for 
curator.
 Data such as this, that registers and represents interactions on the 
platform that directly involve manipulation of content on Wikipedia, 
can be seen as exemplary of big data practices, while also linking it 
directly to the content (images and texts) that these practices generate. 
A visual representation of this process mediates data into the kinds 
of practices that can be seen in Figure 1 and 2. Such forms of content 
curation, executed on many levels and simultaneously, while also 
available to processes of visualisation, demonstrates how different 
forms of power are operative within practices of curating content. 
And they contribute to curating becoming posthuman, where human/
nonhuman subjects become functional in the wider system that can be 
represented and visualised as big data statistics (Figure 2).
 Through content selection, contextualisation and organisation, 
curating is distilled to its most relevant and essential parts, which 
increasingly means that it is already a part of some form of counting 
and visualisation facilitated by computation. Together with various 
technologies, such as social media, aggregator sites and other 
applications, curating content constitutes an apparatus directly 
engaged in the production of new subjects through executing 
processes of subjectivation on a platform level and through individual 
performances of those active on the platform. And so curating content 
participates in the creation of particular publics which use online 
platforms and content as source material for practices of individuation 
and subjectivation. This should be seen as the other side of concepts 
which characterise the Internet as a panopticon (Winokour 2003) and 
disciplinary technology (Rajagopal 2014). If we think of the Internet 
as a collection of various technologies of power such as surveillance, 
data monitoring or facial recognition, the function of curating content 
reveals how human and nonhuman bodies are coerced to particular 
forms of subjectivation/objectivation. Yet these processes are 
simultaneously disrupted by certain (ir)rationality/ies also executed  
in the process.
Content curating as technology of the self
In a regime where data and content are extracted and organised 
continuously, the structure which integrates individuals into its 
totalising procedure expands further. It is exponentially distributed 
and naturalised through daily activities that include aesthetic choices, 
technical skills and increasing capacity to stay connected at all times. 
This results in the production of affective data where algorithms, 
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Figure 1. Wikipedia, screenshot of the revision history page for ‘curator’  
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index php?title=Curator&offset=20070205000925 
&limit=500&action=history.
Figure 2. Visualisation of User activity on Wikipedia edits by user Pearl  
(created by IBM). At multiple terabytes in size, the text and images of  
Wikipedia are an example of big data. Source http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Big_data#/media 
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bodies, technical platforms and proficiency in taking selfies, contour- 
ing or instant messaging are always in relation [Figure 3].
 This relationality is situated in a material gathering of human 
and nonhuman subjects in specific relations, not as an abstract value 
in itself but dependent on materialisations that are “intra-actively 
produced” and which are “intra-actively demarcated through the 
specific production of marks on bodies” (Barad 2007, 232). As content 
curators are given responsibility for content and its users, Internet 
users who curate content are in charge of online management of 
their own data/body. This is the dataification process at its core: body 
becomes data while its physicality and materiality sustains how it is 
made operative for systems in order to count life as data.
 Such practices can be described as driven by a desire to “count 
as subject” and to “become eligible for recognition” (Butler 2009, iv). 
Manifested by these aspirations, activities that facilitate becoming  
data body are politically potent. They are political where data, like the 
body, is personal yet definitely not private. Curating content involves a 
mix of technological tools, various practices performed by the curator/
user releasing their agential force through linking and reblogging, but 
also through such skills as contouring and taking selfies. These are 
affective practices that influence the popularity of the subject, while 
often increasing their ability to monetise attention of followers online, 
as the cases of microcelebrity personas such as commercial lifestyle 
bloggers exemplify (Abidin 2016). According to Crystal Abidin, 
microcelebrity “involves the curation of a persona that feels authentic 
to readers” (2016, 3) and in itself is “a new style of online performance 
that involves people ‘amping up’ their popularity over the Web” 
(Theresa Senft in Abidin 2016, 3). This form of curating is concerned 
with establishing the status of the self as celebrity, even if on a micro 
level, while it is also about commercial practice of marketing and 
displaying the self.
Figure 3. Screenshot of Twitter post by @satanmistress (2015).
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 And so autonomy and agency are reconsidered anew, taking  
into account that “it is not simply that subjects are governed, 
disciplined or regulated in ever more intimate ways, but even more 
fundamentally that notions of choice, agency and autonomy have 
become central to that regulatory project” (Gill 2008). In effect, it is  
the ability to generate relations between different data forms that 
becomes the valued agential force. Arguably, it is exactly this 
process which is tactically used in Amalia Ulman’s famous Instagram 
performance Excellences and Perfections (2014), a performance that 
manages to expand data relationality beyond Instagram followers and 
platform practices because of its status as an art project (Figure 4). 
Yet, in this case, the performance is not a construction of authenticity, 
but an act of “imposed adaptability” where “bodies must be forever 
malleable” (Horning and Ulman 2014). 
POSTHUMAN CURATING AND ITS BIOPOLITICAL EXECUTIONS
Figure 4. Amalia Ulman (2014) Excellences and Perfections (Instagram update 
20th June 2014) (feather necklace yay or nay?), courtesy The Artist and  
Arcadia Misa 2016.
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 This new feature of malleability that a body must now display and 
which Blencowe also recognises as characteristic to the experience 
of biopolitics, has an ambiguous relation to authenticity, and it is this 
ambiguity that is at the basis of transformation that incorporates a 
multiplicity and not just the totality of big data institutions. The body’s 
ability to always be another self, while also becoming a body of data 
does not concern a body only but its intra-actions that make data 
distinct while increasingly networked and accessible.
 The process of individuation becomes a posthuman experience 
as digital objects, including data, are mediated and already situated 
within complex entanglements. According to Goriunova, a digital 
object such as a meme is not just a product of popular culture but is 
proposed as “an aesthetic performance through which individuation 
takes place” (2013). In this context, individuation is an aesthetic 
process not limited to traditionally defined aesthetic activities but 
a direct expression of aesthetic experience of individuation as 
multilayered and outlined as:
essentially collective, technical and physical: it is the individ-
uation and consummation of ideas, norms, snippets of codes, 
codes of practice, cultural events and political acts, creative 
forms, sets of behaviours, gestures and performances, concep-
tual figures, youth practices, and technical platforms that  
unfolds online. (Goriunova 2013)
Individuation is a process of becoming a thing or a person different 
from other things and persons, while at the same time belonging to 
methods, platforms and ways of being online. It facilitates a process  
by which the self becomes discrete while being defined as a part  
of wider phenomena. Individuation is an expression of difference  
and a never-ending process of realising and reconstituting the self;  
the becoming one not as a subject but as an other as data. And it is  
the other as data that is the subject of content curating while data  
itself enters a process of individuation.
 These are processes of individuation and subjectivation executed 
on the body and on the platform where curating content eliminates  
the body as one by reducing self to a number while supporting 
practices that care only for data as many. In effect, practices of curating 
content and data transform the body into the one that counts as many, 
while injecting life into what otherwise becomes big data.
Bio-mentality of the body
In their essay “On Misanthropy”, Alexander Galloway and Eugene 
Thacker (2006) recognise the biopolitical force of curating when 
they ask: how would one curate an exhibit of computer viruses 
and an exhibit of epidemics? The connection between curating as 
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management of art and curing as management of life is expressed as 
“‘care of the data’ in which the life of information or ‘vital statistics’ 
play a central role” (2006, 161). They see such a process as both “self-
transformation” and “self-destruction”, recognising in it a “duplicitous 
nature” of curating as care and carelessness simultaneously. On the  
one hand, control and management is considered a method of care, 
and on the other, it is immediately undone and let go of at the point 
when control becomes care.
 Today, ten years after their essay was originally published,5 
content curating can be seen as a functionary of vital statistics. Instead 
of a computer virus or exhibit of epidemics, life itself becomes that 
which is curated; not to be cured but to be datafied. Indeed, the care 
of the self becomes the care of data, with no end to curating through 
instantaneous availability of posting, reblogging, tweeting and liking 
while simultaneously transforming the body into statistics, figures and 
digits. The body’s traditional function to sustain life is overtaken by  
its new goal: to live in order to become data. The living [users] become 
data bodies giving rise to a body of data as big data in a regime of 
“informatics of domination” (Haraway 1991). Curating content is a 
transformative act where the self becomes data in the truly posthuman 
gesture of human-becoming-other. This self-transformation also 
destructs the self as only body. Here auto-destruction is a process 
of becoming a data body in a continuous repetition of gestures and 
technologies that integrate individuation into and with subjectivation.
 Here destruction is a creative force. Galloway and Thacker refer  
to the works of Gustav Metzger and their auto-destructive qualities, 
which Alan Liou defines as “viral aesthetics”; auto-destruction blurs  
the distinction between production and destruction as it sabotages  
the work by engaging in destructive modes of productivity. Liou 
identifies this kind of aesthetic in the works of net.art duo jodi.org  
and tactical media collective Critical Art Ensemble as able to “introject 
destructivity within informationalism” (Liou in Galloway and Thacker 
2006, 173). And so while in the process of curating content the self is 
replaced with data as a nonhuman other ready for exploitation, it is 
through managing and organising data that content curation radically 
influences data itself. How content curating transforms bodies and  
how it also transforms data requires a posthuman sensitivity that is  
able to reimagine relations between biopolitics and curating.
 To conclude, I want to introduce a new figure of the affective 
data body so as to provoke future speculations. Affective data bodies, 
epiphenomenon of big data, result from big data’s inability (yet) to 
function without bodies. Content curating is evidence of subjectivation 
and individuation performed through bodies with various technolo-
gies, such as social media, aggregator sites and other applications. 
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Content curating translates the subject into a body of data. It executes 
the experience of the self as my Facebook wall or your tumblr dash-
board. Of course this is not to say that they are “me” or “you”, at least 
not yet. But the experience of the self is defined as a consumer and 
producer of content and at the same time the self is captured by that 
content, while subjects become the products within processes of 
dataification. Production of subjectivity is increasingly reduced to 
linking, liking, deleting or reposting of content as such, and these 
online gestures have to be situated within a much broader assemblage 
of forces which reaffirm themselves as daily practices that turn into 
daily performances of the self. They constitute the individual not only 
defined by the data (s)he produces but as becoming an affective  
data body; one among many.
 Bio-mentality, which Blencowe characterises so effectively, is 
reflected in the posthuman subject of curating. Curating becoming an  
affective data body extending an experience of life beyond the  
human subject colonised as and by big data. The affective data 
body(ies) are the result of trans-organic formations where becoming 
data/body is the becoming data, becoming other, becoming none.  
It is a manifestation of malleability that is the result of data, body and 
affect intra-acting. To think with affective data bodies is to pay attention 
to the “breaks in the established patterns of thought” (Braidotti 2013, 
168) about data, body and subjects. And so this impersonal force  
that the affective data body introduces is not necessarily an introjection 
of destructivity within informationalism, but more of an attempt to 
grasp the creative potential of the posthuman to execute life beyond 
the human self.
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Notes
This essay is based on research 
undertaken for my PhD thesis Curating 
in/as Common/s. Posthuman Curating  
and Computational Culture (awarded in 
June 2016 by Aarhus University), and 
includes some of the material published 
in the first chapter.
1. Popularisation of curating where 
outfits and salads are curated and 
curating is replaced by “curationism” 
(Balzer 2015a; Balzer 2015b) seems to 
suggest that curating today is a form of 
“‘curated’ consumption” (Foster 2015). 
This essay takes a different approach. 
By focusing on curating as everyday 
practices assisted by digital and 
networked technologies and available 
to all with access to such technologies, 
I analyse forms of content curating in 
order to reveal complexities involved in 
such forms of curation today.
2. Unless otherwise stated, emphasis 
in the original.
3. Deleuze (1992) in his essay “What 
is dispositif” in which he proposes his 
interpretation of Foucault’s notion of 
“dispositif” (apparatus) recognises the 
philosophical consequence of apparatus 
that demands abandoning universals 
as unable to explain anything, when he 
asserts “it is the universal which needs  
to be explained’.
4. Matthew Fuller (1998) uses the  
term “not-just-art” in his essay “A Means 
of Mutation. Notes on I/O/D 4: The  
Web Stalker”, where he describes the 
browser Web Stalker as not-just-art  
art, defining the project’s qualities that  
make it functional beyond domain of 
art. Fuller refers to this concept also 
in his later text “Art Methodologies in 
Media Ecology” (2011). I make use of 
this concept and apply it to curating. 
For more on not-just-art curating in the 
posthuman context see (Tyz˙lik-Carver 
2016)
5. Their essay was originally published 
in the Data Browser series entitled 
Curating Immateriality (Krysa 2006).
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A photograph of a photographer allegedly 
taking a post-mortem picture of a corpse 
of a young man. Post-mortem photography 
was popular in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century in Europe and US. It was 
considered to aid the grieving process. 
Screenshot from Imgur. 
Ghost Factory: posthuman 
executions 
Magdalena Tyz˙lik-Carver & Andrew Prior
Ghost Factory is an experi-
ment which we perform on  
the self, with help of machines  
and software. Combining  
flesh and computational 
matter, data and algorithmic 
design, Ghost Factory is a 
laboratory that makes data 
for/of no-one. Cultural objects; 
referents of real times floating 
free; appropriated and 
machined; regurgitated into 
binary placeholders of time 
and space.
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Ghost Factory materialises 
processes in which humans 
and affects are turned into 
data facts. The body only a 
spectre in the shadows of  
“big daddy mainframe”  
(VNS Matrix 1991), turned into 
ghosts by an “informatics of 
domination” (Haraway 1991). 
Everyday mutations happen  
as humans and nonhumans 
enter mutual transformations. 
For just a moment, when 
playing with Ghost Machine 
devices, the human disap-
pears, severed from the body 
into data fictions; a medium 
of remediation, another body 
part, affective s[t]imulation, 
with eyes open, though dead. 
Bodies of affect left behind.
Ghost Machine software 
processes 
Ghost Machine1 is written in  
the MaxMSP coding environment  
and based on processes of 
transcoding and remediating.  
It takes still and moving images 
as source material which the 
machine systematically scans, 
outputting red, green and blue 
pixel values which are routed to 
three sound-making modules.  
Two modules map these values 
onto various musical scales,  
which are then played in real-time 
by a sine-wave generator. The  
last module converts values into 
raw audio amplitudes, producing 
noise and sounds. 
Alleged postmortem photography  
of a daughter held by her parents.
Screenshot from Imgur.
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Fragment of a screenshot from Ghost Machine film by Andrew Prior (2012). 
GHOST FACTORY
 The software allows users to 
control the way in which files are 
viewed. A green square represents 
what is being scanned or read 
at any given time. Users can 
choose to control the square by 
mouse movements, or automate 
its movement across and down 
pages. They can choose whether 
to look at the whole page or the 
scanned area, or superimpose both 
on top of one another. This final 
option creates new audiovisual 
possibilities as the pixels from the  
page and close-up can be 
superimposed on one another 
in a variety of algorithmic ways; 
adding, subtracting, or multiplying 
values — or indeed the plethora 
of other computational functions 
offered by the software — changes 
the visuals, and therefore the 
sounds which are produced by 
them. What we hear and see, is a 
trace of cultural transcoding —  
media become data, to be re-made 
and repurposed as the code 
determines. 
 This little horror story 
feels good, even if a little 
noisy and glitchy. It is exciting, 
like all failure. But we believe 
in ghosts. They live with us  
and we want to touch them.  
We want to hear them.  
We want to have some fun! 
We want to become [with]
one. We have become ghosts. 
Émigrés from the everyday 
of becoming data body, with 
affect left behind we turn  
to a ritual of ghostly labour.  
We call for them to come back. 
We are ghosts of the database. 
Residual bodies without soul 
and with a shell of another 
pattern recognition monster. 
 Is it yet? Has it gone,  
my soul? Is that what I see on 
the other side of database? 
Is it waste of the other that 
excretes from the medium’s 
body? Is it us?
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Ghost Factory curatorial 
interventions 
Ghost Factory2 is a curatorial 
mediation of Ghost Machine and 
performative curatorial installation 
with humans, machines and 
software. It has been performed 
twice (2013, 2015), reflecting 
on the ambiguous character of 
participatory culture in digital 
and networked media. The 
exhibition creates an environment 
to experience divided appeal of 
technology in popular culture. 
It arranges people, machines, 
software, sound and text, in ghostly 
combinations. Each installation 
unpacked Ghost Machine into 
separate layers and plugged the 
results into the data of a YouTube 
facilitated channel. In 2013, the 
factory explored ideas of the 
immaterial labour of ghostly 
internet workers, while in 2015 
it focussed on zones of non-stop 
creative production. The posthuman 
character of contemporary pop 
is revealed as contingent gesture 
and a challenge producing ghosts 
that occupy forgotten depths of 
the internet, while often creating 
zombies whose residual bodies 
are the result of an experiment 
gone wrong. Ghost Factory opens 
another posthuman experience to 
the willing participant. In any case, 
there is considerable doubt it is 
of any use in this life or thereafter. 
Consider it a voluntary work 
experience. 
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Notes
1. Ghost Machine is a collaborative 
work by Andrew Prior and Magdalena 
Tyz˙lik-Carver, which was originally 
commissioned as part of the publication 
Local Colour. Ghosts, Variations 
(2012) edited by Derek Beaulieu and 
InEditMode Press (Malmö). Ghost 
Machine takes as its starting point  
Derek Beaulieu’s graphical reworking 
of Paul Auster’s novella Ghosts (1986). 
It frames the multiple approaches to 
remix in Local Colour as examples 
of transcoding, raising questions 
around authenticity, affect, and the 
computational transformation of culture.
Ghost Machine is available as part of  
the publication and online at http://www.
ghostmachine.thecommonpractice.org. 
2. Ghost Factory is a curatorial 
remediation of Ghost Machine. It was 
performed at Cornwall Media Resource 
in Redruth in 2013, and at Falmouth 
University in 2015. 
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Bataille’s bicycle: execution  
and /as eroticism
Marie Louise Juul Søndergaard & Kasper Hedegård Schiølin
Introduction
Eroticism is an inherent aspect of computational culture and history. 
From love letter generators in the early days of computer development, 
through the rise of Internet porn industry in the 1990s, to the neoliberal 
products of IoT dildos, VR porn and sexbots of the present time,  
the development of computational technologies has been influenced 
by human eroticism. Eroticism in computing is all about the lust and 
pleasure of desiring subjects; corporate visions of increased connec-
tivity and remote intimacy increasingly exploit users’ inherent erotic 
and sexual inclinations. Simultaneously, computational art prac-
tices and counter-DIY cultures are hacking into the intimate sphere, 
exploring how individuation may be challenged through sometimes 
violent, erotic executions. Through practices of execution, performed 
through digital means, new powerful and transgressive relations of 
individuation are emerging.
 This chapter questions if and how, a language of eroticism is 
useful in understanding the unstable, intimate and violent — that is, 
erotic—aspects of execution? We thus address the inherent, excessive 
eroticism in computational culture by focusing on execution at the 
boundary between extreme pleasure and extreme pain as it manifests 
itself in the experiences of eroticism and realisation of desire  
in modern digital technology. More precisely, we explore the trans-
gressive potential of the excessive, blurred connection of desiring 
subjects and executing objects. 
 Entangling Georges Bataille’s (1993) writings on eroticism 
and excess with, amongst others, Franco Berardi’s (2009) notion of 
connected bodies and Lauren Berlant’s (2011) reflections on cruel 
optimism, we question how networked bodies are executed and 
engage in blurred, erotic processes that transgress a mere voluntary 
sexuality where consent is sacrosanct. Through a close reading of 
specific sections in Bataille’s novella Story of the Eye (Histoire de l’œil) 
(1979), we show how topics central in the novella such as excess, 
consent, control and unwillingness reflect the execution of our erotic, 
emotional state in computational culture. We argue that Bataille forms 
an exploratory taxonomy, or even hierarchy, of human lust and desire, 
in which the character Marcelle enjoys supremacy precisely because 
of her unwilling lust. In accordance with this argument, the speculative 
design Marcelle, named after Bataille’s character, is our attempt to 
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further explore the phenomenon of involuntary lust through design. 
Marcelle is a pair of white cotton briefs with built-in vibrators that are 
executed by the surrounding WiFi network landscape. In our exploring 
of its eroticism, Marcelle becomes a conceptual way of questioning 
both the limits of design and philosophy.
 As we move beyond cruel optimism of the good life (Berlant 
2011) and designed, spectacular sentimentality, eroticism is an 
inherent aspect of the social, political and aesthetic aspects of 
computational culture and execution. We argue that eroticism is about 
the transgression of the will, and in computational culture this is also 
manifested through cases of uselessness, instability and unwillingness. 
Furthermore, we argue that erotic technologies have economic and 
commodifying interests, but also violent and liberating potentials,  
that transgress the controlled logic and reasoning of technology. Art 
and design experiments, such as Marcelle, may help us understand  
this paradox and ambiguous relation.
 
 
Figure 1. Marcelle (2016) by Marie Louise Søndergaard. All pictures by the  
first author.
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Eroticism as Excess
Describing eroticism is a complicated matter. It crosses the fields of 
art, society, health, religion and death, and is historically understood 
as being largely a “side-effect” of sexual reproduction. However, in 
Bataille’s terms, eroticism is nothing less than the essence of humanity 
(1991). As an exuberant energy, that is, as excess, it flows in every 
corner of society and in all human activities. Contrary to sexuality, 
which might have productive outcomes, eroticism is “a sovereign  
form, that cannot serve any purpose” (Bataille 1993, 16). To Bataille, 
eroticism is excess. Excess is what begins when “growth ... has reached 
its limits” (1991, 29). When there is too much of something, it does 
not represent a utility-value, and thus becomes a loss, a something 
to squander or waste. In Bataille’s general economy, excess as a term 
defines that which cannot be tamed and transformed into capital.  
“[E]rotic excess develops to the detriment of work” (1993, 83), he 
argues, and as such eroticism as excess is evidence of humanity’s 
uselessness. Consequently, Bataille’s eroticism expresses an implicit 
critique of the capitalist society where everyone and everything 
are being judged by use-value. Bataille believed in eroticism’s 
transgressive potential of unveiling hidden structures and seemingly 
universal prohibitions; structures and prohibitions that man established 
in order to separate and distinguish “perfect humanity, for which the 
flesh and animality do not exist” from “animal disorderliness” (55–56). 
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However, as eroticism only exists, he argues, in its respect for and 
possible transgression and deviation of forbidden values, eroticism 
gains a double meaning as something that both civilises and possibly 
liberates human beings (57).
 Michel Foucault takes a different perspective on eroticism than 
Bataille. In Foucault’s study of the history of sexuality, he breaks 
sexuality into two segregated historical practices: ars erotica, the 
spiritual and lustful eroticism, and scientia sexualis, the truth of sex, 
the scientific and civilised sexuality as we also find it in Christianity 
and confessions (Foucault 1990). Foucault criticised the Marxist 
hypothesis that the rise of capitalism suppressed sexuality and desire, 
and instead brought forward the argument that capitalist, Western 
society had invented a new form of sexuality; a scientific sexuality 
where sexuality is omnipresent in the way we organize society and 
understand ourselves as human beings. Consequently, Foucault argues 
that sexuality has not been unequivocally repressed or tabooed, but 
has occupied different, shifting forms and installations in society. 
 Bataille argues that not only sexuality but also, and especially, 
eroticism has relations to both the artistic and spiritual sides of society 
and its civilized and political sides (1993). Similar to Foucault, he 
argues that eroticism is not to be ignored in the public spheres of 
everyday life, and that it is an inherent part and regulator of the norms 
and laws of society (52). His theory differs from Foucault’s in his focus 
on eroticism as something that relates to subjectivity and corporeality, 
and not (just) to the social dispositif of biopolitical control. Bataille 
regards eroticism to have a connection to a deep sexuality beyond 
sexual reproduction. In its nature, eroticism is useless, it is opposed to 
work and cannot be governed as it is always in excess (52). Although 
eroticism is civilised by capitalism and different rational discourses, 
Bataille argues that eroticism is deeply connected to human’s object of 
desire. “Erotic activity can be disgusting”, he argues, “but it illustrates 
a principle of human behavior in the clearest way: what we want is  
what uses up our strength and our resources and, if necessary, places 
our life in danger” (104). As such, eroticism is linked to anguish,  
horror and even death, and its liberating potential is paradoxically 
released in the transgression of life itself.
An Eroticism of Connected Bodies
Drawing on Marxist and feminist traditions, art and computational 
culture have mostly dealt with the execution of eroticism as a liberating 
force, an organisation of power and a political act. However, in the rise 
of digital technologies, eroticism and sexuality have gained a new 
value. Already in the 1990s, cyberfeminism claimed sexuality as an 
“empowering” weapon and argued for its liberating potentials against 
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technology’s patriarchal, dualistic structures and the increasingly 
governed spaces of the formerly free, distributed network (Haraway 
1991; Plant 1997; Steffensen 1998).
 In the present tech industry the state of eroticism has, however, 
changed into a governed, commodified and managed form of sex and 
intimacy, and thus adapted to a neoliberal Silicon Valley-ideology 
described by Evgeny Morozov as technological solutionism (2014). 
Examples include Spreadsheets, an app that tracks the movement, 
volume and lengths of sexual intercourse; OMGYes, a website 
that teach users ways of enhancing (women’s) pleasure through 
touchable videos; and Lioness, a dildo that uses biometric sensing 
and statistical methods to “characterize your sexuality” and suggest 
improvements. By offering and capturing erotic spheres of everyday 
life through apps and products, the tech industry thus extracts the 
maximum value from subjects as they perform emotional labour. 
Through worldwide marketing of sexual tools that promise to empower 
(mostly) women, neoliberal start-ups take ownership of what used to 
be a critical political act, and confuse the rather complex (political) 
difference between sexuality and eroticism. As a result, eroticism, 
as it is experienced in present computational culture, expresses the 
antagonistic conflict of desire-liberation having both anti-capitalist  
and capitalist interests.
 Eroticism may be understood as an abstract principle of polit-
ical, affective and philosophical processes that already are and also 
continue to become manifested in concrete material and embodied 
sites of execution. These sites of execution become part of the 
economy of eroticism, where everyday affective relations are tracked, 
managed and sold, gaining value beyond the relation itself. When 
considering today’s neoliberal society surviving on individuals’ 
productive consumption and emotional labour, it is no wonder that  
a common issue and increasing trend in corporate design is the  
wish to capitalise and rethink eroticism and sexual activity under  
capitalist terms.
 The increasingly hyper-connected and hyper-visual character of 
today’s digital culture (Berardi 2009) offers endless space for excessive 
joy and erotic sharing. We like, connect, match and laugh at kittens  
like never before. This endless realisation of desire and pleasure in  
our digitally-mediated social life has led Berardi to reflect on our 
present emotional state and its relation to economy. “Not repression, 
but hyper-expressivity”, he argues, “is the technological and anthro-
pological domain of our understanding of the genesis of contemporary 
psychopathologies” (108–109). This, he argues, has consequences  
for eroticism:
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Connected bodies are subjected to a kind of progressive 
inability to feel pleasure, and forced to choose the way of 
simulating pleasure: the shift from touch to vision, from hairy 
bodies to smooth connectable bodies ... The control is built 
inside, in the very relationship between self-perception and 
identity. When the info-sphere become hyper-speedy …  
we become less and less able to elaborate in a conscious way 
on the emotional impulses reaching our skin, our sensitivity,  
our brain. (Berardi 2009, 100)
The disconnection between language and sexuality, Berardi argues, 
has led to a lack of empathy and a rise of obsessive rituals. Our 
sensitive organism is subjected to a permanent execution, as our 
every action is broken down to likes, retweets and emotional analyses. 
Similarly, our compulsive repetitions of rituals, of liking, swiping, 
scrolling, checking emails and notifications, point at a state of being 
where each emotional action does not fulfill its aim. As desiring 
subjects, we are thus “addicted” to a pleasure that is never fulfilled. 
Instead, our excessive obsessive rituals and emotional execution 
serves the aim of larger, hidden infrastructures; the aim of 
corporate economic structure, gaining value of “an overload of info-
neural stimuli” (108) and emotional input to the systems. Although 
Berardi argues that repression of sexuality is not an issue in present 
psychopathology, it is exactly in the hyper-expressive and hyper-
sexual culture of connected bodies that eroticism is repressed. 
Following Bataille’s notion of eroticism, eroticism is beyond desire and 
smooth bodies, and closer to what Berardi terms “conjunctive bodies”; 
“the encounter and fusion of rounded irregular forms that infiltrate  
in an imprecise, unrepeatable, imperfect, continuous way” (87).
 The obsession with vision and connectivity does not (only) 
come down to a critique of porn, VR-porn or Internet connected sex 
toys; they may or may not lack empathy and context due to a blurred 
distinction between “natural” and “artificial” sex, but the critique 
unfolded in this essay has a different focus. We are concerned with 
the misconception of the essence of human sexuality as expressed 
through the notion of eroticism, and this leads to deeper, existential 
consequences concerning humanity itself.
 To lay the foundations for this critique, we will dig deeper into 
Bataille’s eroticism by a close-reading of some central sections in his 
(pornographic) novella Story of the Eye, and eventually connect it to  
the emotional state of present computational culture.
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Story of the Eye
Blood, sperm, egg yolks, tears, urine, rain, vomit and milk are, 
metaphoricallly speaking, dripping from the pages of Bataille’s 1928 
novella Story of the Eye. This is, however, not news. Already in 1962, 
shortly after his death, Roland Barthes (1979) observed that fluids  
play a crucial role in Bataille’s highly symbolic novella. Barthes’ 
analysis is striking, and has indeed become a central text in Bataille 
scholarship. However, it literally reduces the story (of the eye) to a 
metaphor (of the eye), that is, to a pure linguistic analysis. Initially, 
Barthes even claims that Story of the Eye is “by no means … the story  
of Simone, Marcelle, or the narrator”; it is really just, he continues,  
a “story of an object” (119), that is, a “story” of an “eye”, metonymically 
substituted by other “substitute objects”. 
 But Story of the Eye has much more to offer. Contrary to Barthes’s 
refusal of the importance of the individual characters, we argue that 
Bataille forms an exploratory taxonomy, or even a hierarchy, of human 
lust and desire, in which the character Marcelle, due to her unwilling 
lust, is attributed supremacy. In accordance with this argument, the 
design Marcelle is our attempt to further explore the phenomenon of 
involuntary lust. Admittedly, this is a rather paradoxical endeavour, 
because design is generally seen as a material way of satisfying the 
user’s more or less articulated will to reach a specific end. However, 
perhaps design is a more passable way than philosophy to explore 
eroticism. “Philosophy”, Bataille asserts, “cannot embrace the extremes 
of its subject, the extremes of the possible as I have called them, the 
outermost [in particular eroticism] reaches of human life” (1962, 259). 
Hence, Marcelle becomes a conceptual way of questioning both the 
limits of design and those of philosophy. We might say that the two  
can cross-fertilise each other.
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 Working with unwillingness is not only a technical challenge, 
but also an ethical one. Consider, for instance, the dictum “Consent 
is Sacrosanct” that has become the media’s automatic response to 
rape; indeed even the popular bondage porn website Kink.com 
has used it to dissociate themselves from its former employee, the 
famous porn star James Deen, when female colleagues accused him 
of rape in 2015. However, since consent is an unambiguous and often 
legal arrangement between two rational humans, the self-evident 
and appealing dictum reduces lust to a pure and sober intellectual 
endeavour leaving no room for accepting the Bataillean idea of 
transgressive eroticism. This leaves us with two highly contradictory 
views on sexuality; the one strictly philosophical, and the other strictly 
normative. There seems to be no easy solution to this conflict, but 
the speculative design Marcelle can be seen as a way of curiously 
exploring the matters at stake in this inextricable tension on a rather 
safe ground.
Simone’s Will to Sex
As Benjamin Noys suggests, “certain recurring characters […] 
dominate Bataille’s fictions” (2000, 89). This also applies to the main 
characters in Story of the Eye. Following Noys, the 16-year-old Simone 
is the recurring figure of “the woman of jouissance” (90). Noys does 
not translate the common French word jouissance, which literally 
means “enjoyment”. However, “enjoyment” lacks the explicit sexual 
connotations evident in French; “jouir” is slang for “to come”. It is 
thus most likely Lacan’s rather famous usage of the word that Noys 
hints to. For Lacan jouissance is the subject’s always painful attempt to 
transgress the psychological-societal prohibitions that are imposed  
to its enjoyment (1978). As the Lacan scholar Dylan Evans explains: 
“The term jouissance thus nicely expresses the paradoxical satisfaction 
that the subject derives from his symptom, or, to put it another way,  
the suffering that he derives from his own satisfaction” (2002, 93).  
This definition of jouissance corresponds to what Bataille in Story of  
the Eye refers to as deep sexuality:
She [Simone] was usually very natural; there was nothing  
heartbreaking in her eyes or her voice. But on a sensual level, 
she so bluntly craved any upheaval that the faintest call from  
the senses gave her look directly suggestive of all things  
linked to deep sexuality, such as blood, suffocation, sudden 
terror, crime; things indefinitely destroying human bliss  
and honesty. (Bataille 1979, 11)
Again, this definition is resonant in the Bataillean key concept of 
eroticism: 
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In the very first place eroticism differs from animal sexuality  
in that human sexuality is limited by taboos and the domain  
of eroticism is that of the transgression of these taboos.  
Desire in eroticism is the desire that triumphs over the taboo.  
It presupposes man in conflict with himself. (Bataille 1962, 256)
In these definitions at least one thing is clear: Sex is not fun! Or, rather, 
sex is deadly serious. This is, however, also why Noys’ descriptions  
of Simone as a “woman of jouissance”, let alone Bataille’s own apparent 
support of that characterisation, is not entirely correct. To Simone, sex 
actually seems to be fun; with great ease she plays around with, if not 
imperative controls and demands, the horrors of deep sexuality, and 
she does not show any visible signs of pain, or even qualms. Even in its 
most extreme manifestations, Simone’s sexuality is a completely willful 
sexuality; a sexuality of a woman who knows exactly what she wants:  
“I want to have them [the testicles of a bull]”, or, “I want to play with the 
eye … Listen, Sir Edmund … you must give me this at once, I want it!” 
(Bataille 1979, 48, 66, emphasis added).
 In arranging an orgy in the beginning of the novella, Simone’s 
sexuality is furthermore displayed as a rather calculating and 
manipulative will to master and control. By means of an easily won bet, 
she thus ensures herself as the commander of the orgy: 
“I bet”, she said, “that I can pee into the tablecloth in front of 
everyone” ... Naturally, Simone did not waver for an instant, she 
richly soaked the tablecloth ... “Since the winner decides the 
penalty”, said Simone to the loser, “I’m now going to pull down 
your trousers in front of everyone.” (16)
Later, when the orgy has become more heated, her strong will to sex 
(and power) remains perfectly intact and even more imperative:  
“‘Piss on me. Piss on my cunt’, she repeated, with a kind of thirst” (16). 
Marcelle, the Real Women of Jouissance
As the above quotes suggest, one can conclude that rather than being  
a woman of jouissance, paradoxically suffering from her own lust, 
Simone is a licentious and at the same time calculating woman of 
pure sexual will. The recurring figure of the woman of jouissance, 
however, does occur in Story of the Eye, and despite of all the power 
that Simone’s willful sexuality expresses, the painful and unwilling 
jouissance incarnated in the character Marcelle seems even more 
powerful.
 The narrator presents Marcelle as “the purest and most affecting 
of our friends”, and, more notably as having “an unusual lack of  
will power” (5,12). Marcelle first meets the narrator and Simone as 
she accidentally witnesses them having sex on the beach. Marcelle 
is terrified by the sight but is forced to participate in the actions by 
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Simone who is “brutally churning Marcelle’s cunt, one arm around 
Marcelle’s hips, the hand yanking the thigh, forcing it open” (13).  
From that encounter onwards, Simone and the narrator become 
completely obsessed with Marcelle and her unwilling lust; “the sight  
of Marcelle’s blushing had completely overwhelmed us” (15).
 Under false assumptions (a tea party), Simone and the narrator 
succeed in luring Marcelle to attend the above-mentioned orgy, but 
when Marcelle realises the true purpose of the party, she becomes 
angry, and in attempting to leave she is stunned by the sight of  
Simone who simulates a kind of orgasmic-epileptic seizure. This seems 
to be meant to stop the exit of Marcelle who, like the other guests,  
is excited by Simone’s explicit show, but instead of joining the orgy,  
she lets herself into a large wardrobe to masturbate in private.  
The orgy continues but “all at once, something incredible happened,  
a strange swish of water, followed by a trickle and a stream from  
under the wardrobe door: poor Marcelle was pissing in her wardrobe 
while masturbating ... soon we could hear Marcelle dismally sobbing 
alone, louder and louder, in the makeshift pissoir that was now her 
prison” (17). 
 This scene in particular reveals Marcelle as the novella’s real 
woman of jouissance, who, contrary to Simone, suffers under her lust 
and her failed attempt to willingly choke it back; Marcelle embodies 
the paradox of jouissance. Moreover, the unwillingness in her lust, 
and eventually in her orgasm, is emphasised by her involuntary 
urination that leaks from the wardrobe as a symbolic evidence of her 
failed attempt to keep her individuality from being absorbed by the 
shapeless orgy. As the narrator later explains: “Marcelle could come 
only by drenching herself … with a spurt of urine …. at first violent 
and jerky like hiccups, then free and coinciding with an outburst of 
superhuman happiness”, or “total joy”, as he calls it shortly after (28).  
It is this superhuman moment of total joy that captivates Simone,  
who on the contrary is in full control of her urination and orgasm.  
She is, however, tragically trapped in her thirsting for this transgressive 
moment, because as long as she wants it, it remains unreachable; 
transgression depends on the defeat of will. 
Escaping the Penal Colony on Bataille’s Bicycle 
No one has described the tragic metaphysical confinement of the will 
in greater detail than Schopenhauer, and the following quote might 
thus help in clarifying what is at stake in this important motif of Story  
of the Eye, and in Bataille’s writings on eroticism in general: 
As long as our consciousness is filled by our will, as long as  
we are given over to the pressure of desires with their constant 
hopes and fears, as long as we are the subject of willing, we will 
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never have lasting happiness or peace. Whether we hunt  
or we flee, whether we fear harm or chase pleasure,  
it is fundamentally all the same: concern for the constant 
demands of the will, whatever form they take, continuously  
fills consciousness and keeps it in motion: but without peace, 
there can be no true well-being. So the subject of willing 
remains on the revolving wheel of Ixion, keeps drawing  
water from the sieve of the Danaids, is the eternally yearning 
Tantalus. (Schopenhauer 2010, 220)
Schopenhauer also discusses at length the possibilities of 
escaping from this “penal colony”, as he elsewhere calls the world 
(Schopenhauer 2000, 302), in which Simone the narrator, and the 
rest of us are imprisoned. While Schopenhauer’s “escape attempts” 
all depend on a deliberate rejection of the will, primarily through 
asceticism, he does not address the possibility of rejecting the  
will unwillingly such as Marcelle practices it in Story of the Eye.  
Bataille, however, does. 
 In his usual dialectical manner Bataille suggests a unity of 
apparent opposites, asceticism and eroticism, which additionally casts 
light on the essential difference between the lust of Simone and that 
of Marcelle’s. According to Bataille, both eroticism and asceticism 
are about “non-attachment to ordinary life, indifference to its needs, 
anguish felt in the midst of this until the being reels, and the way left 
open to a spontaneous surge of life that is usually kept under control 
but which bursts forth in freedom and infinite bliss” (1962, 246f). 
Elsewhere Bataille refers to this erotic-religious surge of life as  
“the feeling of being swept off one’s feet, of falling headlong” (239),  
or rather, “to capsize”, “de chavirer”, as the original French wording 
goes. We find these characteristics in Marcelle and they are in stark 
contrast to Schopenhauer’s willing subject. 
 Against the shared characteristics of eroticism and asceticism, 
Bataille places sexual cynicism and obscenity, in which Simone and  
the narrator are recognised. In these categories capsizing is thus  
an accepted principle. However, according to Bataille, the acceptance 
implies that the power of capsizing vanishes; capsizing becomes 
the new normal, and is thus weakened and unexceptional: “Having 
submitted unrestrainedly to the pleasure of losing self-control it has 
made lack of control into a constant state with neither savour nor 
interest” (244). On the contrary, for them (for instance Marcelle),  
“who have remained pure [obscenity] is the possibility of a vertiginous 
fall” (244). To Marcelle the fall is indeed vertiginous, and eventually 
even fatal. This again corresponds to Bataille’s description of the 
conflict of the tempted ascetic, who had made his vow of chastity.  
If the ascetic yields to the temptation, as Marcelle does, (s)he will die 
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spiritually, which is why “the religious would choose physical death to 
a lapse into temptation” (236). Marcelle’s lust, and her uncontrolled, 
unwilling orgasm —“la petite mort”— thus prompts a highly vertiginous 
fall, which ends in unbearable madness, and finally in the real “big”, 
physical death. Simone and the narrator’s obscene lust, on the other 
hand, only reach la petite mort, which they ably control at will. 
 There is nonetheless one essential scene in the novella in which 
Simone’s strong will is compromised, and, surprisingly, this scene 
also offers a remarkable perspective to the philosophy of design and 
technology. Escaping from a failed attempt to free Marcelle from the 
mental hospital, Simone and the narrator rush along naked in the  
night on their bicycles: 
A leather seat clung to Simone’s bare cunt, which was inevitably 
jerked by the legs pumping up and down on the spinning 
pedals … she was literally torn away by joy, and her nude body 
was hurled upon an embankment with an awful scraping of steel 
on the pebbles and a piercing shriek. (Bataille 1979, 30)
Through the medium of technology — on the bicycle — Simone  
thus eventually becomes what she constantly hankers after: she 
becomes Marcelle, the “real woman of jouissance”. In this way Bataille 
deploys the repetitive and circular movements of technology to  
outplay and absorb the clear linearity of Simone’s otherwise purposive 
will. This use, or indeed “nonuse”, of technology countervails the 
predominant understanding of technology that sees technology as 
a tool that serves a specific purpose evident to the rational user in 
control of it. As a figure of thought, “Bataille’s bicycle” thus hints to  
the concealed violent and erotic aspects of technology.
Becoming Marcelle 
What would a contemporary version of Bataille’s bicycle look like?  
A transgressive technology that would allow for becoming Marcelle? 
As an experiment, or a transgressive exploration into Bataille’s notion 
of eroticism as excess and the very idea of an erotic technology 
beyond “use”, we suggest Marcelle. 
 The speculative design (Dunne and Raby 2013), Marcelle, uses  
the language of eroticism to investigate the compulsive and repetitious 
execution of smooth and connected bodies in networked surroundings. 
Bodies are executed in more and more intimate and intimidating 
settings, connecting emotional data and personal “things” with 
corporate infrastructures, closed circuits, and unpredictable networks. 
Marcelle explores the intimate aspects of network connectivity, 
and how the interactions between human and non-human bodies 
subvert and thus transgress the user’s will in everyday life. Inspired 
by critical engineer Gordan Savicˇic´’s WiFi-connected corsage 
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Constraint City: The Pain of Everyday Life (2007), Marcelle proposes that 
similar to the structural and political violence network users find in 
encrypted networks, the pleasure or satisfaction of being online and 
staying connected is an equally important affective state of today’s 
computational culture, and an equally painful one. 
 The pleasure of everyday life, however, contains the same ambiv-
alence as the notion jouissance does, because being online and 
connected is equally painful exactly because of the violent power 
structures of the contracts we are signing when we are deciding  
to enter into this life-long relationship, which is exploited by economic 
models and violated by normative ideologies. An Internet of bodies  
(as things) is a network that structures, categorizes and manages 
blurred and unstable relations. In each execution, relations are 
subjected to structures of power, control, and opaque treatment of 
consent and access.
 As a culture-critical and partly fictional design (Bleecker 2009), 
Marcelle aims to go beyond 1990s cybersex and teledildonics and 
present neoliberal Internet of Things designer vibrators, in order to 
question what if eroticism becomes a restricted action, or a design-
erly “problem” to be solved, by applying logics of automation, effi-
ciency, remote intimacy, and control? Presuming that we live in a 
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leather, cutting mat, wires, vibrators, networks, circuits, panties.
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computational culture of desire, could we imagine possible futures of 
erotic execution in the mundane everyday life beyond work, beyond 
the aggressive will to sex, and beyond rational, consent-driven sex? 
How do we discuss eroticism in an era of automation and efficiency? 
With this speculation, Marcelle seeks to transgress capitalist commod-
ification of affects, desire and intimacy, and to question the role of 
eroticism in computational culture by translating invisible wireless 
networks into intimate vibrations.
 As previously mentioned, Marcelle is a wearable sex toy  
consisting of a pair of cotton underpants with modular vibrators that 
is connected to and relies on network information. As electronics 
(WiFi chip, battery and vibrators) are sewed directly into the mundane 
underpants, Marcelle is wearable and mobile, and the user can wear 
it in everyday life situations. The vibrators are made of transparent 
silicone fastened on popper buttons that may be connected at four 
different positions in the panties. This makes the sex toy modular,  
and the user is able to customize it to their own erotic and sexual needs 
and desires. However, the user cannot easily control the vibration 
patterns whose impulses are controlled by the number of surrounding 
WiFi networks. For instance, a space with a variety of different, 
competing networks, maybe a semi-public space with a variety of 
social groups and activities, triggers a very high intensity, whereas 
a private space with one superior network only causes the vibrators 
to vibrate with a low intensity. As such, the user delegates the control 
of the vibrators’ intensity and rhythm to the networked landscape 
of autonomous networks, which makes for a partly unwilling, erotic 
experience characterized by spontaneity, opaqueness, and ambiguity. 
In other words: wearing the underpants allows the user to become 
Marcelle.
(Design) Fictions and Speculations on Eroticism
Marcelle is a partly fictional design and a philosophical argument in 
physical form. In its material form, it is present in the actual world, but 
the premises and narratives surrounding the object point to possible 
futures in which eroticism could be different and exist in simultaneous 
and multiple forms. Marcelle is not a solution to the theoretical paradox 
of involuntary eroticism or eroticism as excess in a restricted (desire) 
economy. Neither is it a clear manifestation of Bataille’s philosophy,  
or a technological design ready-to-use. It is a partly fictional design 
that through a dialogue with Bataille’s philosophical and literary 
writings on eroticism goes beyond eroticism as a theoretical construct, 
to speculate on the issues of excess, unwillingness, and abjection in a 
material form. It might indeed be used, but its user is yet to be defined, 
or more precisely, yet to be performed.
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 The excess of vibrations felt when wearing Marcelle and walking 
around, surrounded by WiFi networks is not exactly useful. The uncon-
trollable amount and intensity of the vibrations is useless compared  
to the purposeful will that gets pleased by the mechanical and effec-
tive s(t)imulations of conventional sex toys. Instead of being executed 
by the vibrator algorithms, reaching orgasm as a purposeful willing 
user, the wearer is exposed to the compulsive and repetitive vibrations, 
which, although increasing and decreasing in intensity, never end.  
The vibrations only end if the wearer, like Marcelle hiding in the ward-
robe, takes refuge in an environment without WiFi, and in our present 
wireless psychopathology this seems almost unthinkable. Instead, the 
purposive will gets challenged, possibly transgressed, in this state of 
execution where neither lust nor desire is executed or relieved but 
instead lingers in between eroticism and asceticism. Wearing Marcelle 
might thus be compared to participating in an orgy, in which individ-
uality—that is, the individual body and the individual will — dissolves 
and becomes uncountable. The wearer does not know exactly who, 
what and how many (s)he is having sex with in this anonymous 
WiFi-orgy. 
 When wearing Marcelle, consent means to not be in control  
of your own body and desire. The purpose of wearing it becomes  
ambiguous, as the outcome is unpredictable and out of control. Thus, 
when you enter the “experience” you do so with the implicit acknowl-
edgement of not knowing the outcome, and consequently it is ques-
tionable whether or not the action actually has an aim, or stays inside 
the fixed boundaries of consent. This opens up onto a temporal space 
of permanent, involuntary execution, where the unpredictability and 
instability enables, if not presupposes, that the wearer elaborates  
on the emotional impulses and surrender oneself to the non-human 
activities reaching one’s lower erogenous zones. A truly excessive 
activity without purpose outside the eroticism of the act itself, the 
jouissance of becoming Marcelle in wearing Marcelle first and foremost 
arises, not in the execution of desire, but in the affective experience  
of unwillingness, of transgressing the will.
 Just as Simone becoming the real woman of jouissance depended 
on the “nonuse” of technology, Marcelle seeks to move beyond the 
critique of disembodied artificial sex — of “using” technology as inter-
human sex mediator — and towards the potential of relational erotic 
(be)coming together of human and non-human beings.
Conjunctive Bodies
The distinction between eroticism and sexuality, as it is understood 
in how eroticism is treated in contemporary computing is first and 
foremost highlighted in its focus on sexuality as something belonging 
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to the intellectual world; a “truth” of sexuality that is controllable and 
essentially manageable through individual free will. Following affect 
theorist and feminist Lauren Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism, this 
scientific and Western understanding of eroticism may be understood 
as a cruel relation (Berlant 2011). The desire for “the good life” is 
inherently a fantasy of the good life, proclaimed and envisioned by 
culture, including visions that have been invented by corporate and 
commercial industry to market their products. It is a cruel optimism 
because it is an obstacle to our flourishing. In other words, we are  
not getting closer to the “optimum” by tracking our sex life or buying 
products that simulate how to provoke a female orgasm. These are 
happy objects (Ahmed 2004) directing us towards a very particular 
kind of eroticism; an ordinary state of desire-liberation that does 
not lead to excessive eroticism, but proceeds as a dulling, chronic 
condition of excitation without release. Too little time to feel, too little 
time to get to know one (others’) body/bodies, but endless amounts  
of apps and designed sex toys to teach and manage the user’s 
sexuality. This smooth, connected, happy state of bodies, where 
eroticism is commodified and sex only happens for a reason, is what 
we have aimed to transgress in the design of Marcelle. Hopefully, it 
moves closer to the state of conjunctive bodies without indulging in  
a sentimental, embodied lingering for a pure state of desire. Instead  
it seeks to transgress human sexuality itself in technologically-
mediated erotic experiences that are uncontrollable, unpredictable 
and ultimately unstable. That is, erotic experiences where subjects  
and objects co-evolve, dissolve and become abject.
Consumption of Bodies (or, a critique of economic  
notions of eroticism)
The demands of eroticism, the exuberant energy that flows in 
computational processes are both subjected to and withdrawing from 
productive consumption and emotional labour. What Bataille would 
not know in his novella Story of the Eye, as well as in his anti-capitalist 
writings of eroticism as excess, was that eroticism and intimacy 
became increasingly (also) executed through technology and software, 
and as such necessarily exchanged and given form. Consequently, 
eroticism has, like most intimate aspects of living, potentially become 
just another action of purpose and exchange-value.
 In this essay, we have aimed to revisit and actualize Bataille’s 
notion of eroticism in contemporary computational culture, firstly  
to revisit if and how the transgression of the will is in evidence in 
present emotional states of desiring subjects and their use of sex 
technology. Secondly, to speculate on how the violent and liberating 
potentials of eroticism may be a challenge for design.
BATAILLE’S BICYCLE
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 Highly inspired by the character Marcelle, and the overlooked 
but truly exceptional status of the erotic technology in Story of the 
Eye — the bicycle — we have proposed that Marcelle embodies and 
manifests the philosophical, theoretical paradox of eroticism, as well 
as the material and bodily emotional state of present connected and 
desiring bodies. As we have shown, eroticism of execution, as in  
the case of Marcelle, is a complex, excessive experience that both 
includes aspects of unwillingness, transgression of prohibitions or 
taboos and repetitious and continuous (unreleased) desire, in an even 
more complex fusion of interactions between human and non-human 
beings of network users, protocols, electromagnetic waves and 
erogenous zones of the body.
197
BATAILLE’S BICYCLE
References
Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics 
of Emotion. First Edition edition. New 
York: Routledge.
Barthes, Roland. [1963] 1979. “The 
Metaphor of the Eye.” In Story of the 
Eye, Trans. Joachim Neugroschel, 
119–27. London: Penguin Books.
Bataille, Georges. [1928] 1979. Story of 
the Eye. Trans. Joachim Neugroschel. 
London: Penguin Books.
——. [1957] 1962. Erotism: Death and 
Sensuality. Trans. Mary Dalwood.  
San Francisco: City Lights Publishers.
——. 1991. The Accursed Share:  
An Essay on General Economy, Vol. 1: 
Consumption. 1st edition. New York: 
Zone Books.
——. 1993. The Accursed Share, Vols. 2 
and 3: The History of Eroticism and 
Sovereignty. Reprint edition. New York: 
Zone Books.
Berardi, Franco. 2009. Precarious 
Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism & 
the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha 
Generation. London; Brooklyn, N.Y.: 
Minor Compositions.
Berlant, Lauren. 2011. Cruel Optimism. 
Durham: Duke University Press Books.
Bleecker, Julian. 2009. “Design Fiction: 
A Short Essay on Design, Science, 
Fact and Fiction.” March. http://
drbfw5wfjlxon.cloudfront.net/writing/
DesignFiction_WebEdition.pdf 
Dunne, Anthony, and Fiona Raby. 2013. 
Speculative Everything: Design, Fiction, 
and Social Dreaming. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press.
Evans, Dylan. 2002. An Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. 
New York: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History 
of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. 
Translated by Robert Hurley. Reissue 
edition. New York: Vintage.
Haraway, Donna. 1991. “A Cyborg 
Manifesto: Science, Technology, 
and Socialist-Feminism in the Late 
Twentieth Century.” In Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women. New York: 
Routledge.
Kristeva, Julia. 1982. Powers of Horror:  
An Essay on Abjection. Reprint edition. 
New York: Columbia University Press.
Lacan, Jacques. [1973] 1978. The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 
London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Morozov, Evgeny. 2014. To Save 
Everything, Click Here: The Folly of 
Technological Solutionism. First Trade 
Paper Edition edition. New York: 
PublicAffairs.
Noys, Benjamin. 2000. Georges Bataille:  
A Critical Introduction. London:  
Pluto Press.
Plant, Sadie. 1997. Zeroes and Ones: 
Digital Women and the New 
Technoculture. 1st edition. New York: 
Doubleday.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. [1819] 2010.  
The World as Will and Representation, 
Vol. I. Trans. Judith Norman, Alistar 
Welchman, and Christopher Janaway. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
——. [1851] 2000. Parerga and 
Paralipomena, Vol. II. Trans. by E. F. J. 
Payne. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Steffensen, Jyanni. 1998. “Slimy 
Metaphors for Technology: ‘The 
Clitoris Is a Direct Line to the Matrix.’” 
Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University. http://www.mujeresenred.
net/spip.php?article1538.
198
EXECUTING PRACTICES
199
200
EXECUTING PRACTICES
201
202
EXECUTING PRACTICES
203
204
EXECUTING PRACTICES
205
206
EXECUTING PRACTICES
207
208
EXECUTING PRACTICES
209
210
EXECUTING PRACTICES
211
212
EXECUTING PRACTICES
213
214
EXECUTING PRACTICES
215
216
EXECUTING PRACTICES
217
What is executing here?
Eric Snodgrass
Instruction Pointer
Execution. The act of carrying out a set of instructions. 
Execution. The act of carrying out a set of instructions in a step by step 
fashion. 
Execution. The automated act of cycling through a set of machine-
readable instructions in a step by step fashion. 
Execution. The automated act of cycling through a set of machine-
readable instructions (logically encoded character-chains fetched  
from stored-program memory) in a step by step fashion (making calls 
upon the memory for relevant operators and storing any resultant 
operands back in memory).
Execution. The automated act of cycling sequentially (in a time 
coordinated process) through a set of machine-readable instructions 
(logically encoded character-chains fetched from stored-program 
memory) in a step by step fashion (making calls upon the memory 
for relevant operators and storing any resultant operands back 
in memory), whereby any actions are made effectively decidable 
(capable of being interpreted by a logical decoder) according to  
the parameters of the active instruction set. 
Execution. The automated act of cycling sequentially (in a time coor-
dinated process determined via a pulse whose period is established 
by a phase distributor) through a set of machine-readable instructions 
(logically encoded character-chains fetched from stored-program 
memory and placed in the executing command circuits) in a step by 
step fashion (making calls upon the memory for relevant operators and 
storing any resultant operands back in memory), whereby any actions 
are made effectively decidable (capable of being interpreted by a 
logical decoder whose signals address the instruction pointer to the 
component on which the instruction operates) according to the param-
eters of the active instruction set and repeating such cycles for as  
long as they continue to remain effectively decidable or until there are 
no more instructions to execute (the instruction pointer points to the 
end of the instruction sequence).
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Marks
shift. 
Perched at the verge of some low-hanging brush or on a leaf’s edge: 
the tick. Dwelling in all of its alien personhood, this “blind and deaf 
bandit” (von Uexküll 2010, 45) of the outdoors passes days, months, 
even years in wait of a single blood meal. Charged. Alert. Questing  
a world of its particular accord. 
 Still, a few actions on its part direct themselves to certain  
devotees of pattern recognition. Writing in 1934, Baltic German biophi-
losopher Jakob Johann Baron von Uexküll shares one such notable  
and oft-cited consideration of the tick’s mode of being in the world.  
In this account, von Uexküll highlights what he distinguishes as  
three particular “functional cycles” that are initialised within the  
tick’s being. These functional cycles are triggered at the first (perhaps  
all-enveloping) detection of butyric acid, an odour promiscuously 
emitted by the skin glands of all mammals and for which the tick,  
like many other animals, is highly attuned to:
And now something miraculous happens … From the enormous 
world surrounding the tick, three stimuli glow like signal  
lights in the darkness and serve as directional signs that lead 
the tick surely to its target … Through these features, the 
progression of the tick’s actions is so strictly prescribed that  
the tick can only produce very determinate effect marks.  
(von Uexküll 2010, 51)
In von Uexküll’s hypothesis, such functional cycles are activated  
within the subjective environments of the “perception world” and  
their co-constitutive productive counterparts from the “effect world”. 
Any nominally organic being is able to receive perceptive stimuli  
(via its particular array of perception organs) from certain objects in 
its environment and form “perception marks” (Merkmal) that highlight 
these stimuli as potential matters of concern. Such perception marks 
are closely related to the particular forms of functional ability on the 
entity’s part to potentially act upon these perception marks by enacting 
further “effect marks” (Wirkmal) of one form or another upon them. 
As von Uexküll highlights, these stimuli are not qualities of the object 
itself, but instead are forms of what, in the context of this essay, might 
be described as interfacial affinities between the perceiving being in 
question and the structural makeup of the perceived entity in question.
It is sense making that von Uexküll is interested in and, as he 
characterises it, the perception mark can be understood as a question 
posed by the perceived object and the effect mark as the perceiving 
subject’s answer to this question. Namely, how does the being in 
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question make sense of and act in relation to the perceptual signs  
that make up its environment? One further note of interest here is how 
the eventual enactment and imprinting of an effect mark is, to one 
degree or another, transformative in regards to the perceived object  
in question — namely in that it “extinguishes” the perception mark (49). 
It executes the functional cycle in question, answering the question  
and making room for other executable queries and actions.
 According to such a scheme, a tick is known to act on an initial 
perception mark of butyric acid by launching itself from its perch 
and, in the case of a successful landing, is able to impress onto the 
mammal’s surface exterior the effect mark “collision”. This in turn 
allows for an erasing of the initial perception mark while also initiating 
a new functional cycle in which the tick sets off across the hirsute 
expanse of its mammalian host, relying on its further sensitivity to 
temperature to detect the perception mark of a bare patch of pulsing, 
warm-blooded skin. A sign that for this bloodborne practitioner of 
hematophagy is quite possibly a mark of marks; an event on which to 
execute the climatic third act of piercing a hole in the host’s epidermis, 
the tick inserting its harpoon-like hypostome into the skin of its 
receiver. An interfacing not only of parasite and host, but of mutually 
executable materials, the layer of skin and calcified hypostome 
readily enveloping one another in an embrace that takes little note 
of consequences to their host organisms. Indeed, “[t]he tick’s hearty 
blood meal is also its last meal” (45).
 As von Uexküll describes it, “[f]iguratively speaking, every animal 
subject attacks its objects in a pincer movement — with one perceptive 
and one effective arm” (48–9). These perception and effect worlds 
WHAT IS EXECUTING HERE?
Figure 1. Functional cycle of a tick. Drawing by Georg Kriszat,  
in von Uexküll & Kriszat (1934, 27).
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are not separate, but rather “form one closed unit”. This is what von 
Uexküll calls the Umwelt: the subjectively experienced lifeworld whose 
perceptible and executable qualities inform the experiences of the 
subject in question. As von Uexküll emphasises throughout his text,  
in such a schema recursively identifiable subjects and objects interact 
in a generative fashion, perceiving and bringing forth perceptive-
effective marks and their rhythms and melodies of interaction from 
the interlinked perceptions and effects that arise within what is at one 
and the same time a collection of subjectively distinct yet cellular 
and mutually impinging gatherings of Umwelts. With such a relatively 
simple abstract functional schema in place, von Uexküll’s biosemiotic 
method is ostensibly able to breakdown the most complex or basic1 
of animal Umwelts. Its robust, pincer-like binding able to unpack the 
functional cycles and material discursive Umwelt of seemingly any 
entity of its choice.
 Questions around interpretation are inevitably a central point of 
discussion for most disciplinary endeavours. In the early twentieth 
century however, as witnessed in much of the key work emerging in 
fields such as linguistics, mathematics, physics and the arts (e.g. Dada), 
the question of interpretation can be seen to become a particularly 
pressing and formative one. Writing in the very same period as von 
Uexküll, Alan Turing, in his paper “On Computable Numbers, with  
an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1937), was able to 
formalise his breakthrough description of computation and a sketch  
of its practical application in the form of a “universal machine”. As with 
von Uexküll’s functional cycle, there is a pincer-like quality all of its 
own in Turing’s formulation.2 Georges Ifrah captures it as follows,  
“The real genius of Turing’s invention is the fact that he invented both 
Figure 2. Surrounding environment of a bee and the same environment  
as experienced in the bee’s own perceptual Umwelt. Drawing by Kriszat,  
in von Uexküll & Kriszat (1934, 59).
221
the abstract form of a revolutionary device and the mathematical 
concept which allowed the device to be analysed: the theory and its 
application were unified from the outset. It is as if Archimedes had 
invented the principle of the lever and the lever itself at the same 
moment” (Ifrah 2001, 278-9). Where von Uexküll would regularly 
(and with much delight) mock behaviourist “machine theorists” and 
their habit of turning animals “into pure objects” (2010, 42), Turing’s 
formulation highlights a rather decisive and powerful vitality of this 
particular machine by showing its inbuilt potential to recursively 
be both an object and subject of its method of discretely defined 
operations. In the place of the functional cycle, the many fetch-decode-
execute cycles of computing machines, bootstrapping themselves 
from one hardware-software setup to another and injecting their 
interpretations into this or that collection of executable entities.
 These theories of von Uexküll and Turing, as well as those of  
the likes of Kurt Gödel and Niels Bohr before them, bring to life 
powerful models of interpretation and execution. The notions of 
constraining sensorial or computational limits that they highlight can 
be understood as being generative in nature, as incitements towards 
further queries and inventive responses to dynamic lifeworlds as they 
present themselves at any particular instance. As Elizabeth Grosz 
describes it in her own reading of von Uexküll, an organism’s milieu 
“is an ongoing provocation”, with an organism’s own existence as a 
co-constituted “provisional response to that provocation” (2008, 44).  
At the same time, these theories involve what might be seen as a rather 
leaky form of unification: namely, that for any formalist discursive 
endeavour there will inevitably exist truths that are not accessible  
by the same system that implies them. Just as the machine cannot read  
and write code at the same instant, formalisation here comes up 
WHAT IS EXECUTING HERE?
Figure 3. Stills from “A robot amongst the herd” video by the Australian  
Centre for Field Robotics (2013), portraying a pilot investigation  
regarding the behavioural response of dairy cows to a robot. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=S4Dndp-Esd8.
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against a kind of tantalising gap between its expression and execution, 
just as its discrete makeup is itself contingent upon a continuous flux 
and iterability of things (Mackenzie 2006, 36–7).
 In the very undecidability of their nature, such theories and their 
actualisations point to a generative power of execution as it continually 
churns across a spectrum of interactions. Its ongoing moulding and 
puncturing of Umwelts that indicates towards discourse as materially 
oriented and materiality as subject to its own ability to be marked  
and formed. An interfacing and marking of bodies upon one another. 
The forcing or mere leaking of energies of interaction across materials, 
systems, flows, Umwelts. And in the process, the potential reconfig-
urations or coalescings of newly fused ensembles and ecologies of 
the executable that emerge from such interactions. Execution breeds 
execution.
(Skins, Bodies, Tapes, Sites …)
shift. 
As media theorist Friedrich Kittler (2006) highlights in his writing  
on the introduction in the early 1980s and then regular inclusion of 
what was termed as a “protected mode” feature within what is the  
still common x86 family of instruction set architectures,3 logics of 
enclosure have a way of becoming immanent throughout media 
discourse networks. Here the enclosing logic in question is the 
implementation of a built-in restriction that further removes users 
from the real mode4 of ostensibly full access to a computer’s “original” 
Von Neumann architecture.5 Protected mode style features, typically 
referred to as executable space protection, can be implemented 
in a variety of ways. In the example that Kittler is referring to, it is 
a technique applied within CPUs to segregate areas of memory by 
marking them as non-executable, such that an attempt to execute 
machine code in these regions will cause an exception. The NX bit 
(“No-eXecute”) is one example of this. Thus, in contrast to such a 
segregated system of restricted access, in real mode a user should 
ostensibly be able to access and address all areas of the memory 
without any protection mechanism being employed.
 In an ongoing series of experimental works, artist Martin Howse 
interrogates the nature of computational enclosures, with their 
“separation of users and of their desires and affects” (2013a). Howse 
is specifically interested in how, through the establishing of such 
enclosures, “[t]he possibility of transferring execution outside these 
sets of containers or black boxes into the world is resolutely denied” 
(2013a). Many of Howse’s works can be seen to highlight a key  
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question to be addressed with regards to the nature of computation in 
the world. As Howse characterises it in an interview discussion: 
One question I’m very interested in which you could say fuels 
my research is to ask where exactly software executes. Where 
exactly do these seemingly abstract coded processes which 
seriously effects our lives, where do these take place? At first 
it seems simple, somewhere inside this machine or black box, 
a laptop, a smartphone, but looking at it closer there’s no easy 
answer. And I feel that this answer has to do with our skin and 
the Earth. (Howse, in Sayej 2013)
For Howse (with a direct nod in his notes to J. G. Ballard’s Crash),  
one method or exploit for triggering a reacquaintance with the fault 
lines of such a question is the act of shifting the site of an executable 
process from its typical or stabilised domain to a less typical, less 
stable one. To this end, he carries out a range of experiments that  
work to shift computational sites of execution into “new material (data), 
outside the particular confines of a trusted and identifiable process 
or skin” (Howse 2013a). Beyond simply shifting the site of execution, 
Howse can also be seen in these works to be continually foraging 
for and repurposing such shifted arrangements towards alternative 
conceptions and sites of the executable. Looking at almost any of 
Howse’s projects, a lingering question can be seen to take hold: What  
is executing here?
 
 The above images (Figure 4) are from documentations of Howse 
demonstrating the workings of his piece pain registers (2011), which 
uses the ptrace()6 system call to make readings of the opcodes (oper-
ational codes). Opcodes are the portions of machine language instruc-
tions in an instruction set architecture that specify the operation to be 
executed by a processor (e.g. an operation might be “read”, “write”, 
“add”, “jump”, etc.). In Howse’s characterisation of them, opcodes are 
the “bare logical bones of computation” located on the “questionable 
WHAT IS EXECUTING HERE?
Figure 4. Martin Howse’s pain registers (2011). Images courtesy of the artist 2016.
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surface which divides software and hardware” (2013a). The ptrace 
system call ostensibly allows one piece of software (the “parent”) to 
observe, control, examine and alter any aspect of another process 
running on the same operating system. In pain registers, the read-
ings of the opcodes running on a computer CPU are promiscuously 
transposed, with Howse shifting the site of execution of code from the 
instruction pointer over to a machine-operated needle that carefully 
executes an up and down rhythmic pricking upon the skin of its user, 
writing patterned, piercing inscriptions on the skin’s surface according 
to the currently executing processes running on the user’s computer 
(such as the booting up or closing down of a Firefox web browser).
 This is in part a kind of reanimation of the semi-mythical “killer 
poke” from the earlier days of a less materially protected form of 
computing, in which “[t]he computer crash originally referred to the 
disastrous impact of the hard disk’s read/write head on the shiny, 
information-rich surface of the hard drive platter … eliciting violent 
hardware destruction” (Howse 2013a). With echoes of Kittler, Howse 
contrasts such a materially present crash with the pseudo-nature of the 
crash as it came to be presented at the level of software in the standard 
operating systems of the day (such as the “Blue Screen of Death” of 
Windows operating systems):
The promises of the word made flesh are denied in a necessary 
crash; the crash of the operating system is some kind of 
fraudulent non-accident, designed to avoid the Ballardian 
collision and miming the same faked revelation or exposure of 
the pornographic, designed and enacted to draw to a halt any 
potential perversion of the instruction pointer, before it gets  
out of hand. Crash appears as original and volcanic revelation, 
yet uncovers only another unpierced skin layer; in both cases, 
only more protocols. (Howse 2013a)
As hinted at in pain registers, for those users spared/denied of the 
pains and vicissitudes of computing, whether due to choice of software 
and hardware and/or because of a certain privilege that keeps them 
at the higher end of the speed and computational efficiency spectrum 
(and far away from both the manufacturing sites and waste dumps of 
computation’s political economies), shifting sites of material execution 
are perhaps readily painful and intimately charged events, enacted 
as they are at a more tangible level in which their tentative instability 
vibrates in a potentially more visceral and transgressive fashion.
 This potential for tension and resolution between executing 
entities points to execution’s making of necessary distinctions in the 
form of discursive inclusions, exclusions and markings of executable 
entities. Consider, for instance, the originary interstitial gap that 
Turing’s computing model opens up, with its mandate of discrete 
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elements capable of being enumerated and made into effectively 
calculable algorithms for execution upon and by computing entities. 
As a machine that cuts so as to count, the task that digital computing 
sets engineers is originally that of rendering various forms of analogue 
hardware (vacuum tubes, transistors, etc.) signals into discretely 
readable units whose determinations can be accurately analysed and 
reliably carried out from one step to another. In this materialisation 
of Turing’s thesis into actual computing machines, the act of making 
things discrete,7 so as to be computable, becomes one of establishing 
machine-readable cuts: the switchable on and off state elements, or 
flip-flops executed via logic gates used to store and control data flow. 
Such switchable and readable states constitute a practical material 
basis that allows for the writing and running of the executable binary 
instructions of machine code upon a computing machine. All of which 
eventually results in what has become a particularly productive cut, this 
incision of the digital and its seismic materialisation in computational 
form, giving birth as it has to the “manic cutter known as the computer” 
(Kittler 2010, 228).
 Howse is continually after ways of bringing this materiality of 
discursive practices to the fore. Thus skin, as a notably sensitive and 
markable surface, is a site of interest for Howse because of its quality 
as a thing “to be pricked, pointed to, mined, excavated and extruded, 
in order to test, engineer, show and expose precisely something” 
(Howse 2013a). In pain registers, this pricking involves not only the 
code calling the ptrace function but also the creation of the modified 
hardware setup that acts as “an appendage or code prosthetic” for 
translating the opcode values into “needled plunges”. In order for skin 
to take on its quality as skin, various organs, appendages and other 
extensions and externalisations must form so as to be able to touch 
upon (in one way or another) and thus partly point towards its quality 
as skin, as the epidermal border around which markable bodies  
have for so long been demarcated.
 A similar quality of bordering can be seen to work itself into 
Turing’s machine model, which requires its site of discretely arranged 
tape with which an instruction pointer can read and write its instruc-
tions for operation. In this way a key function of the tape is twofold, 
providing (1) a layer of discretely enclosable areas that (2) have 
the ability to be marked. The instruction pointer points to one set of 
computable instructions after another in a mode of execution. In doing 
so, it mobilises various energies and pacts of structural impositions, 
both intensive and extensive, while also having the potential effect 
of consolidating and making amenable certain bodies into its oper-
ating regime. Where execution meets resistance, it is often a question 
of recomposing either the program and/or the executable bodies in 
WHAT IS EXECUTING HERE?
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question (with the application or threat of pain as a knowingly effective 
measure in the case of many organic bodies). Bodies then, as demar-
cated entities within a particular discursive system, are notable sites 
and materially discursive loci that can act as productive points of entry 
for studying the heterogeneous workings and executing processes 
involved in a certain situation. In the case of pain registers, the human 
body and its sensitive layer of skin and nerves act as a particularly 
suggestive site for engaging with Howse’s ongoing interest in interro-
gating a notion of execution in computing, the needle becoming here  
a rather tangible instruction pointer for better impressing its mode  
of execution onto the user, not unlike the harrow of the execution  
apparatus in Kafka’s Penal Colony, to which Howse also makes refer-
ence in his writing (2013a). Indeed, Howse sees pain registers as 
pointing towards an even older computational reference, with its 
punctuating of executing processes upon the skin of its user enacting 
a “knowing reversal of the operation afforded by the punch card, that 
other surface lying historically at a beginning for user software with 
Jacquard’s loom” (2013a).
 Pain registers’ shifting of the site of execution from the CPU’s 
instruction pointer to the skin can be understood to enact a method of 
materialising the cybernetic epistemology of a “unit” of information as 
“a difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 2000, 315-318) via 
the self-same cybernetic apparatus and onto the user’s skin. Via such a 
seemingly simple shift, the piece accounts for a sense of difference as 
computation is executed as “marks on bodies, that is, the differences 
materialized” (Barad 2007, 89). In the context of the Jacquard loom and 
computing pioneer Charles Babbage’s well known adoption of certain 
of its properties, it is important to pay heed to the ways in which 
any cut is also a cutting out. Just as Babbage’s model for computing 
proved prototypical of those that were to come, so too would its 
partitioning and making invisible of the work, labour, materials and 
energy expended in sustaining seemingly seamless automation. 
From the very beginning, the many bodies involved — their often 
marginalised and “nimble fingers” (Nakamura 2014; see also Gallardo 
and Samson in this volume on the presence of hands in contemporary 
capitalist modes of production) that continue to remain at best as 
footnotes in histories and practices of computing (Plant 1995, 63–4). 
This despite their crucial role in the creation, running and sustaining 
of computational economies, whether at the level of manufacturing 
(Nakamura 2014), programming (Plant 1995; Chun 2005) or networked 
community management and support (Nakamura 2015). Ada Lovelace 
programming under a gender-neutral pseudonym. Turing’s chemical 
castration. ENIAC Girls and Mechanical Turks. Obscured bodies and 
invisible hands of execution.
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 To summarise, execution in the standard model of computation 
such as Turing and others originally put forward, involves some kind 
of privileging of a discrete and symbolically enumerated logic of 
enclosure in the name of executability. It defines the rules and limits 
of its procedures, and in doing so, creates various kinds of executable 
entities. When executed, the executing process in question presents 
its programmatic imposition within a range of other executing 
processes, the executing process in question aiming to make operative 
the differentiating cuts of its particular material discursive makeup. 
Execution in this sense is both a discursive attempt at defining 
differences and material enactment and working through the various 
material discursive queries that arise in such attempts. Thus, execution 
is not merely the computability of something but the actual practice 
and execution of this computability in the world and over time; 
each instance of execution bringing the wound-up velocities of its 
discursively established logical abstractions into contact with  
the frictional and situated materials of its executing encounters.  
An ongoing interplay of affordances whose multi-scalar ensembles  
of bodies and sites operate as situated and compositional bearers  
of a certain propensity and potential for execution.
Interpreters
In this summer of 1915 [a three-year-old Alan Turing] made  
his first venture in experimenting: as one of the wooden sailors 
in his toy boat had got broken he planted the arms and legs  
in the garden, confident that they would grow into toy sailors. 
(Sara Turing 2012, 10)
The code of nature maintains consistency and flexibility by 
repressing itself from one level to the next.  
(Jack Burnham 1974, 74)
What is executing here? … As Karen Barad has elucidated (drawing 
from the example of quantum physics and its highlighting of the 
formative impact of the mediating apparatus and its observer 
effect), “[m]atter and meaning are not separate elements. They are 
inextricably fused together” (2007, 3). Discourse and its interpretive 
efforts are dependent on materials and perceptual-effectual devices 
whose operations are themselves dependent on the various material 
affordances and energies of the components that make them up.  
Forces that are in turn moulded and interpenetrated by further 
embodied, technical, social and nonhuman energies of any situated 
instance. In order to both address and expand upon this ongoing 
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prompt from Howse’s work and to cover some more of the specifics of 
execution, a further work of Howse’s will be brought in for discussion 
here: his Dark Interpreter effects processors.
 In computing, an interpreter is a procedure that executes source 
code in what is an ostensibly more on-the-fly fashion, specifically 
because an interpreter doesn’t fully compile a program’s instruc-
tions into machine language prior to execution. As Abelson et al 
characterise it: “An interpreter raises the machine to the level of the 
user program; a compiler lowers the user program to the level of the 
machine language” (1996, 607). Given Howse’s aim of bringing  
the workings of machines into a closer and more direct proximity  
with their users, it is clear why his interrogation of execution would 
lean towards a focus on interpreters rather than compilers. In a  
recent essay, “Dark Interpreter — Provide by Arts for the hardnesse  
of Nature”, Howse outlines his own take on interpreters:
What is an interpreter or an interpretation? Within the realm  
of computer science an interpreter exists as a program, devised 
in earth, in hardware, which instantly translates language into 
action, into execution and material or breath, either directly 
or through an intermediate translation. The interpreter must 
itself be described in a language, which, Orouboros-style 
can perhaps be the very same language which is interpreted, 
thus slowly and seasonably bootstrapping itself into a wordy 
autumnal existence and a cycle of development. It seems as if 
interpretation must always come after a writing; seasons are not 
reversed or coming before. Yet, following the season/reason of 
the lake (the return), what is to come is what has happened  
— it is always repeated and returning; the base principle of 
scrying is reading the palimpsest which is the Dark Interpreter, 
and like-wise interpretation in this sense is nothing but 
divination, knowing how to execute that which comes later to  
be uttered. (Howse 2015)
It is a rich and characteristic passage of Howse’s, highlighting an 
ecological take on execution as seasonal cycles of sedimentation in 
which interpretation is simultaneously a divination of future utterances 
and a palimpsestic bootstrapping onto sets of already existent, 
sequential processes of execution and interpretation in the world.
 In his knowing reappropriation of the shadowy figure of the Dark 
Interpreter from Thomas De Quincey’s writing on the productive 
“ventilation of profound natures” that pain brings forth ([1891] 2009), 
Howse further develops his thinking on execution in relation to his  
new set of noise processing sound generators, which he gives the name 
of Dark Interpreter to. In doing so, Howse repurposes De Quincey’s 
shadowy figuration of interpretation by shifting it into the realms of 
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computing and noise generation, in this case, via a “skin-sensitive 
electronic instrument” (Howse 2015) capable of translating, or rather 
interpreting, the conductions of body capacitance, skin resistance and 
biological micro-voltages into noise generation. Crucially for Howse, 
“The Dark Interpreter is thus not to be controlled. It is an obsidian 
electronic mirror, the earth and skin itself” (2015). Howse is interested 
then not necessarily in the registering and working with the “dark” 
powers of frenzy and grief such as De Quincey would have it, but 
rather in ventilations and on-the-fly interpretations of what might be 
understood as the (comparatively) nondiscursive abilities of the body’s 
capacity to continually conduct energies all of its own accord.
 
 Howse also situates his series of Dark Interpreters in a direct 
comparison with the CPU of computing: “But what is exactly this hidden 
place of the now, where symbolic orders, where language becomes 
material change at a quantum level? Where words are subjected to 
literal and not literary un-angelled noise … This non-place is the CPU 
or Central Processing Unit, anchoring any technology, AKA. the Dark 
Interpreter” (2015). This presencing mode of Howse’s Dark Interpreter 
can be read in multiple ways: as a referent for the moment of the 
infusion of discursive logics (e.g. information, mathematics, code) with 
their nondiscursive substrates (e.g. entropy, noise, materials); as the 
act of live interpretation and execution as it unfolds in the world and 
in the moment of the now; as a processual, “autoevolutionary machine” 
and executor of Gnostic style programs of universal organisation 
(Howse 2013b, making direct reference to Stanisław Lem’s Summa 
Technologiae, a collection of philosophical essays); or as an incessant 
drive towards creation and execution, as witnessed both in the kernel 
of inspiration that inspires a young Turing to plant the limbs of his 
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Figure 5. Mater Tenebrarum, the third of Howse’s Dark Interpreter series.  
Image courtesy of the artist 2016.
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broken soldiers in the ground and in the same dark, creative responses 
of the soil within which these limbs are inserted.
 As a notion of the Dark Interpreter hints at, a key issue that can 
be seen to arise in Howse’s works is the interplay of discursivity and 
nondiscursivity and the way that each potentially infects the other. 
As Abelson et al. remind readers of their well-known textbook on 
the structure and interpretation of computer programs, “the most 
fundamental idea in programming” is that “[t]he evaluator,which 
determines the meaning of expressions in a programming language,  
is just another program” (1996, 360).8 In their work to materialise 
Turing’s and others’ formulations on computation into reliable 
executing machines, engineers of the time had to work hard on 
making matter and phenomena such as electricity into necessarily 
reconfigurable and controllable elements that could consistently carry 
out the operations of mathematics and logic that would flow through 
them. In his essay on this key phase in electrical engineering, artist 
and writer David Link highlights how this engineering of matter as 
reconfigurable can be seen as the culmination of an intense history 
of experimentations with electricity, leading to a situation in which 
engineers “no longer understood natural phenomena, such as 
electricity, as fate and fact to be grasped descriptively, but as material 
that could be formed in any number of ways” (2006, 41). Combined 
with Claude Shannon (1938) and others’ work on formalising the way 
in which relays and switching circuits could be utilised for executing 
logic functions, a kind of decisive tipping point can be seen to be 
crossed, one in which a powerful mode of discursivity becomes 
materially executable on these new computing machines.
 Turing’s (1946) own proposal and work on his Automatic 
Computing Engine (ACE) ably highlights this flexible mobility of 
meaning and matter. In it, Turing outlines how mercury-filled acoustic 
delay lines9 can be used to form a high speed storage component in 
the machine. According to this setup, five-foot-long tubes of liquid 
mercury (or other liquid alternatives) with quartz crystal transducers 
are injected with carefully controlled pulses of electricity (about a 
microsecond apart) that, via crystals on one end, propagate ultrasonic 
wave patterns along the length of the tubes, whose varying amounts 
of energy can then be reconverted, via crystals on the other end, back 
into electricity whose resultant voltage must in turn be sufficiently 
amplified so as to give a readable output that can then be used to 
gate a second standard pulse generated by the clock. In this creative 
manipulation of materials, logically encoded bits of information are 
progressively shifted across metal, rock and liquid, at one point riding 
upon sound waves that are themselves propagated via the undulant 
affordances of mercury. In all of this, a kind of tectonic material 
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discursive rumbling can be seen to be working its way across the 
exponential range of practices infused by this model of computability 
and its execution in the world. This highly transducible form of 
information processing, one that, despite its many prickly, error-
prone and difficult to control physical elements, begins to call forth a 
diverse array of materially switchable and relayed forms of executable 
operations into the world.
 Such flexible and mobile forms of transduction and recursivity 
in the execution of programmed material discursive pursuits poses a 
question of what exactly the nondiscursive becomes in such setups.  
In his article on stack software structures, Rory Solomon poses the 
question of “whether it is truly possible to access nondiscursive layers 
of media, and what that even might mean” (2013). Using the examples 
of both the functional call stack within programming languages and  
the more general purpose diagrams of application stack software 
architectures (with their pyramids, cones, cylinders and other diagram-
matic heaps of sedimented computational layers stacked one over or 
below the other), Solomon highlights the way in which a mode of last 
in, first out interpretation and execution, as well as other stack-like 
models can serve as a helpful reminder of how one discursive system 
can bootstrap and further build itself off of other discursive systems,  
a cycle of layering and sedimentation that points to discourse and 
interpretation as both historically sequential and highly contingent.
 Just as the meaning of expressions in a programming language  
are themselves determined by other programs, one can of course 
speak of other such recursive relations. As media theorist Alexander 
Galloway emphasises in his work on network protocols, “the content  
of every new protocol is always another protocol” (2004, 10). Or, as  
in the example of source code that Wendy Chun deconstructs, a 
notion of software code as “source” is a distinct glossing over of the 
“vicissitudes of execution” (2011, 53), one that ignores the fact that 
source code is historically posterior to object code, as well as the 
more direct matter that source code is not itself executable, but rather 
must be compiled and thus is subject to other elements, operations, 
protocols and discursive institutions that could themselves be posited 
as source. Paul Kockelman captures the crux of the matter:
just as a bicycle (as a relatively large instrument) provides  
an interpretant of the function of the smaller instruments that  
make it up (e.g., spokes, pedals, chains, etc.), and just as these 
smaller instruments provide interpretants of the purchases 
provided by the affordances they incorporate (e.g., steel, plastic, 
rubber), an accumulator provides an interpretant of each of 
the logic gates that make it up, and each of these logic gates in 
turn provides an interpretant of the purchase provided by the 
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affordances it incorporates (from silicon to solder, depending 
on the current state of technology). In short, just as one can 
zoom out to the function served by many interconnected digital 
computers (qua the Internet), however wide, one can zoom  
in to the purchase provided by many incorporated silicon  
atoms, however narrow … In other words, do not get hung  
up on the fact that instruments are “derivative” agents. There 
is no life form that is not a derivative agent in this account. 
(Kockelman 2011, 723)10
All of which serves to highlight a perspectival nature of discourse 
and its material purchase; how any “agential cut” (Barad 2007) and 
interpretation is itself built upon certain black-boxed supports that are 
nonetheless interoperating and potentially material discursive mobile 
entities of their own.
 Much of Howse’s own practice can be understood as highlighting 
just such a contingency in execution. In his method of applying forms 
of engineering towards the creation of contraptions in which compu-
tational logics and materials are made to unravel their own enclosing 
drives, it seems clear that Howse’s implementations veer towards what 
could be described as a promiscuous mode: an intentionally perverse 
mode of inquiry and method of execution aimed at unsettling the more 
stratified interpretive modes of executing machines as they have often 
tended to become. To this end, Howse launches his materials (code, 
chemicals, software, needles, soil, circuit boards, crystals, EEG readers, 
Amanita muscaria fungi, etc.) up to their stratic limits, pushing them 
to their perceived frictional and/or fictive constraints. Like the unruly 
particle of physics, potential sites of executability flash back and forth 
across these various works: surfacing as a computer crash; a needle 
pressing the skin to its breaking point; a slime mould becoming runny 
and separating itself from a sufficiently stratified solid. Each instanti-
ation, leakage and interpretation suggesting both further routes for 
transgressive expression and new potential supports for material  
and endophysical enclosure.
 What is executing here? Again, the command line’s pushy  
prompt. In each or any shift enacted in these works, there is a certain 
bringing to the fore of materialised sites of contact and exchange that 
inscribe and articulate their particular capacities amidst a range of 
ongoing, active ecologies of execution. In the example of von Uexküll’s 
tick, execution is envisaged as the launching of an action in response 
to a threshold event that triggers an executable response on the part 
of the tick. A dangerous promiscuity of skin glands and subjectivities. 
In Kittler’s exposition on the implementation of protected modes that 
further solidify perceived divides in hardware from software, one 
is made privy to the creation and sedimentation of certain kinds of 
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notable layerings between the material and discursive. In response 
to the often misguided projections of any such enclosing drives, 
Howse positions the executable as “the real, that which is enacted 
and constructed by software in/as the world itself” (2013a), aiming to 
remove any sense of a privileged view from the outside. In doing so,  
he highlights the interpenetrative entanglements and generative 
powers of matter and discourse across a range of charged entities, 
practices and sites of execution. In pain registers computational 
execution is palimpsestically traced off of the computer’s operational 
codes and transduced via a needle onto a layer of generative skin. 
In the Dark Interpreter the skin’s promiscuous capacities become 
themselves executable inputs for contagious, noisy divination. In 
Howse’s Earthboot execution worms from the soil into the circuits of 
a bespoke trowel of a motherboard. In Diff in June (2013) a summer’s 
day’s worth of executional traces are excavated from the changes in 
the register of a PC’s file system and spilled out into a 1,673 page 
graphomanic archive and tribute to micro-instructional executive 
ardour. And in Sketches for an earth computer (2014–2016) collections 
of earthly materials and naturally provided for telluric flows and 
atmospheric inputs code an embryonic assemblage that regardless of 
its comparatively unrefined state will inevitably execute these inputs in 
one way or another. In any lingering sense of doubt at times as to their 
executability, the very potential of the executable. Its needle furrowing 
across sedimented surfaces, unearthing unstable interpretations and 
potential leakages in these stacks that bury and unbury;11 the codes 
and materials growing wild, producing opaque excess and new 
“alliances of bastard components” (Fuller 2005, 103).
 This becomes that. Information, entropy and the liveliness of 
materials bring forth ongoing encounters and sites of execution. 
Amidst such an ecology of executions, interpretation can be 
understood to “haunt” (Gitelman 2013, 3) the act of processing,  
even if only in its basic effect of mobilising certain energies and 
their further generative and questioning prompts. Thus the discourse 
network, as a result of its own demonstrative interpretative power,  
can increasingly be seen to be unravelling long held notions of a 
human-centred interpretative agency. At the same time, emerging  
from the mills of Babbage’s beloved nineteenth century factories,  
the invisible hands and instruction pointers of capitalism and Moore’s 
law steadily accumulate their own uneasy returns in the geological 
record. The dark interpretation of the moment: Anthropocene.
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Notes
1. Indeed, any notions of complexity 
are themselves subject-specific 
formulations. Von Uexküll: “All animal 
subjects, from the simplest to the 
most complex, are inserted into their 
environments to the same degree of 
perfection. The simple animal has a 
simple environment; the multiform 
animal has an environment just as  
richly articulated as it is” (50).
 2. Turing’s name and work is often 
invoked in this essay as a stand in for 
what can easily become an exponential 
list of a range of actors involved in 
various key achievements in regards 
to both the theoretical horizons and 
practical materialisations of computation.
 3. A family of backward compatible 
instruction set architectures introduced 
in 1978 by Intel with the release of their 
8086 central processing unit. Despite its 
age, the x86 architecture continues to 
be one of the most used and dominant 
computer architectures, featuring in 
most desktops and laptops, as well as in 
many of the various hardware setups of 
contemporary networked cloud services.
4. Like the tightly wound psychoan-
alytical schematics of Jacques Lacan, 
protected mode can be seen to act here 
“as both the enemy and co-existent 
partner of a Real Mode” (Kittler 2006, 
359–60).
5. A stored-program computer 
for the processing, transmission and 
recording of inputs and outputs in 
which numerically encoded program 
instructions and data are stored in 
the same read-write, random-access 
memory and accessible via a common 
bus. Protected mode style features 
indicate towards a general trend of 
modifications to the Von Neumann 
architecture. In fact, the majority of 
modern CPUs (including many variations 
of the common x86 microprocessors) 
also incorporate aspects of the Harvard 
architecture model, a setup in which 
program instructions are stored in 
physically separate storage pathways 
and accessed by a separate bus, thus 
allowing instructions and data to be 
fetched in parallel. These hybrid 
models of Von Neumann and Harvard 
architectures are typically referred to as 
a Modified Harvard Architecture, with the 
most common modification involving the 
implementation of a memory hierarchy 
via a CPU hardware cache that allows 
for certain separations of instructions 
and data (typically for speed or security 
reasons) while still retaining the 
flexibility of a unified address space that 
an underlying Von Neumann architecture 
gives.
6. Accompanying statement to a short 
video by Howse on the ptrace() call: 
“Date of origin: 1979. Author/inventor/
context: Seventh Edition Unix, Bell 
Laboratories. An operating system call, 
ﬁrst implemented in Version 7 of AT&T 
UNIX in 1979, which allows one piece of 
software (the parent) to observe, control, 
examine and alter any aspect of another 
process running on the same operating 
system. The ptrace call is commonly 
used to debug running code and can 
be considered as an active language, 
inﬁltrating and interrogating, snooping 
on and injecting code into living, running 
processes; an active language projecting 
a potential process promiscuity within 
the machine. Ptrace shifts the site of 
execution and is nowadays commonly 
viewed as an unnecessary security risk” 
(Howse, https://vimeo.com/86690846). 
7. As Turing and von Neumann were 
both well aware of, when comparing 
what Turing describes as the “idealised 
machines” of his formal descriptions 
of “discrete state machines” to their 
instantiation into “actual machines”, 
the very materiality of these machines 
means they are of course not actually 
discrete. Turing: “Strictly speaking there 
are no such machines. Everything thing 
really moves continuously. But there are 
many kinds of machine which can be 
profitably thought of as being discrete 
state machines” (1950, 439–440).
8. Evaluator being another term for 
interpreter. In speaking of execution, it 
can be helpful to compare and contrast 
the many alternative phrases invoked in 
its place within computing. For instance, 
if execution has a sense of suggesting a 
kind of decisive moment, the common 
235
terminology of “running” a program 
brings more readily to the fore the 
durational aspects of live execution 
(“runtime”) and the ongoing and 
necessary processes of upkeep involved 
in any processes of computation (see, 
for instance, Linda Hilfling’s essay in this 
collection, or Kafka’s penal colony officer 
and his frequent outcries of designerly 
frustration at the ongoing work required 
to keep the execution machine in not 
only working order, but at a level of 
pristinely polished condition that does 
sufficient justice to its own pointedly 
performative act of execution).
9. Turing later acknowledged 
the influence of J. Presper Eckert’s 
pioneering work on mercury delay line 
memory in this particular setup of his.
10. See Marie Louise Juul Søndergaard 
& Kasper Hedegård Schiølin’s 
contribution in this collection on 
“Bataille’s bicycle” for a notable 
interpretation of a further purchase 
afforded by the bicycle.
11. In outlining his implementation 
of a last in, first out stack data structure 
as part of the design for his Automatic 
Computing Engine, Turing designates 
the terms “bury” and “unbury” (1946, 
11–12 & 30) for the calling and returning 
from subroutines (what were called 
“subsidiary operations” in Turing’s 
terminology).
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Critter Compiler 
Helen Pritchard
On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez had just  
entered Alaska’s Prince William Sound, after departing the 
Valdez Marine Terminal full of crude oil. At 12:04 am, the  
ship struck a reef, tearing open the hull and releasing 11  
million gallons of oil into the environment. Initial responses 
by Exxon and the Alyeska Pipeline Company were insufficient 
to contain much of the spill, and a storm blew in soon after, 
spreading the oil widely. Eventually, more than 1,000 miles  
of coastline were fouled, and hundreds of thousands of  
animals perished … Though the oil has mostly disappeared 
from view, many Alaskan beaches remain polluted to this  
day, crude oil buried just inches below the surface.1
The year is 1997 and we are at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
California. Mike Simpson, the inventor in the lab, is holding up a 
microchip in front of his computer. He traces the sensor with his 
finger and points towards the surface; it is here that the genetically 
engineered Pseudomonas fluorescens HK44 is “living” on the bed 
of silicon. Mike has fondly named the sensor, a tiny light-sensitive 
computer chip coated with the bioluminescent bacterium HK44, 
“Critters on a Chip”. When the bacterium encounters petrochemical 
pollutants, it lights up, creating an electrical signal that the chip can 
process or amplify. Mike explains that they have used the HK44 to 
create a biochip as it is sensitive to naphthalene, a common petroleum 
pollutant. HK44 is a genetically engineered strain that responds to 
exposure to naphthalene, salicylate and other structural analogs 
by production of visible light. It was constructed using genes from 
the light organ of the tropical fish the Monocentris and the common 
bacteria Escherichia coli (E.coli). Exposure to naphthalene, one of the 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons that are a component of coal and 
petrochemicals, causes injury to the HK44 and the resulting harm 
creates a bioluminescencent reaction. Light sensors embedded on 
the chip subsequently compute this reaction. Mike tells us that a 
naphthalene biosensor could be useful for monitoring hazardous waste 
sites, remediating oil spills or as a forensic application to evidence  
the presence of a particular chemical. The Critter Chips can be 
installed either on a floating platform or as the patent shows on the 
backs of the common honeybee. Mike notes that if the bacteria  
come into contact with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, it flips a 
biological switch and the bacteria start to glow. As the bacteria used 
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Figure 1. Critter Chips on the backs of Honey Bees, circulate over the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill. Pritchard (2016).
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give off a great deal of light, they are able to study the processes at a 
high resolution—down to a microscopic level in individual organisms. 
Of course, as he explains — such Critter Chips have limitations, 
because they are alive. The bacteria and the honey bee hosts need 
food, and they can die or mutate. So Critter Chips will probably carry 
(literal) expiration dates. 2
 
*  *  *
This chapter unravels how execution holds — in enduring states —  
semi-living microbes in sites of petrochemical waste. By referring to 
semi-living I am not signalling a life sustained through technolog-
ical means (Catts and Zurr 2002), but a living constrained and held in 
injured states by computation. I ask what type of activity is this execu-
tion that derives from injury and how we might speculate on execution 
otherwise? Through ethnographic and speculative engagements with 
Critter Chips I will show how execution can be described as propelling 
semi-life, outlining how computation exploits the potential of microbial 
injury and death. I follow this with a discussion of the artwork Critter 
Compiler, a fabulation (Haraway 2013) that engages with contemporary 
microbial computing. Critter Compiler is a prototype for a microbial 
novella writer and a response to Rosi Braidotti’s call for experi-
ments that “are non-profit and actualise the virtual possibilities of an 
expanded relational self that functions in a nature-culture continuum” 
(2013, 61). The artwork takes as its starting point toxic execution, and 
as a speculative experiment performs (or executes) these processes 
otherwise.
 
Negative possibilities 
In scenes of toxicity, Critter Chips operate through engaging the 
productive capacities of the HK44. Yet in these scenes this renewal is  
not often a capacious, co-flourishing, but a drawn out persistence 
preceding death. The HK44 might be described as a technical compo-
nent, in which processes of differentiation, in the form of damage 
or injury to the microbe, signal the presence of toxic hydrocarbons. 
Critter Chips outline the crucial yet elusive intra-actions (Barad 2007) 
of nonhuman organisms in computational execution; nonhumans  
who might be said to accompany execution as negative shapes.  
As Nigel Clark observes,
 Our bodies, our identities, our social formations, are also 
consequent of the non-relation we have with all those who  
did not make it … Accompanying us as negative shapes — as 
silent, spectral figures—are the many who did not pass safely 
across thresholds, who took a wrong turn at a bifurcation,  
CRITTER COMPILER
240
EXECUTING PRACTICES
whose experimental wagers did not win out. Our own 
flourishing may even be impacted in these falterings. 
(Clark 2011, 209)
Microbial deaths become negative shapes that emerge with us from 
scenes of petrochemical toxicity such as the ongoing pollution from 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the coast of Alaska or the waste from the 
industry of the Pearl Delta River Basin, in South China. Rosi Braidotti 
notes that the opportunistic post anthropocentrism of advanced 
capitalism both invests in and profits from the commodification of 
all that lives. “The capital it goes after is the informational codes of 
living matter itself in all its forms. Life, as bios as well as zoe, is turned 
into commodities for trade and profit” (Braidotti 2014, 243). It is these 
processes that not only destroy and erase life but also propel new 
biotic subjects such as Critter Chips. Whilst advanced capitalism is 
often characterized by the exploitation and erasure of life, this chapter 
engages with a contemporary mode of existence3— semi-living, 
exhausted, partial lives that both are propelled into and depleted  
by scenes of what I call toxic execution.
 The existence of Critter Chips is not an individual project, indeed 
they foreground what Donna Harway and Karen Barad describe as 
entangled intra-relating (Barad 2007, ix). Critter Chips emerge from 
an already-meshed-together scene, where their capacities are artic-
ulated through computation and particularly execution. Through an 
engagement with matter, we might understand that it is the excess or 
creative force (i.e its potential to renew) of both the HK44 and execu-
tion that renders the Critter Chips active. Seeking ways to account 
for this creative force of matter, material feminisms (alternatively 
called new-materialism or neo-materialism) have often turned their 
attentions to that of co-creation and conjoined forms of production 
with the non/inhuman world.4 Although these accounts have opened 
spaces of alterity beyond humanist concerns, their search for positive 
engagements with nonhumans has often attended to only that which 
we can know and flourish with, rather than that which takes an entity 
apart from itself. This has led to dominating articulations of life that 
obscure negative encounters of semi-living, exhausted, partial lives, 
and as discussed by Claire Colebrook, premises naturalised accounts 
(2014). Additionally, little attention has been dedicated to the appli-
cation of (bio)computational organisms in environmental computing, 
on the assumption that computing that addresses climate change or 
pollution from petrochemicals is based on an extended intimacy with 
“nature” and positive possibility. Critter Chips demand us to entertain 
a different articulation. As Barad notes, “[t]he stakes in denaturalizing 
nature are not insignificant. Demonstrating nature’s queerness, its 
trans*-embodiment, exposing the monstrous face of nature itself in 
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the undoing of naturalness holds significant political potential”(Barad 
2015, 412). In this context it is important to foreground the entangled 
relations of petrochemicals, waste, computation and capitalism, to 
trouble nature and its naturalness “all the way down” (Barad 2015, 413), 
I do this by invigorating the idea of toxic execution. 
 As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has noted, in the context of 
computation things always seem to be disappearing in such crucial 
ways, not just because of the effects of computation but because this 
process of disappearance is central to the temporality of computation 
itself. “[O]ur computers execute in unforeseen ways, the future opens 
to the unexpected. Because of this, any programmed vision will 
always be inadequate, will always give way to another future” (Chun 
2011, 9). Engaging with toxic execution enables us to pay attention to 
these disappearances so that we might attend to the ways that injury 
and death are enrolled with the computation of the environment that 
generates (so-called) real-time (big) data. Consequently, and as a 
queer experiment, instead of focusing on a co-flourishing of humans 
and non-humans, I draw on queer theory to pay attention to damage, 
injury and the constraints placed on the possibilities of life and 
brought about through computation. As Heather Love notes, there is a 
genealogy of focusing on injury in queer studies and a willingness to 
investigate darker aspects of experience (Love 2009, 2). As the anti-
social turn in queer theory outlines — to queer something is to engage 
with both the powerful negativity of punk politics and a mode of 
crafting alternatives with others (Halberstam 2008, 148 and 154).
 I extend queer theories that concern personal injury into more-
than-human ensembles in order to consider the damages and attend 
to the suffering, loving, caring, pain and death shared by humans and 
nonhumans in entanglements of computation and petrochemicals. 
Drawing on queer theory is not an anti-affirmative stance. Instead, as 
Heather Love outlines, “[t]he emphasis on damage in queer studies 
exists in a state of tension with a related and contrary tendency — the 
need to resist damage and to affirm queer existence”( Love 2009, 3). 
Therefore to think through affirmative questions of resistance we first 
need to ask how execution constrains life and produces an alternative 
economy of critical life that needs attention. This question pushes us  
to begin somewhere other than with the economy of life and nonlife. 
Trans Practices
Myra Hird observes that nonhumans have long “been overburdened 
with the task of making sense of human social relations” (2008, 229).  
Indeed, many critters have been “enrolled” as sentinels in  
environmental sensing “to detect signs of disturbances that remain 
indiscernible to humans” (Akrich et al. 2006 cited in Gramaglia  
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2013). Canaries, molluscs and lichen have all been tasked as sentinels, 
to signal future events or warn us, “making it possible to lower the 
threshold for detecting toxins in air, soil and water, and allowing 
investigations on the effects of low doses of particular pollutants on 
the environment” (Gramaglia 2013). Gail Davis also points to how our 
understandings of human corporeality and potentiality are increasingly 
enacted through the individual bodies of a multitude of laboratory 
mice (Davis 2013, 3). However, the HK44 has not just been tasked 
through genetic engineering with the characteristics of a sentinel  
but also enrolled further as a computational component. Yet as HK44 
emit an excited fluorescent glow, as the light from the microscope 
passes through them, my engagements with them seem to illuminate 
their enduring liveliness.
 In Animal Trans Hird describes how she shares Haraway’s interest 
“in trans species/cendence/fusions/gene/genics/national that  
disturb the hierarchy of taxonomic categories (genus, family, class, 
order, kingdom) derived from pure, self-contained and self-containing 
nature” (2008, 231). For Haraway, Hird explains, trans [practices]  
“cross a culturally salient line between nature and artifice, and they 
greatly increase the density of all kinds of other traffic on the bridge 
between what counts as nature and culture” (Haraway 1997, 56 cited  
in Hird 231). Critter Chips engage me with a trans aesthetics of 
affective ecologies (such as suffering, loving, caring, pain and death) 
shared by humans and nonhumans (Puig de la Bellacasa 2010, 8). 
Provoking an account for our shared “ambiguity/undecidability/
indeterminacy” (Barad 2012, 212) in our entanglements with 
computation. By focusing on Critter Chips, I do not wish to reinstate 
the categories of the nonhuman organism or execution as fixed. 
Instead I want to develop a fuller understanding of capitalist practices 
of computing and the ways in which they extend their reach into the 
possibilities for life. 
Critter Chips
In 1997 “Critters on a Chip” were set to replace expensive and 
complicated optical detection systems for petrochemicals that used 
photo multipliers and optical fibres buried in the ground. These 
Critter Chips used the genetically engineered microorganism HK44 to 
produce light as it was injured by hazardous waste, so that monitoring 
could be undertaken at sites of petrochemical accumulation. Almost 
twenty years later I am a visiting researcher at the Toxicology lab 
at City University in Hong Kong. China is the third largest producer 
of petrochemicals, and a site of energetic activity for biotechnology 
(Ong 2010, 3). Today the lab is busy, and Vincent the lab technician is 
standing near a rapidly spinning centrifugal machine. He explains  
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that he is generating bacteria for a microbial chip which will detect  
oil and petrochemical waste from refineries and factories, such as 
those in the Pearl River Delta, the low-lying area surrounding the  
Pearl River estuary, where the Pearl River flows into the South China 
Sea. Today, Vincent is attempting to harvest the genetically engineered 
bacteria cells that will live on a small microcontroller. He draws a 
picture for me on the back of his pad, to show how the Critter Chips 
will shimmer in vast floating networks compiling signals in real-time 
from the microbes’ metabolic and reproductive processes as they 
respond through injury to oil spills. These signals translate the  
Critter Chip’s injury from toxicity into iterative arithmetic computation.  
The Critter Chip is imagined in its input/output specification, 
generating metabolic reactions that produce output quantities of 
proteins as a function of input quantities of hydrocarbons. Through 
the process of writing and compiling code in bacteria’s DNA it is 
possible for iterative constructs such as while loops and for loops to be 
implemented on the Critter Chip, based on a clocking mechanism. 
 The results are mapped onto specific biochemical reactions selected 
from libraries — a task analogous to machine language compilation.5
 According to Cisco, there will be 50 billion devices connected 
to the network by 2020.6 Many of which will be living sensors such 
as Critter Chips. In Vincent’s speculative scene, the Critter Chips are 
enrolled as part of a networked computational ensemble, producing  
a fluorescent shimmering glow, to make intense the most harmful,  
yet unknown, unquantifiable, unrecognizable, unmatchable traces of 
waste, specifically so they can [re]enter capital circulation as data.  
I am left to wonder what is brought into play by the “temporal or 
immaterial dimensions of matter” (Yusoff 2013, 2).
 In this spectral vision, as petrochemicals from industry and 
production circulate, they appear, fleetingly, as glowing traces illumi-
nated by the metabolic process of microbes. The shimmers here  
are literal and material affective variables, which pattern the flows  
of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. Whereas the Critter Chips  
of Oak laboratory were imagined to operate in small independent 
mesh configurations, the Critter Chips in Vincent’s lab will most likely 
operate in networks, where hub nodes collect and aggregate data 
using machine-learning algorithms from ensembles of geographically 
distributed sensors. It is in these sites of computation, which are at 
the edges of human perception, where much of toxic execution will 
take place. Lauren Berlant notes, “[q]ueer, socialist/anti-capitalist, and 
feminist work has all been about multiplying the ways we know that 
people have lived and can live, so that it would be possible to take 
up any number of positions during and in life in order to have ‘a life’” 
(Berlant 2011, 182). As I leave the lab that evening and return the next 
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morning I find myself caught within, and approaching, the entangle-
ments of Critter Chips as instruments of difference, arrested within the 
theoretical metaphors that open up the possibilities of going beyond, 
discourses of purity and originals, yet also caught within the very 
different lived experience of the Critter Chips. I am hustling between 
formations that are metaphorical and formations that are literal. 
Continuous Expiration
From the 1930s onwards computation (in technical terms) has on the 
whole been recognised as the execution of halting Turing machines 
or their equivalents. Although other models of computation such as 
recursive functions, rewriting rules and lambda-calculus could have 
been taken up, the restriction of computation as the execution of a 
machine that stops or concludes — so called halting machines — takes 
hold (Denning 2010). This was in part because of material constraints 
and in part because of what the practices of computing demanded. 
It was more common than not for algorithms to be terminal, in other 
words to implement functions, to compute defined values. Critter Chips 
are however based on interactivity that involves an instantiation of 
algorithms in the environment rather than a reaching of a resolution.  
As Parisi notes, 
[f]rom the standpoint of interaction, the successful running  
of an algorithm is a performance in the environment  
(i.e. computation is embedded in the world) and of the  
environment (i.e. computation needs the world and the  
data extracted from it to fulfill the algorithmic task).  
(Parisi 2014, 121)
As interactive processes, the imaginaries and practices that propel 
Critter Chips demand a different computation to that of a final value. 
Compared to the Turing machine, Critter Chips take on a different  
set of characteristics, as they are entanglements of interactive 
processes, so-called natural information processes, which are 
imagined as — but not necessarily enacted as — continuous processes. 
In order to achieve this near continuity, the execution of interactive 
processes in Critter Chips instantiates itself across computational 
and metabolic processes. The temporality of the termination of these 
processes is quite different to that of a Turing Machine. The Critter 
Chip is not designed to perform halting executions that resolve 
calculations; instead the Critter Chips are (until the expiration date) 
non-terminating processes in which the fluorescent signals are read 
by the Chip and sent across the network continuously. Instead of the 
halting machine reaching a resolved number, in Critter Chips, signals 
continue until the expiration of the Critter Chips of the microbe,  
which is a significantly different process. 
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 Petrochemicals have become a focus of increasing concern for 
human and environmental health over the past two decades. However, 
the effects of thousands of chemicals still remain unknowable. As 
Michelle Murphy notes, spatial and temporal industrially produced 
chemicals, “are regulated and ignored, studied and yet filled 
with uncertainty” (Murphy 2013, 105). As Vincent and I watch the 
centrifugal machine spin we discuss how Critter Chips are propelled 
by this uncertainty. He explains that the advantage of using a Critter 
Chip instead of an electrochemical sensor is that it is not limited 
to signaling one chemical of an oil spill but rather, because of the 
microbes’ capacity for injury in response to a wide range of toxins, it 
is able to further signal the toxicity of a range of known and unknown 
compounds that are similar to naphthalene. As Vincent demonstrates  
to me in a petri dish, the Critter Chip is designed to signal the 
presence of petrochemical compounds that may be unknown, as 
well as chemicals already defined as petrochemicals. Those that are 
unknown may remain indeterminate, except for the injury that signals 
their presence. Rather than determining the presence of a specific 
chemical, the Critter Chip exhibits affects that can be attributed to 
toxicity. It is this quality of tracing affects, and existing within the 
unknowable, that makes the Critter Chip quicker and cheaper than 
other types of computational sensing. 
 Through execution across the domains of the biological, 
geological (fossil fuels) and the technical, the Critter Chip expands 
the temporal and spatial possibilities for the exchange of information. 
It could be envisaged that the Critter Chip is an extension of a 
cybernetic imaginary, one in which microbes are machines, and input 
and output need not be in the form of numbers or diagrams but sense 
organs read by ultra rapid computing machines such as imagined  
by Norbert Weiner (Weiner, 1948, 36). However the Critter Chip is  
not an ensemble that employs the HK44 because it is the same as  
the machine but instead because they are different from each other. 
In On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects Gilbert Simondon 
outlines a philosophy of technology that pays close attention 
relationally to “actual difference, techniques, apparatuses and 
paradigms” (Combes 2013, 89). Simondon’s theory of technical objects 
accounts for the important differences between “living” (humans, 
nonhuman animals, plants) and technical elements. In part, his focus 
on difference was a response to cybernetic theories of his time that 
had undertaken a shift from merely comparing animals with machines 
analogically, to making the much stronger claim that animals are 
machines. In cybernetics, these claims of animals as machines were 
used to envision ensembles of computers and biotic subjects. However 
for Simondon matter, organism and machine are different, “they can 
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even be said to be ontologically different, but within an ontology that 
methodologically avoids dualism and substantialism” (LaMarre 2013, 
80). It is under these circumstances that I want to suggest that the 
instantiation of computation across metabolic processes is more akin to 
the “enhancement” of the machine through differentiation that enables 
an increase in sensitivity to information, as opposed to a cybernetic 
model. Simondon outlines extending the margins of indeterminacy in 
the technological ensemble, noting “[i]t is such a margin that allows 
for the machine’s sensitivity to outside information. It is this sensitivity 
to information on the part of machines, much more than any increase 
in automatism that makes possible a technical ensemble” (Simondon 
1958, 13). However Critter Chips are by no means what Simondon 
describes as an open machine with freedom of operation.7 Instead 
the Critter Chip only increases the margin of indeterminacy at critical 
moments in its operations, and at other points the meshing of organism 
and chip restricts the margin. It is the restriction that holds the HK44 
in its enduring state and enables a certain level of performance as 
a sensor. It is this double bind that is exploited in the Critter Chip 
ensemble and renders the HK44 semi-living. The microbial processes 
of the HK44 open up the sensitivity of the technological ensemble yet 
are also moments of injury. The practices of computation command  
that the HK44 are genetically engineered around its ability to 
temporally localise its indeterminacy at critical moments in the 
computational process, such as its ability to shimmer in the presence 
of toxicity. At other critical moments, HK44 has to be able to do less, 
to live less, in order to remain enduring, that is to be more component 
like and less life like within the technical ensemble. Under the glare 
of advanced capitalism in which nature, commerce and politics 
are explicitly entangled, the use of HK44 to extend the margins of 
indeterminacy points to the ways in which toxicity “straddles the 
boundaries of life and non life as well as the literal bounds of bodies  
in ways that introduce a certain complexity of integrity of either lively 
or deathly subjects” (Chen 2012, 4096). 
 Through extension into biotic subjects, toxic execution (both 
applied and speculative) extends the horizon of calculation to include 
protein production, metabolisms and nonhuman variation. Yet it is the 
same innovative capacities that have the potential to extend calculation 
that also limit the HK44 to life lived for the Critter Chip, constraining 
its possibilities for life. As Steven Shaviro (after Whitehead) notes, life 
cannot be understood as a matter of continuity or endurance, “[r]ather 
an entitiy is alive precisely to the extent that it envisions difference  
and thereby strives for something other than the mere continuation of 
what it already is”(Shaviro 2010, 113).
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Enduring States
The primary feature of toxic execution is not generalised interactions 
that lead to some kind of fusion of all that there is, or a mass 
entanglement or the biological, geological and technical. On the 
contrary, the microbial organisms that toxic execution acts upon hold 
together in a specific mode of advanced capitalism in which they are 
not independent of a complex environment they partly shape, and 
upon which they depend, but is also constantly putting them at risk 
(Stengers 2006, 8). Specifically, toxic execution holds together in a way 
that generates value through its entanglements with petrochemicals, 
humans, nonhumans and the network. If, as Jennifer Gabrys notes, 
“[w]aste reveals the economies of value within digital technology” 
(Gabrys 2011, 17), toxic execution highlights the reclaiming of waste 
as producing value in computation. This value from human labour is 
inseparable from toxicity and critter chips. Mazen Labban outlines  
(in relation to microbial biotechnologies for fossil fuel extraction),  
that these processes produce “what neither can on its own”. This 
specific mode is a generation of capital from a wasting, “through which 
value is simultaneously created and reproduced, transferred and 
preserved, and extracted from waste and transformed into other forms 
of waste” (Labban 2014). Yet this injury is a double bond as it is the 
process by which the Critter Chip also persists. The constraint of both 
humans and nonhumans affected by toxic execution is most violently 
revealed in these states of suspension and liminality that Critter Chips 
are held in, violence that remains unaccounted for, in exchange for the 
hope of the predictive capacities of big data and intimacies with the 
environment. Thinking with toxicity, we can recognise that there is not 
a computational network that constitutes a technological outside to 
ecological life. Rather, toxic execution is the force that emerges from 
the collapse of subjects through their intra-actions with computation.
What seems important to retain is a fine sensitivity to the intersectional 
sites in which computation and petrochemicals involve themselves in 
very different lived (or partially lived) experiences. In the experience 
of the Critter Chip, the HK44 are not rendered as unproductive or 
dead immediately, but are held in a state of enduring productivity, 
by harnessing the affects of toxins as something quantifiable by 
computation. They become productive (more productive than a query 
run across a central processing unit), if only for a moment in a short-
lived life. Computation in this scene brings back into circulation all 
perceived wastes, which include toxic and queer subjects through their 
enrolment into productive roles.
 Critter Chips are scenes, in which computational execution is 
increasingly instantiated (in both a metaphysical and computational 
sense) by the extension of computation into nonhuman organisms.  
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That is, the bodies of nonhumans with carbon-based metabolisms 
emerge solely as entities to contain the execution which seeks to 
compile the innovativeness of organisms. This is not however another 
example of the parasitism of life by capital, but an engineering of,  
and extension of, vulnerability to execution.
 In the twenty-first century, Critter Chips emerge as part of a 
computational ensemble engineered to instantiate the formal rule of 
algorithms, with injury becoming a significant component of sensing. 
Critter Chips bring to the fore the ways in which advanced capitalism 
plugs organisms into systems of (big) data at the service of capital. 
Consequently it is from sustaining injury and prolonged death (rather 
than the exploitation of life) that capital extracts value. In doing so, 
toxic execution acts as a quantum torque simultaneously tightening  
and loosening on life.
*  *  *
Critter Compiler
How then might we speculate on ensembles of microbial organisms 
and computation otherwise? In the Critter Chip the HK44 exists for its 
capacity for injury. However as Lynn Margulis evidenced, microbial 
life played a unique role in establishing the biosphere and have 
a continued prominence in earth processes and signaling climate 
change (Margulis 1998; Hird 2009; Clark 2011). So then how might we 
open up the processes of execution to a freer relation with the amazing 
deeds of microbes? That is to enable microbes to exploit execution 
as manifestations of life and to “generate novel forms and behaviors, 
probe new pathways and spaced of possibility, proliferate itself”  
(Clark 2011, 42). 
 Critter Compiler is an experiment, a speculative artwork 
developed as a response to microbial computing otherwise, through 
a more unruly process of compilation. Critter Compiler exploits the 
heat generated by execution of a recurrent neural network to train 
a novella writing algorithm, which in turn provides the heat needed 
for algae to proliferate. As computation is executed the central 
processing unit (CPU) processes much of the activity that takes place 
in the computer—and as this happens, heat is emitted, to the point that 
the execution processes can cause the CPU to overheat or burst into 
flames. Recursively, as the algae pass over the CPU it cools it, affecting 
its processing speed, which in turn effects both the algae growth  
and the novel-writing process.
 Whereas Critter Chips are harnessed in semi-living states  
to signal toxicity, Critter Compiler is an unruly multitude of algae  
microbes and computational processes. Critter Chips are 
249
CRITTER COMPILER
always-already proceeding towards harm for capital. Instead, and  
as a form of punk solidarity, Critter Compiler enlists the process of 
execution to promote unruly growth of microbial life. Yet although  
this is a fabulation, just as “the vast majority of microbial intra- 
actions have nothing to do with humans” (Hird 2009, 2), much of the 
processes of Critter Compiler are similarly inaccessible to us.  
Instead of approaching microbial life as a resource to measure and 
extract data from, Critter Compiler is an engagement with processes  
of execution that attempts to generate a non-profit-oriented 
experiment.
 
 In the case of the Critter Compiler, the machine learning algorithm 
learns its writing style at a character-based level from George Eliot’s 
vast novel, Middlemarch (1871-72), which is both “A Study of Provincial 
Life” and a meditation on social and political justice. Therefore, 
whilst some machine learning algorithms might have been trained 
for efficiency, financialisation, attention on individuals and profit, 
Critter Compiler is trained by a novel that conveys how we live in a 
world in which we are all bound in a huge web—and if one pulls one 
way or another someone or something is affected. Consequently, in 
Middlemarch all events, even the smallest or most everyday ones, are 
connected to planetary flows — much like microbial life. In addition 
in Critter Compiler the characters are not all human, and their 
genders are not fixed. In our algorithm, algae species and other lively 
nonhumans replace human characters. The audience-participant is a 
witness to this story, which unfolds between us, aquaspheres, politics, 
global climate change, and algae. Starting at the genealogy of injury 
but not lingering there, Critter Compiler is a small experiment in 
Figure 2. Critter Compiler in training. Pritchard (2016
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practices of execution that contributes a set of possible ethno-political 
practices for microbial computing and life itself, while resisting the 
production of ever new reparative fantasies of ecological life within 
networks. 
Notes
1. http://www.theatlantic.com/
photo/2014/03/the-exxon-valdez-oil-
spill-25-years-ago-today/100703/. 
2. This is a semi-fictional account 
based on archival research, patent 
research and my own lab research in 
2013. 
3. For a further discussion see the 
panel convened with Elizabeth R. 
Johnson “Bioaccumulation: Re-valuing 
life in the Anthropocene”, Association 
of American Geographers (AAG) 
Annual Meeting, San Francisco , 2016 
and https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/
cgi-bin/webadmin?A2=CRIT-GEOG-
FORUM;27909dfd.1509. Thanks are also 
due to Kathryn Yusoff, Johnson and Mazen 
Labban for their feedback on my paper 
presented on this panel. 
4. For example Haraway’s exquisite 
story of meeting, feeling and listening 
together during agility training with 
Cayenne (2007); or Eva Hayward’s 
evocative engagements with cup corals, 
that explore multispecies sensorial 
ensembles and unruly provocations 
(2010).
5. See Shea et al. (2010) for a 
discussion on the modularization and 
abstraction of synthetic biology.
6.http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/
en_us/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_
IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
7. For a parallel discussion that 
pays close attention to the widening 
of the margin of indeterminacy as an 
intervention that might enable greater 
freedoms of operation in technical 
ensembles see Jennifer Gabrys’s 
eloquent account in Program Earth 
(Gabrys 2016, 256–258).
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Shrimping under Working 
Conditions
Francisco Gallardo & Audrey Samson
We propose that mutated forms of death are emerging with 
neoliberalism’s biopolitical financialisation of life. Thinking of such 
forms as commercial extinction and social death, how do we begin  
to frame these outside of a quantified rhetoric of surplus? These 
questions aim to provoke a discussion about these terms that can 
be interpreted as modes of exhaustion, while maintaining particular 
biological, social or economic conditions of life. When we are 
confronted with capitalism’s failure to fulfil resource exhaustion, a 
model of conservation by dispossession1 might emerge within what 
Rosi Braidotti calls “new and subtler degrees of death and extinction” 
(2013, 115). In this text we want to think with other conditions of  
death and extinction that can help to move beyond the missing item of 
an inventory, a carved rock along a fossil road or a set of pre-emptive 
actions to be executed beyond a certain threshold. Thus, we ask if  
there could be figures, which rather than narrating death as a 
biological or geological concept, open it up to other equally violent 
forces that are nevertheless materially situated. More importantly,  
will we ever be able to think of extinction beyond ideas of absence  
or frame death from social or economic realms as an emerging mode 
of living? In order to address many of these questions we dissect a 
critical example of extinction, that of the brown shrimp (Crangon 
crangon) as it flips between commercial (albeit not yet biotic) death  
in the ex-fishing grounds of the South East corner of the UK, and  
the social death embedded in the labour-power of the ex-processing 
factories of the Special Economic Zones of Tangier and Tetuan in 
Morocco.
Crangon crangon: the Undine of neoliberal numbers
Let us start by saying that certain forms of devastation can be inter-
preted as a condition of being worn out towards the maintenance  
of life.2 We understand devastation following Gilbert Simondon’s 
formulation of the term “deadening”. For Simondon, there are different 
modes of death, one of which is productive and integrated in the 
process of life (Barthélémy 2015, 48–49). In other words, in opposition 
to adverse death, there is a death that has a constitutive role in life 
itself. In this light, we want to differentiate our argument from others, 
such as those sustained by Elizabeth Povinelli (2016), for whom  
death is opposed to the notion of population — a group formed by 
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individuals of the same species sharing the same geographical loca-
tion.3 In this section, we discuss the ways in which — under neoliberal 
conditions—there are modes of death that do not oppose this concept 
of population. It is rather the deadening of a certain population that 
grants its survival. However, while Simondon’s deadening considers 
the individual and its processes of individuation, our comments are 
focused around devastation as connective tissue between deadening 
and population.
 By devastation we refer specifically to the survival strategy of  
a certain marine organism, the brown shrimp. Contrary to the survival 
strategies of most organisms, the brown shrimp sits ambiguously 
between wasteful redundancy and catastrophe. Populations school 
in the soft bottom of shallow coastal waters and are subjected to the 
strong tidal forces of the North Sea. Female shrimp reach maturity  
at ten months, after which they spawn millions of offspring twice a year. 
Densities of sixty individuals per square metre of seabed are common 
to find. C. crangon is a predator to young fish and crustaceans, by  
which it is later preyed upon. However, maritime predators such as 
whiting or sole, given their low tolerance to satiety, quickly assimilate 
large numbers of immature offspring (Campos 2012). Such mechanisms 
of quick turnaround and fast maturity sit at the core of sociobiology, 
linking what some experts term the “dilution effect” (Howard 1971)  
and “predator-saturation” (Molles 1999). In summary, the presence  
of any individual is diluted by the large cloud of a population, hence  
its risk to be predated is diminished. In other words, the brown  
shrimp finds safety in sheer numbers by feeding its predators with  
its neighbours. Rioting fecundity in addition to group living are forced 
mechanisms in order to cope with predatory pressure. For shrimp,  
the optimism transpiring from the force of maintaining population  
rests upon modes of quick death and wasteful life.
 Such forces of devastation and optimism were at play in nine-
teenth-century efforts to reduce evolution by natural selection to a 
set of arithmetical questions (Magnello 1993). At that time, Charles 
Darwin’s ideas posed a strong emphasis on deviation, a concept  
that was often unwanted and ignored, escaping mathematisation alto-
gether until then. At the theoretical level, Darwin maintained that  
variation (deviation from the norm) was meaningful and hence should 
be accounted for, as variation allowed tracing species back to the  
tree of life. However, as Eileen Magnello (2011) reminds us, Darwin’s 
biological variation required two key changes within the discipline of 
statistics. First, to regard variation as a resource, not as a source of  
error,4 and second, the notion of biological species needed to be 
defined not as average individuals but in terms of population. That is, 
a group that shares a geographical location and is formed of variating 
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individuals. However, even though Darwin introduced various types of 
mathematical tools that could be used to that effect, statistical methods 
remained at the level of sophistication of the rule of three (Magnello 
2011, 34). As eugenicist and mathe-matician Karl Pearson declared, 
“every idea of Darwin, from variation, natural selection, inheritance to 
reversion, seemed to demand statistical analyses” (1901, 3).
 Two thousand nine hundred and eighty brown shrimp from 
Sheerness and Plymouth were carefully counted, painfully peeled, 
measured and dissected by biologist Raphael Weldon during his 
stays at the Laboratory of Marine Biological Association at Plymouth 
(Pearson, 2011). C. crangon accumulates small changes rapidly  
through generations that are visible to the unaided eye. For each 
shrimp, Weldon took four measurements, concentrating on the main 
body parts (carapace, tergum and telson) (Weldon 1892). In order  
to deal with such an immense wealth of data, mathematician Pearson,  
a collaborator and close friend of Weldon, developed a standardised 
system of frequency distributions. Deviation, accumulated visibly 
through the rapid and wasteful life cycle of the shrimp thus provided 
the means necessary to develop mathematically-based statistics. 
Techniques such as correlation, regression and goodness-of-fit,5  
all having deviation as a core, permitted systems of comparison 
and generalisation that were previously impossible. Evolution was 
no longer a matter of “causalisation”, that is, cause and effect, but 
of correlation. Nature was not a matter of collective things that hold 
through aggregates of individuals. In Alain Desrosière’s words,  
nature became a “thing that holds” (2010, 30).
The offspring of extinction
According to historical records, the lucrative business of brown shrimp 
first came into effect after the exhaustion of more valuable fisheries  
in the Thames Estuary such as oyster or cod (Lewis 1831). By the 1850s, 
the Leigh shrimp-net had become the main predator of the brown 
shrimp. During the age of sail, vessels were timed by the clock of the 
tide. The sandy shoals from the north bank of the Thames Estuary to the 
Nore were trawled by “bawleys”6 or cutter-rigged smacks,7 powered 
by westerly winds, and later by steam trawlers. Using from two to  
four beam-trawls at a time, they were kept down up to an hour or more 
at a time, depending on the extent of ground and sailing conditions 
(Holdsworth 1877). At the sail-age, this trade employed nearly one 
hundred boats with a crew of two, mostly during the summer months 
when wind and weather conditions are usually more favourable.
 Today, after years of heavy trawling, shrimp fishing has become 
a rare activity in the Thames Estuary. The dwindling density of shrimp 
grounds is to blame, in conjunction with sharp rises in fuel prices.  
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It could be said that together these have pushed the brown shrimp 
out from the Thames Estuary. As business jargon would have it, brown 
shrimp is, for most intents and purposes, commercially extinct. This 
is not a matter of concern for conservation, as other fishing grounds 
fill the guts of the national and continental seafood market, such as 
those of the Wash, Morecambe Bay and the Solway Firth. Commercial 
extinction is a concept rather than a fact. Every individual that is 
plucked from the seabed is virtually the last one, though this does 
not necessarily infer crisis. The commercial extinction of the brown 
shrimp is a force that helps to bring other fields such as statistics, 
economics or technology, among others, into more traditional accounts 
of extinction, which are restricted mostly to geology and biology. 
Commercial extinction still pertains almost exclusively to the concept 
of population measure. However, this mode of extinction can be better 
understood through the notion of environmentality (Agrawal 2005), 
which emphasises population within a space of financial power and  
the financialisation of life.
 As the phrase implies, commercial extinction defines death 
from economic, social or cultural realms but not from the total 
(virtual) biotic inventory of marine life. It is acceptable loss, or 
better, a comfortable form of catastrophe.8 Drawing from Lauren 
Berlant, commercial extinction can be understood as a form a “slow 
death”, in the way in which it implies a “mass physical attenuation 
under global/national regimes of capitalist structural subordination 
and governmentality” (2007, 754). This mode of extinction shows, 
opposing Maurizio Lazzarato’s reading of extinction (2014), that the 
destructive nature of capital is relative, not absolute. While commercial 
extinction still reduces something like a fishing ground to a mere 
object of exploitation, it shows the very exhaustion of exhaustion. 
The commercial extinction of the brown shrimp collates what most 
addresses of extinction fail to do: to underline the failure of capitalism 
to consume, or to fulfil extinction. It infers that a slow mode of 
deadening is a possible mode of living. In short, the shrimp is still 
there, but it is not sufficiently there. After all, there are certain things 
that cannot be extinguished entirely within capitalism, such  
as unemployment.9
 With neither biopolitics nor necropolitics fully capable of 
discerning between life, death and non-life, Povinelli (2016) puts 
forward her own three figures of extinction: the desert, the animist and 
the virus. The desert is a geographical entity denuded of life, though 
it can regain it. The animist collapses this division as nonsensical. 
Everything is alive. The virus gags at the notion of life; as for a virus 
it is the difference that makes no difference (Povinelli 2016, 14–18). 
These three figures interrogate extinction and help to think with them 
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through different discourses, questions and problems. In Povinelli’s 
words, they do not reproduce the division between life and nonlife so 
relevant in the current modes of thought and practice that define late 
liberalism (2014).10
 As compelling as Povinelli’s figures are, they do not address the 
questions that commercial extinction might raise for us. By posing  
new figures within the realm of the brown shrimp’s commercial 
extinction, we want to bring forward the notion of deadening within  
a neoliberal order as a mode of life and/or living. After all, a survey  
of species catalogued under the label of commercial extinction reveals 
that most of them are to be found in the ocean. This to us seems quite 
fitting, given that, as Christopher Connery notes, “[the ocean] is 
capital’s favored myth element” (1994, 56).
 Here we would like to propose the trawl, the price of liquid fuel 
and the railway as figures of commercial extinction. Petrol replaced 
altogether other traditional forms of power such as the cumbersome 
cotton sails and, later on, steam-coal. Formed by hydrocarbon chains 
of lesser complexity, hence of higher caloric content,11 liquid fuel 
helped to detach horsepower from the power of a horse; a carrying 
capacity that affords greater dragging and heavier gear. However, as 
Timothy Mitchell (2011) argues, it was liquid fuel’s physio-chemical 
properties that became constitutive of political agency. In other words, 
liquid fuel is easier to manipulate, distribute and store. Oilfields, 
pipelines, refineries and pumping stations are by effect, and by design, 
immune to organised labour, unlike the systems that had governed the 
extraction and distribution of coal (Mitchell 2011, 108). Turner Prize 
artist Jeremy Deller would find his petrol-equivalent Battle of Orgreave 
(2010) re-enacted with slight differences at every peak in oil-price  
in the form of mass-killings.
 The best way to catch a cloud of brown shrimp is with another 
cloud. Throughout seven centuries, the trawl’s evolution as a technical 
object has afforded thicker and more turbid clouds of detritus, deposits 
and by-catch. When alarmed, C. crangon buries itself in the sand with  
a fan-like tail movement. However, under vibratory stimulus such as  
a predator’s presence — i.e. cod, or the approaching bottom contact  
of a pounding beam — it is known to trigger a startle escape response.  
The trawler’s bottom contact has widened seven fold from the early 
beam-trawls of Barking,12 which later developed into tickler chains, 
chain matrices, bobbin ropes and the otter trawl.13 Gear for white  
and pink shrimp in the distant bays of Florida can deploy otter trawls 
with each door weighing almost a tonne and a net spanning thirty 
metres. As the pounding of a beam or chain approaches, the shrimp 
spring upwards, clearing the bottom bar and jumping straight into  
the net. 
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 The combustion engine reminds us that supply and demand 
were not always related. Railways dithered to appreciate the radical 
potential their system could have on the marketisation of highly 
perishable commodity. Railway industries originally focused on high-
tariff fish traffic such as large cod, sole and turbot (Robinson 1986). 
Shipments integrating multiple companies were awkward at first. 
Too far from waterways and shorelines, it wasn’t uncommon to see 
supply glutting markets at the same time as severe shortages, caused 
primarily by poor harvests. Cobles14 would be laid up and tons of 
protein-rich white fish dung were sown over vast fields. However,  
as some historians have noticed, increases in the trawled-fish trade 
were related to the construction of railways (Blackman 1992). Robb 
Robinson (1986, 32) brings to attention the correlation between  
the opening of the North Sea to trawling in the nineteenth century  
with the explosive construction of railway infrastructure, dubbed as  
the two railways mania.15 The expansion of the railway was needed  
for the overabundance of fresh fish that trawling could deliver in order 
to grow, while at the same time the trawling industry needed a mode  
of connection between ports and markets.
 At the dawn of the twentieth century, traditional Greek boat-
building knowledge couples the figures of extinction into what 
is today the modern trawler (Edenfield 2014) — a.k.a. the world’s 
most disruptive, as well as the most economically productive, 
fishing technology.16 Austrian artist duo Ubermorgen have used the 
mediagenic capital of British Petroleum’s (BP) Deep Horizon explosion 
and subsequent spill catastrophe as material.17 Pointing at abundant 
aerial images captured during this dramatic episode, they claimed  
the return of oil as “the supreme discipline of art” (Ubermorgen 2010). 
For the artists, this comeback had forced oil painting to evolve into  
a kind of sickly generative bio-art.18 Similarly to Ubermorgen, we 
would like to consider the scraping and digging of the roots of seabed 
life by trawlers to be the Earth’s biggest work of printmaking. Trawl 
marks remain observable by side scan sonar two years after they were 
first ploughed. It is perhaps more cynical that these scars remain while 
shrimp schools are generally too hard to ensonify by echo-sound.  
A shrimp is too small a target and lacks an air bladder,19 unlike most 
fish. One step ahead of Andy Warhol’s famous efforts to mechanise  
and automatise the work of art, the three figures of commercial 
extinction — the trawl, the price of liquid fuel and the railway — turn 
into art the work of mechanisation and automation. Freed from the 
clock of the tide, these figures have left trails and carvings, many of 
them visible to satellites and SONAR.20
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Peeling
The collagen-rich shell of the brown shrimp sits at one of the last 
frontiers of mechanisation. The shrimp’s abdomen is largely filled  
with muscle and connective tissue. Comprising almost half of the  
total shrimp’s weight, it accounts for a powerful muscle used only  
in predator avoidance. While protein bonds in the epidermis 21  
are known, the route resulting in the breaking of such bonds is not  
well understood yet (Crawford 1980). Currently, the processing of 
shrimp covers a multi-step process, including the ageing step before 
peeling, which takes up to six days and occurs partially during 
transportation to the peeling factory. Ageing loosens meat from the 
shell as a result of the breaking of protein bonds in the membrane 
before peeling by hand. So far, and despite repeated engineering 
efforts, peeling has escaped mechanisation all together. Unlike  
other kinds of shrimps, the brown shrimp still requires the dexterous 
thin fingers of unskilled, typically female workers (Perez 2010;  
RNW 2010). To a certain extent, the brown shrimp claims that there 
are still some limits to the ability of mechanisation to take command 
(Giedion 1970).
 The processing of brown shrimp sailed away from Europe in 
the early 1990s. In the mid 1980s, The Netherlands banned shrimp 
hand peeling altogether when a dysentery outbreak killed fourteen 
homeworkers (Kayser and Mosel 1984).22 As a result, shrimp 
processing was offshored from Dutch unregulated work-homes to  
the uncontrolled outskirts of Europe. They moved first to Bulgaria 
and Poland. However, after the constitution of the Economic European 
Area limits, companies needed to scout still further for cheap labour, 
creating offshore and nearshore23 hubs. The Free Trade Zones of 
Tangier and Tetuan in the early 2000s became the new bastion for  
the neoliberation of many economic activities servicing the single 
market, shellfish manufacturing being one among many.
 As claimed by Aihwa Ong (2006) and Michel Feher (2014), 
neoliberalism promises the extinction of manual labour by the  
ghostly workings of its invisible hands. The recipe is apparently 
simple. It first requires the implementation of temporal “sacrifice 
zones of exception” in clogged economies, or as the authors reframe 
them: UNDER economies — economies rated as Underperforming, 
Non-Developed, Expropriate-able or Ruined (Toban et al 2014). 
Industrial capitalism was originally imported into these regions  
by promising the transfer of technical and capital knowledge in 
exchange for the capitulation of labour protection, duty impositions 
and environmental regulations, among others. The current promise  
for these zones is that the industrial economy will be absolved by  
a financial substitute: advanced capitalism. The former international 
SHRIMPING UNDER WORKING CONDITIONS
260
EXECUTING PRACTICES
zone of Tangiers is now emerging as a host to offshore banking 
activities resembling those of Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Bahrain, 
Luxembourg or the Cayman Islands.
 In the field of photography, Allan Sekula (2014) reflected upon 
the threat of the automatisation of the image as opposed to the iconic 
significance of the organ of drawing. He highlighted Roland Barthes’ 
(1980) protesting of the ubiquitous presence of the human hand in 
Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, published in France between 
1751 and 1772. In many plates, hands without bodies accompanied  
the encyclopaedic objects, almost as another component, in each 
complex mechanism or artisanal work. From Sekula’s remarks, it is 
not difficult to see how these plates were, perhaps unintentionally, 
turning every citizen—or better every hand—into a kind of 
expendable technological organ. Transferring this reflection to a 
more contemporary economic order, hands could be said to be the 
“sacrifice zones” marketed for the promises of a new economic order. 
The exploitation of forms of inhuman energy can be understood as 
another way to understand “slow (social) death”. As an aside, it might 
be useful to recall the role that the hand has played in processes of 
criminalisation and/or socialisation. Jailed prostitutes were put in 
forced workhouses to pick oakum in nineteenth century England 
(Mayhew and Binny 2011, x). Homosexuals were sent without trial 
to stitch soccer balls in Spain under Francisco Franco’s dictatorship 
(Ugarte 2005). The hysterical woman was medicated by the 
masturbating hand of the psychotherapist, or what Foucault referred 
to as the “laying on of hands” (Micale 2008). Against the optimistic 
rhetoric of progress, repetitive, menial and injuring tasks have been 
a weapon throughout history for the re-socialisation of outcasts, 
sexual deviants and prostitutes.24 These moving limbs are part of the 
execution of neoliberal systems’ fetishising traditional labour power 
in order to lead to a new order from the industrial capitalism of the 
labouring hands in which money would be created out of money 
(Mulvey 1993).
Conclusion: Death as a mode of living
Do not despair. The destructive nature of capitalism under neolib-
eralism is not absolute, but relative. “[N]ew and subtler degrees of 
extinction” are mobilised by new practices of “life” (Braidotti 2007,  
2). Throughout this chapter we have introduced several instances  
of operative modes of death. We are particularly drawn by those 
that consider the exhaustion of exhaustion, such as in the concept 
of commercial extinction. In this light, commercial extinction is an 
example of exception to the concept of extinction. The life-cycle  
of the commercially extinct brown shrimp, C. crangon, is based on 
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quick turn-around and group living as a way to reduce predatory  
risk. In fact, such a life-cycle was key to the mathematisation of 
Darwin’s ideas of evolution by natural selection. It helped to kickstart  
a revolution in statistics that rely on the appreciation and translation  
of variation to a set of arithmetic questions. Together with our protago-
nist, C. crangon, we re-staged commercial extinction in such a way  
so as to open it up to a wider process of movements by our proposed 
three figures of extinction. These key players in the emerging modes  
of neoliberal death bring forth the notion that economic life can  
also be a threatening force in a discourse usually focused on biology 
and geology.
 The collagen-rich shell of the brown shrimp is an exception  
to the long assumed command of mechanisation (Giedion 1970).  
The peeling of brown shrimp still demands the dexterous hands  
of unskilled labour power in the Special Economic Zones of 
Tangier-Med, in Morocco. For us, the execution of neoliberal forces 
relies on both industrial capitalism and its financial counterpart, 
represented in this chapter by the invisible and the labouring  
hand. What are these hands without bodies executing? Conservation  
and dispossession become associated tropes by which movement  
of capital and accumulation are measured and defined. With forms  
of deadening emerging through neoliberalism, death as a mode  
of living invites us to consider the maintenance of economic life 
through social death and commercial extinction as operative. In short, 
comfortable forms of catastrophe.
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Notes
1. Ten year ago, Marxist geographer 
David Harvey introduced the motto 
“accumulation by dispossession”  
in various texts (2003, 2004). With 
it, Harvey described that under 
neoliberalism, capitalism best operates 
not by developing modes of creating 
wealth, but by divesting it from its source. 
More current work on this direction 
highlights the role of sustainable 
models (the economics of ecosystems, 
biodiversity, the Green Economy, etc.)  
as a more stable mode of accumulation  
— accumulation by securitization, 
or accumulation by conservation 
(Büscher and Flecher 2015; Massé and 
Lunstrum 2009). With conservation by 
dispossession we want to place the 
emphasis on the contradiction not of 
extorting nature to pay for itself. We are 
trying to address modes of conservation 
outside of conservation, or conservation 
not as an end but as a by-product.
2. As Gerry Melino (2002) points 
out, part of the explanation for the slow 
understanding of apoptosis processes 
lays in its mode of execution. Apoptosis 
is a process of controlled cellular death 
which occurs twenty times as fast as 
cell division or differentiation, well 
below of the limit of detection. Unlike its 
counterpart necrosis, unprogrammed 
or premature death, apoptosis leaves no 
residues.
3. In discussing the concept of 
extinction, Elizabeth Povinelli (2014) 
explains that the opposite of species is 
not death, but non-life. The opposite of 
population is not non-life, but death.
4. As Alain Desrosières (1998, 
103–105) explains, vital statistics such 
as those in Robert Malthus, Adolphe 
Quatelet or Émile Durkheim emphasised 
means and averages, thus treating 
deviation from the mean as a source of 
error.
5. Goodness of fit test, also known  
as chi-square test, is used to determine 
sample data consistency in the face  
of a hypothesised distribution. See 
http://stattrek.com/chi-square-test/
goodness-of-fit.aspx?Tutorial=AP for 
details.
6. According to E. W. White (2013),  
the development of this type of boat  
is uncertain. It is originally from the 
North side of the Thames Estuary and 
usually referred as the Thames shrimper. 
Its developments are associated with 
the Thames “Peter-boat”. Early bawleys 
were clincher-built and contained a 
wet-well to keep the cargo alive.  
A later development type of bawley  
was carvel-built, which reduced hull 
friction against the water. The well was 
later supplanted by a copper cauldron,  
hereby preparing the catch for the 
market. The name bawley is speculated 
as being a corruption of the English 
for boiler, in reference to the on-board 
boiling apparatus.
7. A rig refers to the arrangement  
of types of sails, lines and mast(s) in 
order to harness wind power. A cutter-
rigged watercraft is characterised  
for its speed and sail manoeuvrability.  
This rig allows turning windward in 
an easier fashion than any other kind 
of rigging. It is especially suitable for 
navigation on creeks, under shallow 
waters and against strong tides. On the 
other hand, they are poorly suited for 
fishing purposes (White 2013, 16).
8. Derrida worked in his last years 
on the subject of thought extinction as 
consequence of impending nuclear 
catastrophe. (Derrida et al. 1984). 
Paradoxically, the threat of human 
extinction allowed a period of “military 
peace”. Conservationists have examined 
some of the odd ecological benefits 
of the Cold War, such as a reduced 
number of species invasion resulting 
from the interruption of trade between 
Eastern and Western Europe (Chiron et 
al. 2010). Another effect of the Cold War 
threat was, as Jacob Darwin Hamblin 
describes it (2013), the spawning of 
the environmental movement, as much 
of modern environmental thinking 
originated with the scientists and 
military strategists during the dark days 
of the cold war.
 9. Unemployment was a monetary 
policy first proposed by economist 
Milton Friedman under the concept of 
natural rate of unemployment. It was 
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successively expanded into what today  
is known as non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment, or NAIRU for 
short. The main underlying concept  
is that a certain level of unemployment  
is necessary to keep inflation low.  
See William Mitchell and Joan Muysken 
(2008).
10. Povinelli (2011) usually 
interchanges the concept of 
neoliberalism for late liberalism as 
a mode to highlight the continuity of 
the process, not the rupture naming. 
This argument is further developed in 
Povinelli, Coleman and Yusoff (2014).
11. The higher chemical complexity, 
the lower energy content (measured  
in unit of energy per unit of mass, 
i.e. Mj/Kg or j/g). Beyond fuel, drugs 
work similarly followed low chemical 
complexity higher effect.
12. The beam-trawl has it ancestor in 
England as “wondyrchoun”, as recorded 
by a Petition elevated by fisherman from 
Barking to the Parliament in 1376–77.  
The name is believed to be a 
deprecation of the Dutch words “wonder” 
and “shoe” or “sock”, which leaves us 
with the speculation of whether the 
genealogy of this technical object dates 
back to footwear customs.
13. In an otter trawl, two doors or  
otter boards function as underwater  
kites by generating and maintaining  
the spread of the net. For further  
details see Davis (1958).
14. The term coble refers to a type of 
open fishing boat, originally from the 
North East coast of England. The use of 
the term is currently extended to most 
fishing vessels. As in many working 
boats, the particular conditions in this 
area, such as prevailing winds, the 
hardness of the sea-floor, wave strength, 
tide, etc., are embedded in the adopted 
shape.
15. In order to give an indication of  
the magnitude for such a bubble, from 
1840 to 1846 (the effective end for this 
event) the proposed routes totalled 
9,500 miles of new railways. This 
mileage contrasts with the current UK 
railway network of around 11,000 miles 
(Wolmar 2009). Surprisingly enough, 
communication infrastructure bubbles  
or manias such as this one have occurred 
approximately every other century. 
First with the Canal Mania in the early 
eighteenth century, the Railway Mania 
of nineteenth century and the Telecom 
and Internet “dot-com” bubbles of the 
late twentieth century. Interestingly, 
the telecom boom was prompted after 
companies became aware that railway 
rights-of-way could be reused to install 
and service an extensive length of 
telecommunication network, affording 
low costs for fibre optic conduits.
16. The most economically important 
single species in the world by weight 
is the shrimp species Acetes japonicus, 
which is used in the production of the 
akiami paste shrimp in many countries 
around the Southeast Sea of China; see 
Rudloe & Rudloe (2009). The industry 
of trawling also produces the higher 
by-catch ratio (by-catch:shrimp), ranging 
from 2:1 in colder waters to 15:1 in 
tropical seas.
17. See Goriunova & Fuller (2017) on 
“Devastation”.
18. The amount of novel forms of life 
benefiting by the oil spill has been 
documented now to a great extent by,  
for instance, Dombrowski et al. (2016). 
Key to the findings are a higher than 
expected biodiversity of polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbon-degrading 
bacteria, chief among them being 
Alcanivorax borkumensis.
19. The air bladder in Osteichthyes  
or bonefish is an organ filled with gas  
for buoyancy control as well as 
producing and receiving sound, due  
to its resonating characteristics. It is 
usually located at the dorsal position,  
the mass centre is below the volume 
centre, hence acting as a stabilising 
system. J. Z. Young, in the Department of 
Anatomy of University College London, 
among others, points to swim bladders 
as the material of earliest contraceptive 
sheaths or condoms, even before  
sheep’s caeca. See Huxely (1957).
20. See Palanques et al. (2001).  
The biggest trawling gear, spanning  
30 m wide, can be, technically  
speaking, perceived from orbital 
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space. 30 m x 30 m is approximately the 
standard resolution of today’s satellite 
systems, such as the Landsat program 
used for meteorological purposes.
21. In anatomic studies of 
invertebrates such as in molluscs, 
crustaceans and echinoderms, epidermis 
usually refers to the membrane between 
the muscle or meat and the shell.
22. A small epidemic of dysentery 
caused by Shigella flexneri 2 occurred in 
the Netherland between December 25th, 
1983 and January 7th, 1984. It caused 
death in 14 patients. See Kayser and 
Mosel (1984).
23. Nearshoring zones are not 
much dissimilar to offshore zones. 
Predominantly, they are dedicated  
to outsourced service industries,  
i.e. call centres, banking, insurance 
or software maintenance. They have 
become increasingly popular due  
to the consumer pressure of moving 
beyond full globalisation. The first  
two nearshores of Tanger MED were 
created in 2007, a model that is  
planned to double by 2020.
24. See Mayhew and Binny (2011). 
Picking oakum is the colloquial term 
used when referring to the manual 
labour of untwisting and loosing old 
cords or ropes. Oakum, after tarring  
was used in sealing cast iron plumbs  
and caulking timber joints in wooden 
vessels and later on planking iron and 
steel ships. Under Spanish dictatorial 
regime, from 1954 to 1976 Spanish 
homosexuals were prosecuted and 
sentenced without trial under the  
‘Ley de Vagos y Maleantes’ [Vagrants  
and Crooks Act]. They were either  
sent to prisons on Badajoz or Huelva 
according to a sorting system between 
“actives” or “passives”. See Ugarte 
(2005).
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Afterword: Reverse Executions  
in the Internet of Things
Jennifer Gabrys
Execution, as the chapters in this collection demonstrate, is a process 
and condition that might unfurl through code, but also overspills the 
edges of code. The range of contributions included here addresses 
the ways in which code could be comparable to the law — or a 
suspension thereof; to effects that are productive of violence or 
political encounters; and to extended sites and ecologies where the 
performance of code remakes relations and materialities. What might 
begin as a set of instructions to be compiled and executed, then 
inevitably moves beyond the mere carrying out of commands to open 
into a wider set of considerations about the effects that computing  
has in the world. To “execute” is not simply to run a script to effect  
a particular action. It is also to activate a set of material-political 
relations and transformations. Yet this is less a deterministic operation, 
and more of a shifting set of encounters and contingencies that play  
out through the performance of execution.
 Among the many provocations and lines of analysis that emerge 
across the insightful chapters included here is a question that  
resonates across several contributions, namely: when does execution 
come up against the limit of the executable to become something  
else? Or, to put it another way, how does the process of execution 
create limit conditions or modes of “termination” that rework or even 
halt the ability to execute? This question could be asked in relation to 
the operations that code would set in action that fail to compute;  
or in relation to the environmental conditions that make the expansion 
of executions untenable; or in relation to the political effects of 
computation that enact violence or even murder; or in relation to the 
ability of processes of execution to destroy the very infrastructure 
of the executable. It is this last area that I would like to explore as a 
point of resonance through a discussion of the Internet of Things (IoT), 
and especially the Mirai botnet attack that has attempted to execute 
commands through IoT devices.
A dark disco with smart light bulbs
In his amusing primer, Abusing the Internet of Things, Nitesh Dhanjani 
provides an array of examples and simple steps for hacking and 
commanding IoT devices. An advanced home wireless lighting 
system, for instance, becomes an infrastructure through which to force 
blackouts or strobe lighting events by gaining control of the lighting 
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system. IoT extends and expands computation into everyday objects 
and environments, as well as infrastructures and control systems.  
At the same time, as computation runs through the fabric of everyday 
things, it also creates conditions for rerouting devices from their 
original programs of use. Security and web cameras can be easily 
hijacked through brute force attacks that allow remote access to real-
time video and audio feeds. Refrigerators can be commandeered to 
make perishables perish. Smart TVs and smart cars are similarly at 
risk, where display systems can be turned into monitoring devices,  
and vehicles can be made to veer off route. And farther afield, 
ice skating rinks with smart HVAC and refrigeration systems can 
be defrosted, energy systems can be shut down and life support 
equipment in hospitals can be powered off.  
 IoT devices often are not manufactured or developed with 
similar levels of security that are now routinely bundled into personal 
computers and mainstream operating systems. Smart things are 
typically cheaply made and sold with default passwords that are 
not changed by consumers, or that are hard coded into devices and 
so cannot be changed in the first place. Many IoT devices also use 
relatively open and accessible communication protocols, which can 
make it comparatively easy to gain access to a host. On one level, 
IoT seems to offer the promise of an enhanced ability to perform 
executions within everyday environments so as to realise efficiency, 
automation, sustainability and more. Yet on another level, this 
expanding array of devices opens up the ability to reverse engineer 
not just these things and their usual programs of use, but also to 
reverse execute the networked systems to which these things are 
connected and in so doing bring down larger infrastructures. 
 Malware, command injections and IP scanners are just part 
of the growing execution toolkit that has sprung up to enable the 
commandeering of IoT devices. Programming practices are then 
proliferating along with devices, with IoT offering up a tantalising  
array of executable options. Execution can as likely be about the 
proscribed commanding and controlling of devices as much as the 
prescribed operation of computational devices in environments,  
where there might seem to be a war of executions and executables 
unfolding. Within the Internet of Things, what programs are to be  
run? Who decides which programs are to be prioritised? And how  
are the conditions of the executable shifting to give rise to new 
problems of execution? 
Mirai: Executing the executable
Within this context of proliferating IoT devices and reverse executions, 
one particular bit of malware has gained attention for its ability to take 
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over a large number of vulnerable things. Mirai is the name of  
the malware that has taken command of security cameras and routers 
in order to create a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against 
websites and web hosts. From September to November 2016, the 
malware has been responsible for attacking a security journalist’s 
website, a French web hosting provider, a major domain name service 
(DNS) provider in the US (Dyn), home broadband routers in Germany 
and a telecom provider in Liberia. The Dyn DNS attack in the US on 
21 October 2016 made the biggest headlines, since its interruption 
affected sites including Twitter, Reddit and Netflix, among others. 
 Dyn’s account of the event suggests that over “100,000 malicious 
endpoints” were used in a botnet attack to disrupt their DNS 
infrastructure. DNS translates domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses so that the locating and organising of computer networks 
can operate more easily. The excess DDoS traffic, which some  
accounts estimated to be as much as 1.2 terabytes per second, not  
only interrupted the DNS system, but also created the problem of 
“recursive DNS retry traffic, further exacerbating its impact” (Hilton 
2016). The “attack vector” shifted across several worldwide regions, 
beginning “in the Asia Pacific, South America, Eastern Europe, and 
US-West regions” and then shifting to the eastern US (ibid.). The attack 
was launched in two stages, the first lasting for two hours between 
11:10 UTC to 13:20 UTC; and the second taking place from 15:50 UTC to 
17:00 UTC. 
 Mirai is set within a wider landscape of increasing DDoS 
attacks, and is one of two now well-known botnets — the other being 
Bashlight — that together are estimated to have control of up to 1.2 
million devices (Goodin 2016). Mirai works by first IP scanning for 
vulnerable devices, and then brute forcing devices with a list of over 
60 default usernames and passwords, many of which are from devices 
made with components from XiongMai Technologies in China (Krebs 
2016). Mirai targets Linux devices using BusyBox, which is free software 
that provides Unix tools in a single executable binary file. These 
devices that can read the language of an introduced binary file will 
treat it as a series of instructions, and the binary file does not require 
compiling or further action in order to run. 
 Once the Mirai botnet malware is on the device, it then performs 
a series of functions, including kicking off (or killing) other malware 
from the device and securing (or killing, again) port 22 (SSH traffic) 
to avoid restarting and port 23 (Telnet traffic) so as to avoid botnet 
competition (Bashlight being the most obvious next competitor that 
would be commanding vulnerable ports). Mirai also establishes a 
connection between the infected device and the home command and 
control (C&C) server to add it to the botnet, and to await instructions. 
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A DDoS attack can then be undertaken through the controlled device. 
In principle, other types of distributed computing could also be 
undertaken with the botnet. In this sense, the botnet becomes more 
than a bit of malware, since through the execution of Mirai on multiple 
vulnerable devices a distributed computational infrastructure is 
formed that could be used for multiple purposes, although DDoS 
attacks have been the most common type of command. Activities are 
conducted from bots, and not directly from the main machine of attack, 
and an algorithm for assigning dynamic domain addresses can also 
ensure that the command and control server is difficult to trace. 
 After the Dyn attack, Anna-senpai, the hacker assumed to have 
executed several attacks, made the source code of Mirai openly 
available on GitHub (some suggest as a way to dump the code and 
cover the tracks of the attacker, thereby multiplying executors and 
executions through others taking up and using the code). On the 
GitHub repository for the Mirai source code, Anna-senpai notes in 
ForumPost.md that up to 300,000 hosts could be identified and infected 
per attack using Mirai (Anna-senpai 2016). Within the source code, 
there are instructions not only for gaining access to bots and ensuring 
communication, but also for setting the terms of a DDoS attack, such 
as the duration of the activity and maximum number of bots involved. 
Botnets of infected devices can also be rented out for attacks, and 
further analysis of the Dyn attack suggests that rented bots from 
multiple locations formed part of the attack on their DNS infrastructure 
(Gallagher 2016). In this sense, there is an economy of executions 
emerging, where executed and executable devices can be hired into 
“attack vectors” at key moments and for particular assaults. 
 The types of execution that the Mirai malware performs are 
notable in several ways. First, its infection of IoT devices demonstrates 
not only that these are vulnerable technologies, but also that they 
can be turned into vectors for attacking other computational devices 
and infrastructures. Second, it extends execution and executability 
into a network of distributed computing that reworks the “sites of 
execution” (Snodgrass on Howse) not only beyond a single machine, 
but also into anticipatory events and temporalities (Soon) that are 
here dependent upon attacks to be launched and money to be made. 
Third, it points to the moment at which execution comes up against 
the limits of the executable, since Mirai, Bashlight and its yet-to-be-
developed competitors, could bring down Internet functions to make 
the communicative exchanges of “smart” devices untenable. This  
could generate a sluggish IoT device, or it could derail a key bit of 
smart infrastructure, or anything in between. Execution involves much 
more than running instructions, and Mirai further points to the ways  
in which these command and control dynamics are, as Gauthier 
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suggests in this volume, severely “under-theorised”. By way of 
concluding this Afterword and discussion of Mirai as a sprawling 
example of execution, I now turn to consider how these ways of reverse 
engineering devices and performing reverse executions might be 
theorised in relation to the chapters in this collection. 
Reverse executions
If you make a motor turn in reverse, you do not break it:  
you build a refrigerator.
– Michel Serres, The Parasite
When Michel Serres suggested that the reversal of motors could 
produce entirely new mechanisms, he did so in the context of a 
discussion of how “systems function with several norms at a time” 
(1982, 68). A refrigerator as reversed mechanism does not break a  
system; instead it could introduce other motorised operations.  
Indeed, in relation to a system Serres further suggests: “The best  
way to succeed in it is to misconstrue it. The counter norm is never a 
noise of the norm but the same norm reversed, that is to say, its twin” 
(68). Such reversals to a system could be a way to “transform it in  
order to reinforce it” (69).
 Taking up this philosophy of reversals in relation to executions, 
and especially in relation to Mirai, we then find a somewhat 
different approach that might first deploy malware as an example of 
“oppositional tactics” to rework and exploit power within networks 
(Cox). But this exploitation of power within networks works just to the 
point of ensuring that botnet executions can continue to disrupt and 
threaten the collapse of a system, without finally destroying the very 
system upon which they rely. Dyn noted that not only did the attack on 
their service draw attention to the security flaws of IoT devices, but 
also it raised questions “about the future of the internet” (Hilton 2016). 
In a related conversation, security researcher Bruce Schneier has 
suggested that “Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet” 
through recurring and larger DDoS attacks that look “as if the attacker 
were looking for the exact point of failure” within any given system 
under attack (Schneier 2016).
 But perhaps the execution that Mirai performs is not one of 
absolutely crashing the Internet, but of demonstrating that this is  
the possibility of an unchecked set of executions performed through 
distributed computing. The reverse engineering of IoT devices 
highlights how reverse executions could terminate the very ability  
to execute, but then the botnets would be terminated along with these 
final executions. The reversal does not absolutely break the motor,  
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as Serres suggests. Instead, it builds another kind of machine within  
the same system. A botnet that could hold machines to ransom and 
decide when and how they operate, and under what conditions, would 
be such a shadowy refrigerator — performing reverse executions in 
order to ensure that some executions and executables have priority 
over others, and that some might even be silenced or extinguished.
 Reverse executions are then potentially generative of other 
programmatic relations. While a DDoS attack might attempt to bring 
down web sites, hosts or infrastructures, security measures are  
also generated to counter and diffuse the attack. At the same time,  
a whole set of other actions are set in motion, from communities 
analysing and developing responses to the attack execution matrix,  
to policy measures for increasing security on IoT devices, to calls  
for manufacturer responsibility for the vulnerability of devices, to 
further attacks and hijacking of devices. The running of instructions,  
as many of the chapters in this collection indicate, is then only one  
part of an extended environment of execution.
 Most “users” of infected devices do not know that their devices 
have been compromised. A sluggish performance due to reduced 
bandwidth could be one clue. Or an inability to access controlled  
ports could be another one. Numerous forecasts for the growth of the 
IoT suggest that billions of devices are still to be introduced. Krebs,  
the security journalist whose website was also targeted by a Mirai 
DDoS attack, notes: 
There are plenty of new, default-insecure IoT devices being 
plugged into the Internet each day. Gartner Inc. forecasts  
that 6.4 billion connected things will be in use worldwide in 
2016, up 30 percent from 2015, and will reach 20.8 billion  
by 2020. In 2016, 5.5 million new things will get connected  
each day, Gartner estimates. (Krebs 2016)
While on the one hand the Internet of Things could be seen to be  
a questionable technological adventure in saturating environments 
with resource-intensive computational devices,1 on the other hand 
the rise of these devices reworks the problems of executions and 
executables to enable surveillance, hijacking, ransoming, cybercrime 
and more. While technologies such as drones are rightly addressed 
in this collection as examples of “computational regimes” that raise 
questions of how to develop “a politics appropriate to these radical 
modes of calculation” (Schuppli), at the same time there are a whole 
host of more everyday devices that have become computational  
“attack vectors” that also fall within the scope of this question.  
If this is a form of “software insurgency” (Cox), then how might a 
malware-commanded botnet army of toasters and cameras begin to 
point toward other programmatic relations? From critter compilers 
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(Pritchard) to “comfortable forms of catastrophe” (Gallardo and 
Samson), the openings made into and through executions can 
demonstrate the shadowy commitments that inform the living and 
dying of our computational systems.
Notes 
1. For an extended discussion and 
critique of the environmental impact of 
the Internet of Things, see Gabrys 2016. 
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